














In the past decades, translation studies have increasingly focused on the ethical 
dimension of translational activity, with an emphasis on reflexivity to assert the role 
of the researcher in highlighting issues of visibility, creativity and ethics. In Reflexive 
Translation Studies, Silvia Kadiu investigates the viability of theories that seek to 
empower translation by making visible its transformative dimension; for example, by 
championing the visibility of the translating subject, the translator’s right to creativity, 
the supremacy of human translation or an autonomous study of translation.
Inspired by Derrida’s deconstructive thinking, Kadiu presents practical ways of 
challenging theories that suggest reflexivity is the only way of developing an ethical 
translation. She questions the capacity of reflexivity to counteract the power relations 
at play in translation (between minor and dominant languages, for example) and 
problematises affirmative claims about (self-)knowledge by using translation itself as a 
process of critical reflection.
In exploring the interaction between form and content, Reflexive Translation Studies 
promotes the need for an experimental, multi-sensory and intuitive practice, which 
invites students, scholars and practitioners alike to engage with theory productively and 
creatively through translation.
Silvia Kadiu is a translator and academic. She is currently a Visiting Lecturer in the 
Department of Modern Languages and Cultures at the University of Westminster, London. 
She holds a PhD in Translation Studies from UCL, and is the author of several articles on 
translation theory, literary translation and translation pedagogy.
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Literature and Translation is a series for books that address literary 
translation and for books of literary translation. Its emphasis is on 
diversity of genre, culture, period and approach. The series uses an open 
access publishing model to disseminate widely developments in the 
theory and practice  of translation, as well as translations into English of 
literature from around the world. 
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This book presents a creative translation practice which I hope will inspire 
students, practitioners and scholars to experiment with the boundaries 
of translation beyond conventional acceptations of the term as a transfer 
of meaning from one language to another. My approach in this volume 
uses the movement of crossing at play in translation as a way of engaging 
with existing theory, while reflecting on that translating experience and 
unfolding in response a view of what translation is or could be about. 
Its premise is that translation theory – the way we perceive, describe or 
think about translation – is inevitably interwoven with practice. Here, 
theorising takes place during the translating process itself, in the act of 
undertaking a translation and attempting to articulate our experience of 
it, of facing a translation dilemma and reflecting on possible solutions. 
In this framework, translation is conceived as a productive process 
which enables an experiential, tangible mode of thinking. Engaging 
critically with a piece of theory by translating it constitutes a creative 
gesture. It presupposes that the text chosen for translation demands 
further exploration and interrogation, and that recontextualising it 
through translation may bring to light new perspectives on translation. 
Ultimately, this book celebrates the critical and creative power of 
translation, its potential for questioning established concepts and 
creating new ones in the process. Its invitation to apprehend texts 
through translation extends beyond translation studies, to students and 
scholars across the humanities, as well as to practitioners and thinkers 
beyond academia.
Using translation as an instrument for critical reflection may prove 
constructive in a variety of ways. In the context of this volume, my focus 
is on translating theoretical texts from English into French and vice versa. 
However, I would like to invite readers to look beyond the confines of my 
practice and consider the range of possibilities that engaging with any 
given material – text, film, painting – through translation (transcreation, 
adaptation, ekphrasis) may instigate in their own discipline or field.
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INTRODUCTION 1
Introduction:
Genesis of a reflexive method in 
translation
Translation theories calling for reflexivity
The rapid development of translation studies as a discipline since 
the 1990s, ‘a period that experienced a boom in translation theory,’1 
has seen a proliferation of theories calling for greater reflexivity in 
translation, which raise issues of visibility, creativity and ethics. Four 
Western scholars in particular – all of whom also had or still have careers 
as practising translators – have been prominent in emphasising the need 
for a reflexive practice of translation: Lawrence Venuti, Susan Bassnett, 
Henri Meschonnic and Antoine Berman. This book presents a creative 
way of exploring their theories. It examines the thinkers’ approaches to 
translation in both form and content, offering critical readings of their 
theories as well as practical translations of the texts that articulate them. 
In The Translator’s Invisibility,2 Lawrence Venuti argues that 
increased awareness of a translation’s conditions of production is 
necessary for an ethical translation practice, since translation involves a 
degree of ethnocentric violence that tends to erase the cultural specificity 
of the source text. For Venuti, a translation that highlights its own status 
as translation is ethical in that, instead of attempting to dissimulate the 
domesticating forces at play in translational activity, it draws attention 
to, and raises awareness of, the cultural differences between source 
and target texts.3 In his view, the translator has an ethical obligation 
to indicate the otherness of the foreign text when importing it into the 
target culture.
In her essay ‘Writing and Translating’,4 Susan Bassnett focuses on 
a different aspect of reflexivity in translation: the question of creativity. 
For her, translating is a form of writing which triggers a dialogic 
interaction between author and translator, an intimate relation in 
which the translator becomes aware of her own creative voice.5 In 
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Bassnett’s approach, reflexivity is not a matter of making a text’s status 
as translation visible, but of recognising the inspirational and creative 
impulse prompted by translation. According to Bassnett, translating is 
a conscious and reflexive form of writing, a playful and poetic activity, 
comparable to theatrical performance. 
In Ethics and Politics of Translating,6 Henri Meschonnic also insists 
on the creative aspect of translation. In Meschonnic’s view, translating is 
above all an inventive, poetic and transformative enterprise, during which 
language and life interact. For Meschonnic, theory and practice cannot 
be separated in translation because translation always involves a reflexive 
decision-making process, which manifests in return the translator’s 
relation to language and to translating.7 Except when it is automated, 
translation, in his view, always expresses a theoretical position: the 
translator’s perception of language and engagement with the world. 
Similarly, in Toward a Translation Criticism,8 Antoine Berman argues 
that translators and translation scholars should reflect on translation 
in a way that combines theoretical considerations with the experience 
of translation. For Berman, reflecting on the act of translating, and 
developing a self-reflexive theory of translation, is crucial for liberating 
translation from its ethnocentric impulse and from the repressed status 
from which it has suffered in the past.9 In Berman’s work, an ethical 
approach to translation is inseparable from a reflexive study of translation 
– that is, from disciplinary self-reflexivity. 
In their own way, each theorist suggests that self-awareness is a 
key requirement for an ethical practice of translation. By advocating 
the visibility of the translating subject (Venuti), the translator’s right to 
creativity (Bassnett), the supremacy of human translation (Meschonnic) 
and an autonomous study of translation (Berman), they seek to liberate 
translation from its ethnocentric violence (Venuti), from the demands 
of fidelity (Bassnett), from mechanical representations of language 
(Meschonnic) and from its dependence on other disciplines (Berman). 
In championing reflexivity, their ultimate aim is to empower translation, 
both as a professional practice and as an academic discipline. 
The purpose of this book is to explore whether reflexivity, as 
presented by each of these scholars, can bring about the empowerment 
that they seek. To what extent can reflexivity foster an ethical practice 
of translation? Can reflexivity provide an effective translation 
methodology? And what can reflexive translation strategies tell us about 
the role, scope and nature of reflexivity in translation? The experimental 
approach I develop to address these questions is itself both reflexive and 
self-reflexive. Using translation as an instrument for critical reflection, 
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the method I showcase here consists of translating translation theory by 
folding it back on the text that formulates it. Operating simultaneously 
on theoretical and practical levels, it inquires into reflexivity through 
reflexivity, reflecting on reflexive translation theories by translating them 
according to their own guiding principles. 
A reflexive method in translation
The reflexive practice presented in this book is inspired by Jacques 
Derrida’s deconstructionist approach in ‘Des Tours de Babel’. In this text, 
Derrida attempts an intralingual translation of Walter Benjamin’s 1923 
essay ‘The Task of the Translator’, to reflect on Benjamin’s translation 
theory.10 In discussing and trying to enact specific aspects of Benjamin’s 
essay, Derrida also develops and showcases his own philosophy of 
translation: the idea that translation is impossible yet necessary. Derrida 
chooses to translate Benjamin’s theory in a Benjaminian way both to 
explore and to actualise this double bind of translation, which consists 
in the simultaneous necessity and impossibility to translate, exemplified 
by the word ‘Babel’, an untranslatable proper noun meaning at the same 
time father, God and confusion. 
Reflecting on the polysemy of the term ‘Babel’, Derrida undertakes 
an intralingual translation of Maurice de Gandillac’s French translation 
of Benjamin’s text into French – an endeavour that he presents as follows:
This singular example [the word Babel], at once archetypical 
and allegorical, could serve as an introduction to all the so-called 
theoretical problems of translation. But no theorization, inasmuch 
as it is produced in a language, will be able to dominate the Babelian 
performance. This is one of the reasons why I prefer here, instead 
of treating it in the theoretical mode, to attempt to translate in my 
own way the translation of another text on translation.11
For Derrida, theorisation is unable to dominate the Babelian performance 
(the polysemy of the word Babel, which makes its translation both 
necessary and impossible), because this performance is itself embedded 
in a language. To think about translation, Derrida prefers to engage in 
translation, choosing to describe translation by practising translation. 
My approach in this book is comparable. The experimental 
translations that I propose as possible interpretations of the translation 
theories examined offer practical ways of exploring theories which suggest 
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that reflexivity is the only way of developing an ethical translation. The 
sample translations presented in each chapter serve to illustrate the main 
concepts of the reflexive theory under scrutiny, as well as my response 
to it, by providing concrete examples of what a reflexive translation may 
look like in each case. These translations are conceived as a creative and 
critical form of engagement with key contemporary translation theories. 
They question the capacity of reflexivity to counteract the power relations 
at play in translation, and problematise affirmative claims about (self-)
knowledge in translation. 
The reflexive method is rooted in the idea that stating is performing 
an act. First theorised in the 1950s by the English philosopher John 
Langshaw Austin, the concept of performativity establishes that words 
do something in the world, something which is not just a matter of 
generating consequences. According to Austin, in speech acts, words are 
actions in themselves: they are ‘performed’ and make a difference in the 
world.12 Common examples of speech acts include promising, naming 
and declaring. Extending his definition of performativity to all utterances, 
Austin suggests that any statement may function as performative, since it 
may be doing by saying something. The reflexive method in translation is 
performative in that it proposes to enact the source text by simultaneously 
doing and saying what it says/does. Saying and doing, word and spirit, 
form and content are co-dependent in this approach.
The idea that form and content are inseparable is largely recognised 
in literary translation, and poetry especially.13 When it comes to 
translations of theoretical texts, however, the emphasis so far has mostly 
been on the way concepts travel,14 rather than on how form and content 
interact in the process of the transfer from one context to another. 
Embracing the idea that form and content, saying and doing, text and 
metatext interconnect in translation, my reflexive approach in this book 
offers an analysis of the particular operation of reflexivity involved in the 
translation of translation theory: the fact that the medium of expression 
(translation) is enmeshed with the object of the discourse (translation). 
For, when translating translation theory, the translator finds herself 
performing the activity discussed in the source text itself: her task as a 
translator mirrors the practice described in the text she translates.
Translating translation theory
The translation of translation theory is a relatively neglected area of 
inquiry in translation studies. In recent decades, however, a growing 
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number of studies have emerged that reflect on the expansion of the 
discipline. Some report the rise of university programmes,15 others 
highlight the proliferation of new journals and publications in the field,16 
while others still describe which translation theories are taught as part 
of these programmes,17 or attempt to map the ways in which research 
interests in the discipline have shifted throughout the years.18 Despite the 
growing interest in meta-disciplinary questions, however, comprehensive 
accounts of the translations of translation theory remain scarce.
Jacques Derrida’s ‘Des Tours de Babel’ and Lawrence Venuti’s 
‘Translating Derrida on Translation’ are two of the very few examples 
of article-length writings reflecting on the practice of translating 
translation theory. In fact, even these two texts are not, so to speak, 
reflections on translating translation theory per se. ‘Des Tours de Babel’ 
is a reflection on translation which presents itself as an act of translation, 
rather than a reflection on translating theory, while ‘Translating Derrida 
on Translation’ starts off as a reflection on translating Derrida’s ‘What 
is a “Relevant” Translation?’ but rapidly digresses into a discussion of 
translation in cultural studies.19 
At the time of writing, there is no single volume specifically devoted 
to the translations of translation theory, no study that attempts to 
theorise this particular practice of translation. Everything that has 
been written so far on the subject appears in scattered form, either as 
prefaces to actual translations of theoretical texts on translation (see 
Françoise Massardier-Kenney on translating Berman’s Pour une critique 
des traductions)20 or in author interviews (see Pier-Pascale Boulanger on 
translating Meschonnic’s Éthique et politique du traduire).21 Interestingly, 
these writers, too, highlight the performative aspect of their work – 
the fact that they translated texts by mirroring the translation theories 
developed in those texts themselves. 
In the introduction to her English translation of Pour une critique 
des traductions, for example, Massardier-Kenney makes clear that her 
approach to translating Berman’s book was deliberately informed by 
Berman’s own translation theory: ‘The principles I used to translate 
Berman’s text,’ she points out, ‘were those proposed by Berman in the 
text itself.’22 Throughout her preface Massardier-Kenney explains her 
translational choices with reference to Berman’s ideas of translation. 
However, she does not explicitly state why applying Berman’s theory 
would be more appropriate than translating his text in another way, as 
though for her a performative approach was unquestionably the best way 
of translating Berman.
Similarly, in an interview with René Lemieux and Caroline Mangerel, 
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Boulanger supports her approach to translating Meschonnic by saying 
that ‘Meschonnic must be translated according to his own conception of 
translation.’23 In the introduction to her translation of Éthique et politique 
du traduire, she further explains:
In order to keep the reader’s attention, I could have worked to flatten 
the reading bumps to correct, smooth English, but this would have 
constituted domestication, which contradicts Meschonnic’s idea 
of translating. He clearly outlines what should be translated in a 
text when he says that ‘we must invent discourse equivalences in 
the target language: prosody for prosody, metaphor for metaphor, 
pun for pun, rhythm for rhythm’ (see p.71). So I decided to apply 
Meschonnic’s theory of translating to translating Meschonnic’s 
theory. This decision implied doing to English what he did to 
French, resisting conventional forms in the translation as he does 
in his writing.24
In saying that translating Meschonnic faithfully meant following his own 
vision, Boulanger implies that when translating translation theory, a 
performative approach is always preferable. 
Joseph F. Graham’s translation of Derrida’s ‘Des Tours de Babel’ 
provides another example of a performative perspective on translating 
translation theory. In a note to his English version of Derrida’s text, 
Graham indicates that the principles guiding his translation of Derrida’s 
essay were also those found in the text itself: 
There was consolation for so much effort to so little effect in that, 
whatever we did, we were bound to exhibit the true principles 
of translation announced in our text. And so this translation 
is exemplary to that extent. To the extent that we were guided 
in translation, the principles were also those found in the text. 
Accordingly, a silhouette of the original appears for effect in many 
words and phrases of the translation.25
In this note, Graham suggests that despite its shortcomings, his English 
translation of ‘Des Tours de Babel’ remains faithful to the French original 
because it exemplifies the central idea articulated by Derrida in this 
piece: the impossibility yet necessity to translate. 
Translating translation theory seems intuitively to call for a reflexive 
approach. It triggers an uncanny mirroring effect, as the translator finds 
herself performing the activity that the theorist discusses in the text to 
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translate. Translating translation theory thus brings about the possibility 
of new forms of fidelity in translation. In the context of such practice, 
the demand of fidelity to the source text appears to apply simultaneously 
to form and content, as though translating the original differently than 
according to its own guiding principles would mean betraying it. When 
translating translation theory, the ideas articulated in the source text 
tend to dictate the way it ought to be translated, seemingly leaving 
the translator no other choice but to translate the text reflexively by 
attempting to apply the theorist’s vision to the text itself. 
Reflexivity, performativity, deconstruction
In this monograph, translating a theoretical text in the light of its 
own theory is developed into an instrument of critical and self-
critical inquiry. The ambition is both to explore the applicability of 
translation theories advocating greater reflexivity and to inspect the 
unique form of reflexiveness involved in the translation of translation 
theory. Studying the reflexive experience prompted by the activity 
of translating translation theory is essential to understanding the 
nature of performativity in translation. As an extreme manifestation 
of the fusion of form and content, signifier and signified, theory and 
practice, translating reflexively brings into question a defining aspect 
of fidelity in translation – the opposition letter vs. spirit which has 
preoccupied thinkers of translation for centuries. By moving beyond this 
opposition, the operation of reflexivity at play in translating translation 
theory provides the grounds for a tangible exploration of the possible 
applications of a performative approach to translation.
What does it mean to simultaneously do and say a text by translating 
it? To what extent is such a practice feasible? And what would its benefits 
and limits be? The reflexive method showcased in this book is deliberately 
deconstructive in nature. Following Derrida’s own deconstructionist 
approach, it strives ‘to undo a construction with infinite patience, to take 
apart a system in order to understand all its mechanisms, to exhibit all 
its foundations, and to reconstruct on new bases’.26 Using translation 
to think about translation, the reflexive method aims to untangle the 
structures of the texts translated by exposing their internal contradictions, 
furthermore building on these aporias to develop a critical and self-
critical mode of theorising reflexivity in translation. 
In this perspective, the reflexive method offers a practical exploration 
of a deconstructionist approach to translation. Derrida’s writings have 
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been widely influential in translation studies. His essays ‘Des Tours de 
Babel’ and ‘What is a “Relevant” Translation’, which subvert traditional 
views of translation as a secondary, inferior form of expression, have 
become canonical texts, foregrounding the importance of critical 
inquiries in the discipline.27 However, his contribution to translation is 
often considered too abstract or inapplicable.28 Moreover, translation 
scholars invoking his work as a source of inspiration tend to focus on the 
notion of untranslatability,29 rather than on the necessity to translate. 
Thereby they occlude the fact that for Derrida deconstruction itself is 
an operation of translation and transformation – a process that ‘consists 
of transference, and of a thinking of transference, in all the senses that 
this word acquires in more than one language, and first of all that of the 
transference between languages’.30
In this book, I experiment with the reflexive method and explore it as a 
possible application of a deconstructionist approach to translation. Unlike 
interpretations which give priority to the concept of untranslatability in 
Derrida’s work, my own approach advances the notion that Derrida’s 
deconstructionist philosophy is in fact unthinkable without a creative, 
experimental practice of translation. My analysis of the particular form 
of reflexiveness involved in the translation of translation theory seeks to 
provide new insight into the articulation of reflexivity in translation, and 
ethics of translation beyond that. For in various ways, the four theorists 
discussed in this book associate reflexivity with ethics, and my intention 
ultimately is to question the scope and limits of an ethical practice of 
translation based on the opposition between reflexive and non-reflexive 
approaches.
Reflexive, self-reflexive, self-critical
Reflexivity is an important but slippery topic, which may conjure up 
a variety of concepts. In some social theories, reflexivity refers to an 
essential human capacity; in others, it is a system property; in still 
others, it is a critical, or self-critical, act. In ‘Against Reflexivity as an 
Academic Virtue and Source of Privileged Knowledge’,31 Michael Lynch 
identifies six main categories of reflexivity (mechanical, substantive, 
methodological, meta-theoretical, interpretative and ethno-
methodological), four of which are themselves subdivided into further 
sub-categories. 
Lynch’s classification of reflexivity, which I have summarised in the 
table below, provides a good overview of its complexity:
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Table 0.1: Summary of Michael Lynch’s classification of reflexivity32









In behaviourist psychology, a 




A circular process 
involving feedback 
loops. 
Models using mechanistic imagery, 
but emphasising a humanistic sense 
of reflexivity as self-reflection. 
Reflections ad 
infinitum
An infinite regress of 
reflections.
Halls of mirrors, the Möbius strip, 





Modes of social 
inquiry relying upon 
expert knowledge.
Risk benefit analysis, economic 
forecasts, opinion polling, etc.
Reflexive social 
construction
Subscription to the 
reality of socially 
constructed facts.
The way consensual beliefs give 
rise to objective social institutions 








Self-inspection and rejection of 





The attempt to 
correct biases that 
distort or confound 
access to the object 
of study.
Researchers considering their 




aiming to enhance 
epistemic value.
Confessional ethnography, anti-
objectivistic styles of discourse 






Applying the same indices of 
‘maturation’ in the natural sciences 





An objectivation of 
the social field. 
Critically revaluing what members 
of a given field take for granted. 
Standpoint 
reflexivity
A reflexive critique 
of dominant 
discourse. 
Subjecting one’s own framework to 
criticism.
Breaking frame
An exposure and 
realisation of the 
conjurer’s tricks.
Film or painting calling attention to 
the illusionist techniques deployed 





A style of 
interpretation 
based on the 
reader’s active 
interpretation.
A sociologist’s self-critical 
interpretation (vs. ordinary 






with, and sceptical 
treatment of, 
representation. 
An analysis problematising or 
deconstructing positive claims 
about knowledge without 
distinction or exemption.
Ethnomethodological reflexivity
The reflexivity of 
accounting practices 
and accounts.
An ethnographic description 
(which explains the features of 
a specific setting, but uses the 
setting itself to make sense of the 
description).
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Each of the types of reflexivity listed by Lynch involves some form of 
‘recursive turning back’: a return, a repetition or a folding back. However, 
what the turning back does, how it does it and what its implications are 
vary from category to category, as well as within a given category. 
Furthermore, the boundaries between these various aspects 
of reflexivity are not clear-cut, but fuzzy, interdependent. 
Ethnomethodological reflexivity, for example – the correlation between a 
fact and its description – is simultaneously methodological and substantive, 
for it involves both philosophical self-reflection and subscription to the 
reality of socially constructed facts. Interpretative reflexivity, on the other 
hand, which includes reading, thinking, contemplating or making sense of 
an object or text, is prominent in most categories, including substantive, 
methodological and meta-theoretical reflexivity. The main challenge of 
dealing with the notion of reflexivity lies first and foremost in identifying 
and clarifying its multiple and shifting meanings, the nuances surrounding 
its various uses and its overlap with other key notions such as reflection, 
self-reference and self-reflexivity.
The distinction between reflexivity (folding something back on itself) 
and self-reflexivity (pointing to or reflecting upon oneself) is particularly 
unstable and hazy. The process of translating translation theory is at once 
reflexive and self-reflexive. The mirroring, self-reflexive effect prompted 
by the act of performing the activity discussed in the source text seems 
to instigate a performative, reflexive approach that incites translators to 
fold the theory they translate back on itself. Hence, in most cases, my 
use of the term ‘reflexivity’ also encompasses the notion of self-reflexivity. 
Later in the book, however, the distinction between these two concepts 
will emerge more clearly as a result of the sample translations I present 
in each chapter. 
The texts discussed in this monograph each address a different 
aspect of reflexivity in translation. Venuti’s argument in favour of a 
foreignizing practice that strives to secure the visibility of a translation’s 
status as translation falls within the categories of breaking frame (an 
exposure and realisation of the translator’s tricks) and standpoint 
reflexivity (a critique of the ethnocentric discourse prevailing in Anglo-
American culture). Bassnett’s approach to translation as a subjective 
engagement with the source text relies on hermeneutic reflexivity, a style 
of interpretation based on the translator’s creative reading of the text to 
translate. The opposition poetics vs. mechanics underlying Meschonnic’s 
theory is founded on the distinction between hermeneutic reflexivity 
(the translator’s subjective interpretation of the source text) and 
mechanical reflexivity (a thoughtless, automatic response to a stimulus). 
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And Berman’s call for disciplinary self-reflexivity is a form of reflexive 
objectivation, which consists in critically revaluing the role of translation 
studies in the articulation of translation and ethics.
My own approach, and use of translation as a critical instrument, 
is inscribed in a reflexive and self-critical praxis that interrogates 
affirmative claims about knowledge and self-knowledge in translation. 
The reflexive method is unstable and continuously changing, mirroring 
the object under scrutiny even while critically challenging it. Translating 
reflexively will mean different things in relation to the different texts 
examined. It requires redefining reflexivity in each context of use, 
determining what it signifies for each of the theorists and what it brings 
into play for their respective theories. Overall, this approach attempts to 
characterise the various expressions of reflexivity in translation, their 
complex articulation with ethics, and the extent to which reflexivity is 
possible, preferable or even avoidable in each case. 
The treatment of reflexivity in this book thus operates concurrently 
on three levels: (1) thematically, in the object of analysis (the reflexive 
translation theories analysed); (2) methodologically, in the method of 
analysis (folding a theory back on itself); and (3) self-critically, on a meta-
disciplinary level (reflecting on the benefits and limits of the reflexive 
method adopted). The multiple layers of reflexivity at play – within the 
text, in the translating process and from a scholarly perspective – are often 
difficult to untangle and therefore constantly challenge the researcher’s 
own self-awareness. These challenges will themselves be examined and 
discussed throughout this work. 
What is translation theory?
In his seminal paper entitled ‘The Name and Nature of Translation 
Studies’, James Holmes describes the then-emerging discipline known 
as translation studies as being concerned with ‘the complex of problems 
clustered round the phenomenon of translating and translations’.33 He 
identifies two main branches in the discipline: on the one hand, ‘pure 
research’, which includes ‘translation theory’ (the establishment of 
general principles to explain or predict translation phenomena); and 
on the other hand, ‘applied translation studies’, in which the findings of 
pure research are applied in ‘actual translation situations, in translation 
training, and in translation criticism’.34 In Holmes’ categorisation, then, 
translation theory is a subcategory of research within the wider discipline 
of translation studies.
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However, the use of the term has created some confusion in the 
field, for several scholars have employed it to refer to the discipline of 
translation studies as a whole. Anton Popovič, for example, defines 
translation theory as a ‘discipline engaged in the systematic study of 
translation’,35 while Peter Newmark describes it as ‘the body of knowledge 
that we have and have still to have about the process of translating’.36 As 
Mark Shuttleworth and Moira Cowie point out, though, such definitions 
gradually came to represent the minority in the discipline, as the term 
became more and more used in the sense of Holmes’s categorisation, 
taking on a meaning which is closer to that of ‘theory’ in the natural 
sciences: ‘a specific attempt to explain in a systematic way some or all of 
the phenomena related to translation’.37 
In the Encyclopedia of Applied Linguistics, Maria Tymoczko defines 
translation theory, following definition 4 of ‘theory’ in the Compact Oxford 
English Dictionary, as ‘a scheme or system of ideas or statements held as 
an explanation or account of a group of facts or phenomena’, which she 
opposes to the ‘loose or general sense’ of definition 6, ‘an idea or set of 
ideas about something; an individual view or notion’.38 According to 
Tymoczko, translation scholars do not consistently maintain a distinction 
between these different meanings. For her, the term ‘translation 
theory’ should only be used to refer to ‘the development and testing of 
hypotheses’.39 Natural scientific approaches like Tymoczko’s are more 
and more debated, however – notably by translation theorists who 
make a deliberate choice to use the term ‘theory’ in the general sense of 
individual views or notions. 
Jean Boase-Beier, for instance, defines theory as ‘a partial description 
(mental or perhaps written down) of a segment of reality’, which, 
she stresses, quoting Iser, is especially true in the humanities, where 
theories ‘do not embody laws that make predictions, but rather search 
for metaphors adequate to the description of the phenomena in question 
in order to understand them’.40 For Boase-Beier, translation theories are 
partial, descriptive accounts which represent different ways of seeing 
and practising translation. Deconstructionist scholar Joseph F. Graham 
goes even further, challenging the very idea that elaborating an all-
encompassing theory of translation is possible. Translations, he suggests, 
comprise an indefinite and fuzzily distinguished set of problems that 
differ sufficiently from each other to undermine any single theoretical 
framework.41
In this book, the term ‘translation theory’ is intentionally used in 
the broad sense of individual views or notions about translation, so as 
to account not only for the experiential, subjective and partial nature of 
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the theories that I consider, but also my manner of considering them. 
The texts examined in subsequent chapters are acknowledged works 
of theory through which the authors present their own perspectives 
on translation phenomena – perspectives that centre primarily on their 
personal experience of translation, or perception of what translation is or 
should be about. In response to these texts, my reflexive practice presents 
a performative, process-driven form of theorising through which I 
compose my own approach to translation. 
My use of the word ‘theory’ is close to Anthony Pym’s. In Exploring 
Translation Theories, Pym draws on the Greek etymology of the term 
‘theory’ (theā, view + horan, to see), stressing its analogy with the 
word ‘theatre’ to define translation theory as ‘the scene where the 
generation and selection process takes place’.42 In Pym’s approach, 
translators are theorising all the time as part of their practice, since 
they generate translations by formulating various alternatives and then 
choosing between them to determine their definitive translation. While 
translating, translators constantly think ‘what translation is and how it 
should be carried out’.43 They theorise translation internally as part of 
the translating process, thus developing a certain view of how to practise 
translation. 
In this work, theorising may thus refer to: 1) the decision-making 
process at play in translation (the mental formation of an individual 
perception of translation through translation); 2) the formulation of 
metaphors and/or explanations designed to describe translation (the 
written account through which an individual perception is expressed); 3) 
the operation of inquiring about the applicability of specific theories (the 
adoption and development of a critical positioning in response to existing 
statements about translation). My overall approach is qualitative rather 
than quantitative in nature. Its aim is not to provide a general account 
of reflexivity in translation (its regularities, tendencies, frequencies, 
distributions), nor to quantify how typical or widespread it is (how much 
of it there is), but to reflect on the various manifestations of reflexivity in 
translation through the actual practice of this activity. 
Reflexive translation studies
In the past decades, translation studies has increasingly focused on 
the ethical dimension of translational activity, emphasising reflexivity 
to assert the role of the researcher in understanding and highlighting 
the ethical issues at stake.44 The main ambition of these translation 
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theories has been to counteract the power relations at play in translation 
(between minor and dominant languages, for example) by making 
visible the transformative dimension of translation itself. The main idea 
underlying this line of thought is that, in order to highlight manipulation 
in translation (such as a stereotypical representation of the source 
culture), research must itself be reflexive and think about the conditions 
of its own emergence. This is necessary because, like the translator, the 
researcher is ‘constantly faced by choices, choices he can make only on 
the basis of his individual grasp (knowledge, sensibility, experience...) of 
the two languages and cultures involved, and with the aid of his personal 
tastes and preferences’.45 The selection and interpretation of concepts, 
metaphors and theories is not only determined by their empirical, 
objective applicability; it is also influenced by the researcher’s feelings, 
personal ideologies and motives. Reflection and self-reflection upon 
these conditions of research is therefore key to the empowering capacity 
of that reflection itself.
Several scholars have emphasised the need for increased reflexivity in 
conducting research on translation. At the outset of the discipline, James 
Holmes registers a moment of disciplinary self-awareness. According to 
him, ‘[t]ranslation studies has reached a stage where it is time to examine 
the subject itself’.46 More recently, Theo Hermans has suggested that 
the self-observations that come with the maturation of every discipline 
‘[oblige] us to reconsider not just what we know, but how we know’.47 
Like Hermans, Mona Baker stresses the importance of the role of the 
researcher in shaping the course of the research, and the subsequent need 
for increased attentiveness to the researching self.48 In adopting a reflexive 
methodology while simultaneously investigating the viability of the 
reflexive approach adopted, I am seeking here to serve as a step towards a 
better comprehension of the researching self in translation studies.
Reflexivity in research is built on an acknowledgement of the 
ideological and historical pressures forming researcher and researched 
alike. In its attempt to identify, acknowledge and act upon the constraints 
of a research project (location, subjects, process, theoretical context, 
data, etc.), reflexivity has important ethical implications. According 
to scholar Jay Ruby, failure to acknowledge the interests implicit in a 
critical agenda, or to assume value-free positions of neutrality, results in 
a ‘dishonest position’.49 The failure to acknowledge the interests implicit 
in any critical agenda is considered unethical because a project that 
affirms its neutrality perpetuates existing norms instead of attempting 
to reflect and act upon them. In the same way as ‘a theory of translation 
should attempt to empower translators-to-be and raise their conscience 
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as writers concerning the responsibility they will face in the seminal role 
they will play in the establishment of all sorts of relationships between 
cultures’,50 the aim of translation scholars ‘should be research and 
training that produces readers of translations and translators who are 
critically aware’.51
The reflexive methodology I adopt to explore the scope and confines 
of reflexive translation theories thus invites me, as a researcher, to 
also think reflexively about my own approach. The goal, however, is 
not so much to highlight my subjectivity as a researcher as to explore 
the extent to which such subjectivity can be highlighted at all. Focusing 
on the question of whether reflexivity can produce self-awareness, the 
sample translations I showcase and discuss in this book question the 
very possibility that one can ever be fully aware of, or make visible, the 
conditions at play in the production of a translation. To what extent 
can reflexivity be achieved in translation research? Can a researching 
translator ever be aware of the range of motivations behind her own 
translation choices? Finally, to what extent can research methods based 
on reflexivity be considered more ethical than non-reflexive approaches? 
If it is true that translation and research on translation can never be fully 
reflexive and self-reflexive, then the question of an ethics of translation 
needs to be reformulated beyond the concepts of visibility, self-awareness 
and intention which underlie current approaches to translation ethics. 
Translation theory in translator education
Translation theory plays a central role in translator education, and 
many scholars have underlined the benefits of theoretical instruction 
in translator training throughout the development of the discipline.52 
Translation theory is essential, according to these scholars, because it 
gives translators more options to choose from when they translate;53 
makes them aware of problems they may not have anticipated,54 and 
provides them with a metalanguage for explaining their choices.55 In 
other words, it helps them to make better-informed decisions.
Interestingly, many of the texts taught on such courses are themselves 
texts in translation. In Lawrence Venuti’s anthology Translation Studies 
Reader,56 for example, which is widely used in translator training 
programmes in the UK, we see that 13 out of the 32 theoretical texts 
listed (40%) have been translated into English from a foreign language. 
This proportion is even larger in Rainer Schulte and John Biguenet’s 
Theories of Translation,57 an anthology of essays containing 61% of 
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translated texts (13 out of 21). A look at the mandatory reading list of 
any postgraduate translation studies programme in the UK shows that 
many of the key texts taught as part of the curriculum are translations 
from foreign languages.
Analysing the nature of the shifts and challenges at play in 
translating translation theory is important for understanding the impact 
that translation may have on the dissemination of such texts and the 
academic response to them. Like any translation activity, translating 
theory involves interpretation and transformation, and perhaps even 
implies a degree of conscious or unconscious manipulation. A translated 
piece of theory will inevitably be different from the original. It will have 
a different effect on the way readers interact with it and interpret it. 
Students’ interpretation of a theoretical text is also likely to influence 
their perception of translation and their behaviour as translators when 
they enter the professional world. 
If students interpret Derrida’s concept of untranslatability as a 
deliberate gesture of resistance to translation, for example, they may be 
inclined subsequently, as literary translators, to retain ‘untranslatable’ 
words in the original language, words that have no established equivalent in 
the target language. If, on the other hand, they apprehend untranslatability 
as an inevitable dimension of the process of translating itself, they may 
be less likely to highlight the ‘untranslatability’ of these words and hence 
decide to translate them in a more creative or experimental way.
Raising these issues in the context of translator education is crucial 
in allowing both students and trainers to address the fact that the theory 
on which their training is based might itself be a translation. As Dilek 
Dizdar perceptively notes in the Handbook of Translation Studies, the 
‘reflexive turn’ in the discipline, which foregrounds ‘the untenable nature 
of a value-free and detached point-of-view’, requires that we ‘recognise 
that theory itself is ambivalent and contingent’.58 The reflexive method 
developed in this book aspires to encourage students and trainers to adopt 
a critical attitude towards the texts that they study or teach in translation, 
and thereby hopes to make a practical contribution to fostering critical 
thinking in translator education. 
Contents and structure
This volume is divided into four chapters, each of which centres on the 
work of a prominent translation theorist and the specific aspect(s) of 
reflexivity conjured up by his or her approach. 
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Chapter 1 deals with Lawrence Venuti’s concept of foreignization and 
its ethical significance in translation. In this chapter I explore the scope 
and limits of Venuti’s foreignizing approach by presenting and discussing 
a sample translation of the opening pages of The Translator’s Invisibility 
into French. I suggest that the ethics of visibility championed by Venuti 
cannot be secured or sustained, and showcase a reflexive translation 
practice which, unlike foreignization, productively thematises its own 
shortcomings. 
Chapter 2 centres on Susan Bassnett’s essay ‘Writing and Translating’, 
and her description of reflexivity in translation as an intimate dialogue 
between author and translator. In response to Bassnett’s dialogic 
metaphor, I provide an example of a performative translation of her text 
in the form of a colour-coded open letter addressed back to the author. 
Building on Bassnett’s subjective and personal approach, reflexivity in 
this chapter is conceived as the responsive enactment of a prior utterance. 
Chapter 3 focuses on my comparative experimentation with human 
and machine translations of an extract from Henri Meschonnic’s Éthique 
et politique du traduire. Putting side by side machine translation outputs 
and human versions of Meschonnic’s text, this chapter questions the 
hierarchy poetics vs. mechanics underlying Meschonnic’s claim that 
reflexivity is inherent to human translation – and ultimately shows that 
automation is itself traversed by reflexivity and uncertainty.
Chapter 4 explores Antoine Berman’s approach to reflexivity in 
translation through analysis of my back translations of excerpts from 
selected works by Berman: The Experience of The Foreign, ‘Translation 
and the Trials of the Foreign’ and Toward a Translation Criticism. These 
translations exemplify the challenges of an ethics of translation based on 
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Chapter 1
Visibility and Ethics
Lawrence Venuti’s foreignizing 
approach
From the moment the circle turns, that the book is wound back 
upon itself, that the book repeats itself, its self-identity receives 
an imperceptible difference which allows us to step effectively, 
rigorously, and thus discreetly, out of the closure. Redoubling the 
closure, one splits it. Then one escapes it furtively, between two 
passages through the same book, through the same line, following 
the same blend (…). This departure outside of the identical within 
the same remains very slight, it weighs nothing, it thinks and weighs 
the book as such. The return to the book is also the abandoning of 
the book.
G.W.F. Hegel1
Lawrence Venuti’s seminal work, The Translator’s Invisibility, opens 
with a quotation by American translator Norman Shapiro, which Venuti 
indirectly uses to criticise the idea – implied by Shapiro – that a good 
translation should not draw attention to itself but be transparent like ‘a 
pane of glass’.2 For Venuti, Shapiro’s approach, which is symptomatic of 
the regime of fluency prevailing in the Anglophone world, is problematic 
because by concealing the transformative component of translational 
activity, the transparent translation erases the foreignness of the foreign 
text and the translator’s inscription in the translated text. Coining the 
concept of  foreignization, Venuti advocates instead an approach to 
translation which seeks to resist fluency and highlights the fact that the 
text produced in the target culture is a translation. 
Venuti’s approach relies on two forms of reflexivity: standpoint 
reflexivity, a reflexive critique of dominant discourse (the expectation 
of fluency in the Anglo-American publishing industry), and breaking 
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frame, an exposure of the conjurer’s tricks (the domesticating work of 
self-effacing translators). Foreignization is a pivotal concept in Venuti’s 
theory in that it establishes a direct link between visibility and ethics. 
A good translator, for Venuti, must strive to make himself visible within 
the translated text in order to raise awareness that the text created is 
not an original. The main contribution of the foreignizing approach to 
translation studies lies precisely in this promise to generate and secure 
an ethical translation practice. 
 Foreignization finds its roots in the idea that translation involves 
a degree of ethnocentric violence which tends to erase the cultural 
specificity of the source text. By recreating the foreignness of the original 
work in the target language, a foreignizing translation, Venuti claims, 
makes visible its condition as a translation and thereby counteracts 
the violent erasure of cultural difference at the core of any translating 
process. In this perspective, a foreignizing translation is ethical because, 
instead of attempting to dissimulate the ethnocentric violence at play in 
translation, it draws attention to it.3 In Venuti’s theory, indicating the 
otherness of the foreign text when importing it into the target culture is a 
necessary precondition for ethical translating. 
But does visible translating necessarily produce an ethical translation? 
What happens, for example, if the indication of a translation’s status as 
translation is itself manipulative, as is the case with pseudo-translations? 
Can the indication of a text’s status as translation ever be secured? 
And if so, for how long can the reader’s awareness be sustained? In 
the following pages, I give a brief overview of Venuti’s foreignizing 
approach, before presenting a performative translation of the opening 
pages of The Translator’s Invisibility. I then explore the scope and limits 
of foreignization as experienced during my attempt to translate Venuti’s 
own text in a foreignizing way. I contrast Venuti’s approach, and the 
translation strategies he describes as producing foreignizing effects, with 
a deconstructionist translation practice which ‘values experimentation’4 
not so as to indicate the otherness of the foreign text, but in order to 
interrogate, and go beyond, its internal contradictions.
The concept of foreignization
First published in 1995, Lawrence Venuti’s The Translator’s Invisibility 
provides an account of the history of translation from the seventeenth 
century to the present day, and shows how fluency prevailed over 
other translation strategies to shape the canon of foreign literatures in 
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English. Since its publication, the book has provoked much controversy 
in translation studies, especially around the concept of foreignization, 
also referred to as ‘foreignizing translation’. Drawing from the theory 
of German theologian and philosopher Friedrich Schleiermacher, and 
developed against the predominance of fluent translation strategies in 
the British and American book industries, foreignization involves, in 
Venuti’s own terms, ‘deviating enough from native norms to stage an alien 
reading experience’.5 With this concept, Venuti’s objective is to challenge 
domesticating practices that prioritise fluency and transparency, in order 
ultimately to enrich the translating culture and submit it to self-critical 
interrogation. 
However, Venuti’s concept has been accused of doing exactly the 
opposite. Loredana Polezzi, for example, has suggested that foreignizing 
translations may create an overly exotic Other which can thus ‘contain 
the text within the boundaries of stereotypical representations of foreign 
cultures’.6 Susan Bassnett has pointed out that a foreignizing approach 
can result in distancing the target language reader unnecessarily from the 
source language narrator or culture.7 Jean Boase-Beier has highlighted 
the inherent contradiction of a practice which, by allowing the foreign 
text to become visible in the translation, ‘causes exactly that invisibility of 
the translation against which Venuti argues’.8 Further editions of Venuti’s 
work, which clarify key terms and develop arguments in response to the 
aforementioned criticisms, were published in 2008 and 2017. 
In the introduction to the third edition, Venuti goes to great lengths 
to address the contentious reception of his book, and to try to clear up 
any confusion surrounding his work. Unsurprisingly, his primary focus in 
these pages concerns the concepts of domestication and foreignization, 
and their ethical significance. While stressing that fluency is not in itself 
domesticating,9 Venuti reiterates the need for a foreignizing translating 
practice that challenges the dominance of fluent translation strategies 
and calls attention to the fact that the text created in the target culture is 
not the original. ‘Fluent translation,’ he explains, ‘allows a translation to 
pass for its source text, inviting readers to remain within the illusionism 
during and after their reading experience’.10 The goal of a foreignizing 
translation is to break that illusion ‘by disclosing its translated status as 
well as the translator’s intervention’.11 
Venuti’s own practice as translator is inspired by Philip Lewis’ concept 
of ‘abusive fidelity’, which is itself of Derridean influence. In ‘Translating 
Derrida on Translation’, the text in which he discusses his translation 
of Derrida’s ‘What is a “Relevant” Translation’, Venuti explains that his 
ambition in translating Derrida’s text was to: 
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implement what Philip Lewis has called ‘abusive fidelity,’ a 
translation practice that ‘values experimentation, tampers with 
usage, seeks to match the polyvalencies and plurivocities or 
expressive stresses of the original by producing its own.’ Abusive 
fidelity is demanded by foreign texts that involve substantial 
conceptual density or complex literary effects, namely poetry 
and philosophy, including Derrida’s own writing. This kind of 
translating is abusive in two senses: it resists the structures and 
discourses of the receiving language and culture, especially the 
pressure toward the univocal, the idiomatic, the transparent; yet 
in so doing it also interrogates the structures and discourses of the 
foreign text, exposing its often unacknowledged conditions.12
In this passage, Venuti draws on Lewis’ concept to justify his approach to 
translating Derrida, which he later goes on to describe as both ‘resistant’ 
to fluency (twisting the English language) and yet ‘relevant’ for an English 
reader (maintaining a level of intelligibility).
In fact, the concept of foreignization as a whole (the idea that the 
linguistic and cultural difference of the foreign text should be made visible 
within the translating language) can be read as an extrapolation of Lewis’ 
notion of abusive fidelity (the notion that translations should not adopt 
the norms of the target culture but try to follow the source text closely, 
even if the result sounds strange to most readers). However, there is a 
noticeable difference between Lewis’s and Venuti’s approaches. While in 
Lewis’s view irregularities should be pursued only at points of ambiguity 
or textual density, in Venuti’s theory resistance is developed into an ethical 
safeguard. In other words, whereas for Lewis creating estranging effects 
should be sought only if it enables new forms of fidelity to the source text, 
for Venuti a foreignizing approach seems always preferable.
According to Venuti, in a foreignizing translation, the translator 
intentionally disrupts the linguistic and genre expectations of the target 
culture in order to introduce a perceptible difference within the target 
language itself. Discontinuities can be created by utilising marginal 
and minority forms, which may include close adherence to the source 
text structure and syntax, calques, archaisms, slang, jargon, dialects 
or any other linguistic form that disrupts the expectation of fluency in 
the target culture. These minor variables (minor in the sense of being 
marginalised and put into a minority position), which Venuti calls ‘the 
remainder’ – a term borrowed from Jean-Jacques Lecercle13 – constitute 
a foreign element within the target culture which can be used to mark the 
foreignness of the translated text. 
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One of the examples Venuti gives is his own translation of works by 
the nineteenth-century Italian author Iginio Ugo Tarchetti:
Nel 1855, domiciliatomi a Pavía, m’era alio studio del disegno in 
nuna scuola privata di quella cittá; e dopo alcuni mesi di soggiorno 
aveva stretto relazione con certo Federico M. che era professore di 
patologia e di clinica per l’insegnamento universitario, e che morí 
di apoplessia fulminante pochi mesi dopo che lo aveva conosciuto. 
Era un uomo amantissimo delle scienze, della sua in particolare 
– aveva virtú e doti di mente non comuní – senonché, come tutti 
gli anatomisti ed i clinici in genere, era scettico profondamente e 
inguaribilmente – lo era per convinzione, né io potei mai indurlo 
alie mie credenze per quanto mi vi adoprassi nelle discussioni 
appassionate e calorose che avevamo ogni giorno a questo riguardo. 
In 1855, having taken up residence at Pavia, I devoted myself to 
the study of drawing at a private school in that city; and several 
months into my sojourn, I developed a close friendship with a 
certain Federico M., a professor of pathology and clinical medicine 
who taught at the university and died of severe apoplexy a few 
months after I became acquainted with him. He was very fond 
of the sciences and of his own in particular – he was gifted with 
extraordinary mental powers – except that, like all anatomists and 
doctors generally, he was profoundly and incurably skeptical. He 
was so by conviction, nor could I ever induce him to accept my 
beliefs, no matter how much I endeavored in the impassioned, 
heated discussions we had every day on this point.14
The foreignizing approach adopted by Venuti in the above translation 
comes through in the inclusion of foreignizing elements, such as close 
adherence to the source text syntax (e.g. the adjunct positions in the first 
sentence), calques (e.g. soggiorno as sojourn) and the use of the archaic 
structure nor could I ever – elements that seek to disrupt the expectations 
of fluency in the target language and indicate the otherness of the 
translated text.
However, in discussing specific examples and case studies Venuti does 
not explain how the translation strategies he describes as producing a 
foreignizing effect will assuredly raise awareness of the text’s status as 
translation, nor does he define how many foreignizing elements are 
required to create a foreignizing text, and therefore to secure an ethical 
translation. Venuti’s concept raises intricate questions for practising 
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translators. How much disruption is needed to foment a foreignizing 
translation? How far can one take foreignization without disengaging 
the reader? And how foreignizing should a translation be to be deemed 
ethical? In the next section of this chapter, I engage with these questions 
in a practical way, as I undertake a performative translation of the 
opening pages of The Translator’s Invisibility into French. Following the 
reflexive method presented in the introduction to this book, I attempt to 
translate Venuti’s text in a foreignizing way in order to explore the scope 
and confines of his foreignizing approach. 
Enacting foreignization: example of a foreignizing 
translation
The excerpt below is taken from The Translator’s Invisibility, Lawrence 
Venuti, © 2008, Routledge, reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis 
Books UK.
Chapter 1: Invisibility
Chapitre 1 : Invisibilité
I see translation as the attempt to produce a text so transparent that it does not seem 
to be translated. A good translation is like a pane of glass. You only notice that it’s 
there when there are little imperfections — scratches, bubbles. Ideally, there shouldn’t 
be any. It should never call attention to itself. 
Norman Shapiro
Je vois la traduction comme une tentative de produire un texte tellement transparent qu’il n’aurait 
pas l’air d’être traduit. Une bonne traduction ressemble à une vitre. On ne la remarque qu’à de 
petites imperfections — des éraflures, des bulles d’air. L’idéal serait de n’en pas repérer du tout. La 
traduction ne devrait jamais attirer l’attention sur elle-même.
Norman Shapiro
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I T he r eg i m e o f f l uency
I Le régime de la fluence
“Invisibility” is the term I will use to describe the translator’s situation and 
activity in contemporary British and American cultures. It refers to two mutually 
determining phenomena : one is an illusionistic effect of discourse, of the 
translator’s own manipulation of the translating language, English in this case; the other 
is the practice of reading and evaluating translations that has long prevailed in the United 
Kingdom and the United States, among other cultures, both Anglophone and foreign- 
language. A translated text, whether prose or poetry, fiction or nonfiction, is 
judged acceptable by most publishers, reviewers and readers when it reads 
fluently, when the absence of any linguistic or stylistic peculiarities makes it 
seem transparent, giving the appearance that it reflects the foreign writer’s 
personality or intention or the essential meaning of the foreign text — the 
appearance, in other words, that the translation is not in fact a translation, 
but the “original.”
The illusion of transparency is an effect of a fluent translation strategy, of the translator’s 
effort to insure easy readability by  adhering to current usage, maintaining 
continuous syntax, fixing a precise meaning. (…) What is so remarkable here is 
that this illusory effect conceals the numerous conditions under which the 
translation is made, starting with the translator’s crucial intervention. The more 
fluent the translation, the more invisible the translator, and, presumably, the 
the more visible the writer or meaning of the foreign text.
«L’invisibilité» est le terme que j’utilise pour décrire la situation et l’activité du 
translateur dans les cultures contemporaines britannique et américaine. Il renvoie à 
deux phénomènes au moins qui se définissent réciproquement: le premier est un effet 
d’illusion du discours, de la manipulation du langage traduisant par le translateur, en 
l’occurrence l’anglais; l’autre est une pratique de lecture et d’évaluation des traductions 
qui a longtemps prévalu en Grande-Bretagne et aux Etats-Unis, ainsi que dans d’autres 
cultures, anglophones ou de langues étrangères. Un texte traduit, qu’il s’agisse de prose, 
de poésie, de fiction ou d’un récit, est jugé acceptable par la plupart des éditeurs, des 
commentateurs et des lecteurs s’il se lit de manière fluente, si l’absence de toute 
particularité linguistique ou stylistique produit une impression de transparence, d’avoir 
reflété la personnalité ou l’intention de l’écrivain étranger, ou le sens fondamental du 
texte étranger–l’impression, en d’autres termes, que la traduction n’est en réalité pas 
une traduction, mais le texte « original ».
L’illusion de la transparence est l’effet d’une stratégie de traduction fluente, de l’effort 
du translateur d’assurer une lecture facile en se conformant à l’usage courant, en 
maintenant une syntaxe continue, en fixant un sens précis. (…) Ce qu’il y a de remarquable 
en cela c’est que l’effet de transparence dissimule les nombreuses conditions dans 
lesquelles la traduction est produite, à commencer par l’intervention décisive du translateur. 
Plus la traduction est fluente, plus le translateur est invisible, et, dans cette perspective, 
plus l’auteur et le sens du texte étranger sont visibles.
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The dominance of fluency in English-language translation becomes apparent in 
a sampling of reviews from newspapers and periodicals. On those rare occasions 
when reviewers address the translation at all, their brief comments usually focus on 
its style, neglecting such other possible questions as its accuracy, its intended 
audience, its economic value in the current book market, its relation to literary 
trends in English, its place in the translator’s career. And over the past sixty years 
the comments have grown amazingly consistent in praising fluency while damning 
deviations from it, even when the most diverse range of foreign texts is considered.
Take fiction, for instance, the most translated genre worldwide. Limit the choices 
to European and Latin American writers, the most translated into English, and pick examples 
with different kinds of narratives—novels and short stories, realistic and fantastic, lyrical 
and philosophical, psychological and political. Here is one possible list: Albert Camus’s 
The Stranger (1946), Françoise Sagan’s Bonjour Tristesse (1955), Heinrich Böll’s Absent Without 
Leave (1965), Italo Calvino’s Cosmicomics (1968), Gabriel García Márquez’s One Hundred Years of 
Solitude (1970), Milan Kundera’s The Book of Laughter and Forgetting (1980), Mario Vargas 
Llosa’s In Praise of the Stepmother (1990), Gianni Celati’s Appearances (1992), Adolfo 
Bioy Casares’s A Russian Doll (1992), Ana Maria Moix’s Dangerous Virtues (1997), Michel 
Houellebecq’s The Elementary Particles (2000), Orhan Pamuk’s My Name is Red (2001), José 
Saramago’s The Double (2004), and Ismail Kadare’s The Successor (2005). Some of these translations 
enjoyed considerable critical and commercial success in English; others made an initial splash, 
then sank into oblivion; still others passed with little or no notice. Yet in the reviews they
La prédominance de la fluence dans les traductions vers l’anglais est visible dans les critiques de 
journaux et de revues. Aux rares occasions où les critiques abordent la question de la 
traduction, leurs commentaires souvent brefs se focalisent habituellement sur le style, 
négligeant d’autres questions éventuelles, comme celles de sa justesse, du public ciblé, de sa 
valeur économique dans le marché actuel du livre, de son rapport aux tendances littéraires de 
langue anglaise, de sa place dans la carrière du translateur. Et dans les soixante dernières 
années, les commentaires se sont étonnamment unifiés à louer la fluence et à condamner les 
traductions qui en dévient, même face à un assortiment de textes étrangers des plus divers.
Prenons le cas de la fiction, le genre le plus traduit dans le monde. Bornons-nous aux écrivains 
européens et d’Amérique latine les plus traduits en anglais, et prenons pour exemples des textes 
appartenant à différents types de récit – romans et nouvelles réalistes, fantastiques, lyriques, 
philosophiques, psychologiques et politiques. Proposons la liste suivante : The Stranger d’Albert 
Camus (1946), Bonjour Tristesse de Françoise Sagan (1955), Absent Without Leave d’Heinrich 
Böll (1965), Cosmicomics d’Italo Calvino (1968), One Hundred Years of Solitude de Gabriel García 
Márquez (1970), The Book of Laughter and Forgetting de Milan Kundera (1980), In Praise of the 
Stepmother de Mario Vargas Llosa (1990), Appearances de Gianni Celati (1992), A Russian Doll d’Adolfo 
Bioy Casares (1992), Dangerous Virtues d’Ana Maria Moix (1997), The Elementary Particles 
de Michel Houellebecq (2000), My Name is Red d’Orhan Pamuk (2001), The Double de José 
Saramago (2004) et The Successor d’Ismail Kadare (2005). Certaines de ces traductions anglaises ont 
joui d’un succès critique et commercial considérable; d’autres ont fait sensation au début puis ont 
sombré dans l’oubli; d’autres encore sont passées inaperçues ou presque. Pourtant dans les critiques 
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were all judged by the same criterion: fluency. The following selection of excerpts 
comes from various British and American periodicals, both literary and mass- 
audience; some were written by noted critics, novelists, and reviewers:
It is not easy, in translating French, to render qualities of sharpness or vividness,  
but the prose of Mr. Gilbert is always natural, brilliant, and crisp.
(Wilson 1946:100)
The style is elegant, the prose lovely, and the translation excellent.
(New Republic 1955:46)
In Absent Without Leave, a novella gracefully if not always flawlessly translated by Leila 
Vennewitz, Böll continues his stern and sometimes merciless probing of the  
conscience, values, and imperfections of his countrymen.
(Potoker 1965:42)
The translation is a pleasantly fluent one: two chapters of it have already appeared in 
Playboy magazine.
(Times Literary Supplement 1969:180)
Rabassa’s translation is a triumph of fluent, gravid momentum, all stylishness and 
commonsensical virtuosity.
(West 1970:4)
His first four books published in English did not speak with the stunning lyrical precision 
of this one (the invisible translator is Michael Henry Heim).
(Michener 1980:108)
elles ont toutes été jugées en fonction du même critère : la fluence. La sélection d’extraits ci-dessous, 
dont certains sont tirés de textes rédigés par des critiques, romanciers et commentateurs réputés, 
provient de diverses revues britanniques et américaines, aussi bien littéraires que grand public :
Il n’est pas facile de rendre les qualités d’acuité et de vivacité quand on traduit en français, 
mais la prose de M. Gilbert est toujours naturelle, éclatante et piquante.
(Wilson 1946 : 100)
Le style est élégant, la prose charmante et la traduction excellente.
(New Republic 1955 : 46)
Dans Loin de la Troupe, un roman grâcieusement, si ce n’est parfaitement, traduit par  
Leila Vennewitz, Böll continue son sondage rigoureux et parfois sans merci de la  
conscience, des valeurs et des imperfections de ses compatriotes.
(Potoker 1965 : 42)
C’est une traduction qui est agréablement fluente : deux de ses chapitres sont déjà 
apparus dans le magazine Playboy.
(Times Literary Supplement 1969 : 180)
La traduction de Rabassa triomphe par son élan fluent et gravide, plein d’élégance et  
virtuose de bon sens.
(West 1970 : 4)
Ses quatre premiers livres publiés en anglais n’avaient pas l’impressionnante précision  
lyrique de celui-ci (le traducteur invisible est Michael Henry Heim).
(Michener 1980 : 108)
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Foreignization in practice
Performing foreignization
Choosing to perform foreignization – instead of simply commenting on it 
– serves several purposes. Exploring the possible effects of foreignization 
by attempting to produce a foreignizing translation is a uniquely hands-
on approach, one which allows me to examine the intricacies of Venuti’s 
theory within the tangible constraints and challenges of an actual 
translation. Furthermore, attempting to create a foreignizing translation 
in order to think about foreignization facilitates a form of critical 
engagement with the text which is productive rather than dismissive. 
In these pages, interrogating the scope and confines of foreignization 
through translation is testament both to the far-reaching influence of 
Venuti’s theory in translation studies and to its unexplored potential 
beyond the realm of literary translation – including in wider disciplinary 
contexts, such as the one wherein my own approach is anchored. 
My performative translation of the opening pages of The Translator’s 
Invisibility centres primarily on the concept of foreignization, a pivotal 
notion in Venuti’s overall translation theory, and the basis for the ethical 
translation practice he promotes. This focus on foreignization is inevitably 
selective, and reflects in part Venuti’s own view that both translation and 
translation criticism are necessarily interpretive in nature.15 However, 
the primacy given to the concept of foreignization in my interpretation 
of Venuti’s work is not exclusive. It is conceived in articulation with other 
key elements in his theory (including the notions of visibility, fluency and 
heterogeneity), as well as in relation to the main translation strategies he 
describes as capable of producing a foreignizing effect.
In an attempt to disturb the French reader and to create a foreignizing 
effect, in my translation of Venuti’s text I have chosen to translate the 
term ‘translator’ using the archaic French word translateur, instead of the 
modern French term traducteur. Phonetically closer to the English term 
‘translator’, the word translateur is itself interesting because it carries 
negative connotations of transparency that echo the very invisibility of 
the translator that Venuti takes issue with in his book. According to French 
dictionary Le Littré,16 uses of the Old French word translateur between 
the sixteenth century and eighteenth century show that, as the word 
was gradually replaced by the modern French term traducteur, it was 
sometimes employed to refer to someone who translates too faithfully, 
someone who imitates the original text too slavishly. Two instances of 
this negative connotation can be found in the literature. 
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The first example appears in Joachim Du Bellay’s Défense et illustration 
de la langue française, where the French poet contrasts the paraphrasing 
activity of the translateur with the imitating role of the traducteur:
Encores seroy’ je bien d’opinion que le scavant translateur fist plus 
tost l’office de paraphraste, que de traducteur.17
It is my opinion that the learned translateur works more as a 
paraphraser, than as a traducteur. 18
It is important to note that, in this context, imitation is perceived as a 
creative form of translation (one which, by imitating the style of the 
original text, contributes to expanding the target language), whereas 
paraphrasing refers to a practice which simply restores the meaning of 
the source text, its content. 
The second example can be found in Jean-François Marmontel’s 
Œuvres complètes, where Marmontel opposes the translational activities 
of the traducteur and the translateur in the following terms: 
S’il s’éloigne trop de l’original, il ne traduit plus, il imite ; s’il le copie 
trop servilement, il fait une version et n’est que translateur.19
If he [the traducteur] distances himself too much from the original, 
he does no longer translate, he imitates; if he copies too slavishly, 
he only provides a version and is a mere translateur.20
The word’s negative connotation as it appears in these two examples – 
translateur as someone who copies too slavishly, but does not challenge 
the boundaries of the target language – echoes Venuti’s criticism of the 
translator’s invisibility in modern English-language cultures, and thereby 
epitomises the main argument developed by Venuti in his book: the fact 
that translators should be more visible. 
Selecting an unusual, archaic word like translateur (archaisms being 
one of Venuti’s most discussed foreignizing techniques) to translate 
such an important concept in Venuti’s theory allows me to perform 
a translation of Venuti’s text in the strong sense, in that it enables me 
to both say and do what the source text says. Using the archaic term 
translateur instead of the modern French word traducteur makes the 
invisible translator (translateur vs. traducteur) literally visible (stand 
out) in my translation, and as such, it allows me to translate Venuti’s 
theory performatively, by enacting it. Through such enaction, however, 
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my performative translation also highlights the limits of the foreignizing 
approach, as I shall explain later in this chapter.
Degrees of foreignization
The purpose of foreignization, according to Venuti, is to point to the 
foreignness of the source text, so that it is immediately visible to target 
readers that they are reading a translation. ‘Discontinuities at the level 
of syntax, diction, or discourse’, he explains, ‘allow the translation to be 
read as a translation […] showing where it departs from target language 
cultural values, by showing where it depends on them.’21 My translation of 
Venuti’s text raises the question of whether the use of the word translateur 
can in itself increase awareness of the text’s status as a translation – since 
the word translateur could, for example, be a concept that a French 
theorist or poet (like Du Bellay or Marmontel) has created in a French 
cultural context in order to refer to a specific type of translator: one who 
translates too faithfully or too slavishly. How can I make sure that the use 
of an archaic term like translateur will draw attention to the text’s status 
as translation, and be perceived as such by a French readership?
In the second edition of The Translator’s Invisibility, Venuti clarifies 
his foreignizing approach, emphasising the need to include minority 
forms within the target language itself. In his later book The Scandals 
of Translation, Venuti continues to insist on the concept of foreignizing 
translation (or minoritising translation, as he also calls it), but further 
focuses on its ability to cultivate a varied and ‘heterogeneous discourse’.22 
According to Venuti, foreignization can only be achieved by contrast with, 
and differentiation from, the nature and register of other words in the 
text. Venuti shows, for example, how his own translations seek to create 
a foreignizing effect by juxtaposing archaisms such as ‘scapegrace’ and 
modern colloquialisms such as ‘con artist’ and ‘funk’, or by using British 
spellings in an American text, to jar the reader with a heterogeneous 
discourse. Foreignization, Venuti argues with these examples, must 
occur through differentiation within the target language itself. 
In trying to perform, and enact, this particular aspect of Venuti’s 
concept, in my translation of Venuti’s text I have translated the word 
‘translator’ not only as translateur but also as traducteur, depending 
on the context in which the word is used. For example, when the term 
‘translator’ appears as part of a quotation from Michener, I chose 
to translate it as traducteur instead of translateur, so as to contrast 
Michener’s rather conventional use of the term with Venuti’s criticism of 
the translator’s invisibility. Contrary to Venuti, in Michener’s quotation 
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the term ‘invisible’ has a positive quality, and works to build an argument 
in favour of fluency and transparency: 
His first four books published in English did not speak with the 
stunning lyrical precision of this one (the invisible translator is 
Michael Henry Heim). 
Ses quatre premiers livres publiés en anglais n’avaient pas 
l’impressionnante précision lyrique de celui-ci (le traducteur 
invisible est Michael Henry Heim).23
By using form (the combined use of the words translateur and traducteur) 
to reflect the content of Venuti’s argument in favour of a heterogeneous 
discourse, my performative translation of Venuti’s text raises several 
questions. 
If, as argued by Venuti, alternation of foreignizing and fluent 
strategies is necessary to create an overall foreignizing effect, then 
how much foreignization and how much fluency are needed? Is the 
juxtaposition of the terms translateur and traducteur sufficient to create 
a foreignizing effect? And to what extent can I be certain that even the 
most heterogeneous use of language will highlight the text’s status as 
translation? Although he explicitly argues in favour of foreignization 
against fluency, Venuti does not recommend a specific degree of 
foreignization. This is something that the translator needs to negotiate 
and define according to the specific demands of her project: how far 
can one take foreignization; up to what point is it acceptable, and how 
foreignizing can a translation be? Each of the translator’s choices works 
as an element of response to these questions, which ultimately build into 
an overall reply in the form of the translated text itself. 
My own experimental translation of Venuti’s text indicates that 
reflexivity – that is, awareness of the text’s status as translation – is not 
possible without making visible the act of translating itself. Even a mixed 
use of archaic and modern words like translateur and traducteur does 
not suffice to ensure that a French audience will know that my text is a 
translation, for these words could very well be variations on the concept 
of ‘translator’ created in French by a French-speaking theorist: translateur 
to refer to a foreignizing translator vs. traducteur to designate a fluent 
translator, as in the two aforementioned examples from Du Bellay and 
Marmontel. 
Venuti makes clear that foreignization is a decision that takes place 
within the target language. For him, a ‘foreignizing translation signifies 
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the differences of the foreign text, yet only by disrupting the codes that 
prevail in the translating language’.24 However, assuming that linguistic 
heterogeneity will in itself create reflexivity does not take into account 
the fact that an utterance can be heterogeneous, regardless of whether 
it is a translation or not. This oversight is particularly striking in the 
context of Venuti’s work, since he frames his overall approach within a 
deconstructionist view of language:
Translation is a process by which the chain of signifiers that 
constitute the foreign text is replaced by a chain of signifiers in the 
translating language which the translator provides on the strength 
of an interpretation. Because meaning is an effect of relations and 
differences among signifiers along a potentially endless chain 
(polysemous, intertextual, subject to infinite linkages), it is always 
differential and deferred, never present as an original unity.25
But if we consider, following Derrida and his concept of différance26, that 
all language (not just translation) is differential, then it is impossible 
to make the status of a translation visible based simply on difference. 
If within any given language words are always differing (are different 
from one another) and deferring (their ultimate meaning being 
always postponed), no foreignizing effect, even the most estranging or 
defamiliarising one, can suffice to signal a text’s status as translation. 
With the concept of foreignization, Venuti shows that his whole approach 
to translation depends on the fantasy of a secure border between source 
and target texts. 
Perhaps one of the best-known examples used by Venuti to illustrate 
a successful foreignizing effect is Matthew Ward’s translation of Albert 
Camus’ novel The Stranger, and more specifically its opening line, ‘Maman 
died today’, which retains Camus’s use of the French word maman. 
According to Venuti, the context makes clear to the English reader that 
maman means ‘mother’ in Ward’s version. But it means much more besides 
to English readers, Venuti claims, because it not only signals the childlike 
intimacy of the narrator’s relationship, but also tells readers that they are 
reading a translation, a version of the French work not to be confused with 
the original text. However, like the alternation of the words traducteur 
and translateur in my translation, the use of word maman cannot in itself 
signify the foreignness of the original and raise readers’ awareness of the 
status of the translated text as translation, because the context does not 
exclude the possibility that the word might in fact refer to the mother of a 
French character in an English-language novel. 
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To draw attention to the text’s status as translation, the translator 
would have to either add a footnote explaining the strategy adopted, 
or merely rely on the readers’ use of paratextual elements (such as the 
author’s name, reference to the translator on the title page, etc.). In both 
cases, however, the very principle of foreignization (the idea of making 
the foreignness of the original visible within the translated text itself) 
would be negated, and there would still be no guarantee that awareness 
of the text’s status as translation would be sustained during the reading 
process. In the third edition of The Translator’s Invisibility, Venuti 
vehemently insists on the fact that, in his theory, the term ‘foreignizing’ 
does not describe specific translation choices or strategies, but rather the 
ethical effect of translated texts, which – he reiterates – is ‘to alter the 
way in which a translation is customarily read by disclosing its translated 
status’.27 Venuti’s focus on the effects of foreignization, as opposed to 
the techniques devised to achieve them, highlights a crucial element of 
his argument: the fact that the effectiveness of foreignization depends 
essentially on readers’ perception of the translated text – a perception 
that the translator can hardly control or secure.
In fact, Ward’s translation of The Stranger’s opening line is 
characteristic of a wider linguistic issue, which is formulated by Derrida 
in the following terms: ‘How is a text written in several languages at 
one time to be translated?’ Taking the example of the sentence ‘And he 
war’ in James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake, Derrida wonders how war, which 
may refer either to the English war for battle or to the German war for 
was, could be translated into another language. Derrida’s example is 
interesting in relation to foreignization because it further emphasises 
that language can be heterogeneous, estranging and defamiliarising 
regardless of whether it is a translation or an original. The effect of 
Joyce’s play on the plurilingual homophony of the word ‘war’ could 
indeed be described as estranging, or even foreignizing, despite the 
fact that it is not a translation. More generally, how can we convey the 
foreignness of a plurilingual text, concept or word when translating it 
into a different language? What does foreignness mean in a plurilingual 
context? And how can heterogeneous uses of language in translation 
(such as borrowings, slang or foreign words) be differentiated from 
heterogeneous uses of language in other forms of writing (including 
plays on words, plurilingual expressions or ambiguous words)? 
In his conference presentation entitled ‘What is a “Relevant” 
Translation?’, Derrida addresses these questions in relation to the word 
relevante, both a French and English term, an adjective borrowed from 
the English, which is not yet used in French, but which, nevertheless, 
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is marked by the meanings of the French verb ‘relever,’ as well as those 
of the French noun ‘relève’.28 Immediately placing his presentation 
‘within the multiplicity of languages’,29 Derrida thus exemplifies 
his (now famous) saying that if we ‘only ever speak one language’, 
it is ‘never (…) only one language’,30 highlighting that what unites 
historic languages is the heterogeneity of language itself. In Derrida’s 
presentation, the plurilingualism of the word relevante challenges the 
notion of natural, transparent language, and serves to illustrate the 
long and complex cultural history of any given language. If any use of 
language may be heterogeneous, regardless of whether it is a translation 
or not, then a foreignizing translation, one that aims to make its own 
status as translation visible, must, in order to differentiate itself from the 
heterogeneity that characterises other forms of language, do more than 
create a heterogeneous discourse.
Beyond foreignization
Venuti is aware of the contradictions underlying the concept of 
foreignization, and in particular the fact that, since it cannot strictly 
operate within the translating language itself, a foreignizing translation 
also involves domestication: ‘foreignizing translation still requires the 
translator to draw on the resources of the translating language and culture 
and is therefore implicated in the ethnocentrism that lies at the very 
heart of translation’.31 Nevertheless, despite his acknowledgement that 
foreignization can never fully escape domestication, since ethnocentric 
violence is ‘inherent in every translation process’,32 Venuti still argues in 
favour of foreignizing translations, because even though they are just as 
‘partial in their interpretation of the foreign text’ as are domesticating 
translations, they ‘tend to flaunt their partiality instead of concealing it’.33
The main ethical effect of a foreignizing translation, according to 
Venuti, is its capacity to point to itself, and thereby to make visible the 
ethnocentrism at play in translation – the fact that translation cannot 
offer unmediated access to the foreign. However, if, as I have argued, 
the techniques presented by Venuti as having a foreignizing effect 
(archaisms, calques, slang, etc.) cannot in themselves make visible a 
text’s status as translation, then no translation, however foreignizing or 
defamiliarising it might be, can highlight the ethnocentrism at play in 
translation processes without also pointing to the ethnocentric violence 
underlying its own creation. Whereas for Venuti foreignization must be 
conveyed within the translating language itself, my experimentation 
with foreignization shows that reflexivity – that is, awareness of the text’s 
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condition as translation – is possible only if we make visible the act of 
translating itself, by showing the original text that is being translated. 
To be reflexive and point to the act of translating, my performative 
translation of Venuti’s text makes the difference of the foreign text 
literally visible by displaying the foreign text as crossed out and replaced 
by the translated text:
‘Invisibility’ is the term I will use to describe the translator’s situation 
« L’invisibilité » est le terme que j’utilise pour décrire la situation et 
and activity in contemporary British and American cultures.
l’activité du translateur dans les cultures contemporaines britannique 
et américaine.
My interlinear translation thus performs Venuti’s concept of foreignizing 
translation, but does so by transgressing it, in the etymological sense 
of going beyond it, crossing it. It performs Venuti’s concept insofar as 
it highlights the ethnocentric violence at play in translation by striking 
off the original and thereby marking its absence. But it also transgresses 
the concept in that it makes visible the difference of the foreign text, not 
through a play of differences within the translating language itself (an 
impossible ambition, as I have argued), but by pointing to the translation’s 




In my translation, the original is still there, visible, but only to the 
extent that it has been crossed out, deleted – thereby suggesting that in 
translation the foreign text can only be made visible as absence. 
In the context of this translation, the concept of foreignization can 
only be performed in accordance with a notion of the performative that, 
in Derrida’s words, ‘must be dissociated, by an act of deconstruction, 
from the notion of presence with which it is generally linked’.34 My 
experiment in foreignization shows that a performative translation of 
Venuti’s text is inevitably transgressive, since to achieve foreignization 
(increase awareness of the text’s status as translation) one must go 
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beyond foreignization (point to the act of translating itself). While for 
Venuti, a foreignizing practice should aim to release ‘the remainder by 
cultivating a heterogeneous discourse, opening up the standard dialect 
and literary canons to what is foreign to themselves, to the substandard 
and marginal’,35 my own experience of foreignization suggests that 
the ‘otherness’ of the foreign text cannot be made visible without 
simultaneously releasing the violent act of erasure and substitution that 
the translating process operates. 
A ‘relevant’ translation of Venuti’s text, such as the one I have proposed 
in this chapter, enacts the concept of foreignization by simultaneously 
challenging it, by pushing it beyond its limits. Relevant, here, is to be 
understood in the Derridean sense, as operating a conserving-and-
negating lift, an effect of substitution and difference – an operation 
inscribed in the double meaning of Hegel’s concept of Aufhebung, 
a German word ‘that signifies at once to suppress and to elevate’, and 
which Derrida translates as ‘la relève’.36 My sample translation enacts 
the idea that a relevant translation (in this case, raising to conscious 
levels a translation’s status as translation) both suppresses and extends 
the original. It suggests that in order to thoroughly enact and perform 
a theoretical text into another language or form, the translator must 
also call it into question and challenge it. Central to my foreignizing 
translation is the idea that a performative practice of translation also 
includes a critical element. 
Venuti’s own translation of Derrida’s essay ‘What is a “Relevant” 
Translation?’ comes across as rather conventional and fluent. In this 
translation, Venuti does not seem to employ many of the devices he 
mentions in The Translator’s Visibility as producing a foreignizing effect. 
Looking at the first few lines, for example, one may be surprised by the 
transparency of his version:
How dare one speak of translation before you who, in your vigilant 
awareness of the immense stakes – and not only of the fate of 
literature – make this sublime and impossible task your desire, your 
anxiety, your travail, your knowledge, and your knowing skill?
How dare I proceed before you, knowing myself to be at once rude 
and inexperienced in this domain, as someone who, from the very 
first moment, from his very first attempts (which I could recount 
to you, as the English saying goes, off the record), shunned the 
translator’s metier, his beautiful and terrifying responsibility, his 
insolvent duty and debt, without ceasing to tell himself ‘never ever 
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again’: ‘no, precisely, I would never dare, I should never, could 
never, would never manage to pull it off’?37
Except perhaps for the use of Middle English terms such as ‘travail’ and 
‘metier’, Venuti’s translation sounds rather natural and hardly draws 
attention to its own status as translation. 
Interestingly, the most reflexive element in this passage (the one 
that most clearly points to the text’s status as translation) is not one 
constructed by Venuti, but Derrida’s parenthetical intervention: ‘(which 
I could recount to you, as the English saying goes, off the record)’. 
Underlining the linguistic and cultural specificity of the expression ‘off 
the record’, Derrida’s comment indirectly points to the fact that the text 
is written in another language than English. Given that it appears in an 
English context here, this indication suggests that the English version 
we are reading is unlikely to be a text originally written in English. The 
reflexive effect in this case is not the result of a foreignizing technique, 
but is inscribed in the phrasing of the original text itself, and made visible 
through the process of translating and its recontextualising work.
In this example, reflexivity is made possible not by reconstructing 
the otherness of the foreign text and attempting to make it present 
through differentiation, but through a recontextualising of the text’s 
plurilingualism, which makes it visible only by showing its effacement 
and hinting at its absence. When translated into English, the plurilingual 
character of the expression ‘which I could recount to you, as the 
English saying goes, off the record’ is erased, and therefore becomes 
graphically invisible; however, it is this very effacement which signals 
the text’s potential status as translation, by underlining the fact that in 
an English context mentioning the cultural specificity of the expression 
‘off the record’ is irrelevant – unless the text was not originally written in 
English. Derrida’s example is a further illustration that a text’s potential 
to highlight its own status as translation also depends on making visible 
the work of recontextualisation that translation activates, as effacement 
of the original and re-enactment of it in a different context. 
Conclusion: from foreignization to foreignization
The reflexive approach engaged in translating Lawrence Venuti’s translation 
theory uncovers crucial aspects of reflexivity in translation. Showing that a 
reflexive practice of translation based on visibility cannot be secured nor 
sustained, this experimentation in foreignization suggests that to perform 
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foreignization one may need to exceed foreignization itself. In my sample 
translation, enacting another text by simultaneously saying and doing what 
the text says requires going beyond it, crossing its limits. It means stretching 
the boundaries of Venuti’s concept, but only to realise its own potential as 
an approach that seeks to point to the ethnocentric violence at play in all 
translational activity. In this sense, my foreignizing translation is at once 
abusive and faithful, transgressive and performative, enacting Venuti’s 
concept while in the same moment emphasising its limits. Like Philip Lewis’s 
notion of ‘abusive fidelity’, this performative experiment in foreignization 
occasions a redefinition of fidelity in translation which accounts for the 
fact that, while displacement may itself manifest faithfulness, it inevitably 
exceeds the translator’s will or control.
From a critical perspective, the reflexive practice deployed in 
this chapter shows that ironically folding a text’s theory back on itself 
is an impossible task, one that cannot be accomplished without also 
transforming the concepts translated, without also introducing a 
difference. Hence, in this framework, folding a theory back on itself 
does not mean repeating the source text’s theory by reproducing it 
identically, but going beyond it by embracing its internal contradictions. 
My engagement with reflexivity in this chapter showcases a performative 
practice whereby translation is not understood as ‘the transport of a 
semantic content into another signifying form’,38 but as the re-enactment 
of a text in a different context. In this approach, meaning itself is a 
performative and contextual event, which cannot be extracted from, or 
exist outside, the specific context of its creation. In Derridean terms, ‘[it] 
must await being said or written in order to inhabit itself, and in order 
to become, by differing from itself, what it is: meaning’.39 Performing 
a translation of a theoretical text thus becomes a form of critical 
interrogation whereby attempting to enact a text (like The Translator’s 
Invisibility and its key notion of foreignization) contributes to creating a 
new concept: foreignization. 
In such practice, translating reflexively is a form of writing ‘under 
erasure’ (sous rature), an approach first developed by Martin Heidegger and 
later expanded by Derrida to indicate a word’s inaccuracy or difference by 
crossing it out. In fact, writing ‘under erasure’ is a typographical expression 
of the fact that key terms and concepts in a text may be paradoxical or self-
undermining. In my foreignizing translation, this difference (the concept’s 
non-identity to itself) is the locus of a theoretical stance through which I – 
as a translator – create and express my own approach to foreignization. My 
contribution as a translator is precisely this ‘abuse’ (or difference), ‘whereby 
the translation goes beyond – fills in for – the original’.40 In addition, 
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since writing is always a structure of signs under erasure, ‘always already 
inhabited by the trace of another sign which never appears as such’,41 the 
technique of ‘sous rature’ is used in my translation to signify that all meaning 
derives from difference, including (but not only) in translation. In fact, 
my foreignizing translation signals that, just like foreignizing translation, 
translating under erasure cannot secure reflexivity, visibility or awareness 
of a text’s status as translation, since all writing (not just translation) takes 
place under erasure. As such, my experimental translation of Venuti’s 
text presents a practice which, unlike foreignization, accounts for the 
productive failure of its own reflexive endeavour. 
In the third edition of The Translator’s Invisibility, Venuti appears to 
soften his approach, reorienting foreignization towards a more open, 
slightly less prescriptive practice. Not only does he acknowledge that 
the ethical effects of a foreignizing translation depend primarily on their 
recognition by the readers of the receiving culture, but the linguistic and 
cultural differences perceptible in a foreignizing translation are now 
described in ways that seek to avoid the idea of untroubled transfer.42 
In fact, Venuti suggests that, to be effective, a foreignizing translation 
requires that readers themselves make an effort and be trained to 
perceive the linguistic and cultural differences inscribed in the translated 
text.43 For Venuti, foreignizing translation requires a level of comparative 
analysis which, as he recognises himself, excludes de facto readers who 
do not speak the source language or whose interest in the translated text 
may be limited to readerly pleasure. Ironically, since they may depend 
on a certain level of scholarly analysis to be recognised at all, the effects 
of foreignization are targeted at readers who are most likely already to 
be sensitive to, or willing to engage with, the ethical issues at stake in 
translation. The ethical impact of foreignization, too, is presented in more 
tentative terms, as the following extract from the third edition illustrates: 
What allows a foreignizing translation, furthermore, to limit and 
redirect its inevitable domestication is not its orientation toward or 
adherence to the source text, but rather the translator’s command 
and application of certain linguistic and cultural resources in 
the receiving situation. It is the effects of those resources that 
potentially exceed mere domestication and become differential.44
Here, the use of the word ‘potentially’ is decisive, in that it hints at 
foreignization’s incapacity to secure an ethical translation. If translation 
techniques are not in themselves foreignizing, and if a foreignizing 
translation cannot guarantee to draw attention to its own condition, then to 
what extent is it ethical?
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Venuti still argues in favour of foreignization, insisting that the mere 
choice of source text can suffice to create a foreignizing effect. But in 
most instances the choice of text too is neither only foreignizing nor only 
domesticating. My own sample translation of The Translator’s Invisibility 
into French, for instance, may be deemed simultaneously foreignizing 
and domesticating. Venuti’s criticism of the dominant regime of fluency 
in the Anglophone world was undeniably a marginal argument when 
his book first came out in 1995. However, when transferred to a French 
context, Venuti’s position as a minor voice becomes more uncertain. 
On the one hand, translating Venuti into French means promoting a 
marginal American voice, which also has the potential to confront implicit 
expectations of fluency in the French book industry. On the other hand, 
the concepts of domestication and foreignization are hardly marginal in 
the context of French translation theory, where they echo the ideas of at 
least two prominent French thinkers: Jean-René Ladmiral45 and Antoine 
Berman.46 In fact, Venuti’s position on the international academic scene 
is rather ambiguous. His voice remains to a certain extent marginal, as 
it is still widely criticised by translators and scholars across the world. 
At the same time, The Translator’s Invisibility has become a canonical 
text in translation studies, where it is extensively referred to and used as 
teaching material in translation programmes worldwide. 
The intricacies of determining whether a translation is foreignizing 
or domesticating, as highlighted throughout this chapter, illustrate the 
difficulty of approaching translation through these two concepts without 
risking oversimplifying the challenges at play in translational activity, 
or reproducing the binary oppositions (‘literal’ vs. ‘free’ translation) 
that Venuti’s approach claims to combat. Venuti expressly condemns 
interpretations of his work that treat the distinction between domesticating 
and foreignizing translation as a simple ‘dichotomy’ or ‘binary opposition’, 
suggesting that such readings eliminate its conceptual complexity.47 Yet he 
seems oblivious to the fact that his very choice of terms, and the dualistic 
way they are presented in his work, may themselves have contributed 
to the interpretations he denounces. The most compelling element in 
the introduction to the latest edition of The Translator’s Invisibility is 
perhaps Venuti’s explicit call for innovative translation strategies, as well 
as for critical, partial and open engagements with his text. This chapter’s 
response to Venuti’s call has sought to provide a detailed illustration of 
what such critical engagement may involve in practical terms, as well 
as an example of an alternative reflexive translation practice which 
constructively thematises its own failures and limitations.
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Chapter 2
Subjectivity and Creativity
Susan Bassnett’s dialogic metaphor
I, as a responsible reader, am not (…) seeking to reveal an 
unchanging core of meaning, the text’s ‘secret’ in the conventional 
sense of unrecoverable interior, but rather attempting to perform, 
here and now, an affirmation of its singularity and alterity – a 
different kind of secret that cannot simply be revealed. If this 
performative response is to do justice to the singularity of the text 
(…) it must itself be singular and inventive – not merely an act of 
obedience to a law. 
Derek Attridge1
This chapter centres on Susan Bassnett’s essay ‘Writing and Translating’.2 
Published in a collection of articles exploring the interpretative role of the 
translator, Bassnett’s intensely personal and subjective text describes her 
practice as a writer and translator. For her, translating and writing literary 
texts are intertwining experiences: translating is a reflexive activity through 
which the writing subject becomes aware of her own possibilities and voice 
as a writer. In her essay, reflexivity is not perceived as the result or effect 
of a given translation strategy or choice of text, but as a dialogic process 
through which the author and the translator interact.3 In fact, Bassnett 
is not interested in reflexive writing strategies or in forms of translating 
which draw attention to themselves. Rather, by comparing translation 
to a dialogue, she seeks to highlight the correlation between writing and 
translating, in an effort to assert the creative power of translation. 
Bassnett’s text deals with reflexivity on three levels. Firstly, reflexivity is 
conceived as self-discovery and self-perception. Speaking about translating 
Alejandra Pizarnik, for example, she explains: ‘I felt I was somehow engaged 
in a kind of dialogue with her, that by translating I could understand my 
own thoughts better.’4 Translation in this context occasions a reflexive 
operation of self-exploration. Secondly, Bassnett describes translating as a 
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singularly ‘playful’ activity through which one ‘consciously and deliberately’ 
engages with a text: an activity which ‘can act as a regenerative force’.5 
Here, reflexivity lies in the conscious interaction with, and distance from, 
the source text, in the translator’s capacity to create something different: a 
‘counter-poem’.6 Thirdly, with its introspective tone and autobiographical 
quality, the essay is itself the locus of a self-reflexive process whereby the 
author looks back on her own approach to translating and writing in an 
attempt to better understand what constitutes the translating self. 
Bassnett’s overall approach to translation as a subjective engagement 
with the source text relies on hermeneutic reflexivity, a style of 
interpretation based on the translator’s creative reading of the text to be 
translated. In this chapter I draw on Bassnett’s essay to explore the idea 
of a dialogic interaction between author and translator shaped by her 
theory, and engage in a performative translation of her text into French, 
so as to interrogate the significance of her metaphor in the context of 
my own reflexive practice of translation. If translating is a reflexive form 
of writing that requires an active engagement with the source text, as 
Bassnett suggests, to what extent is it dialogic? What aspects of the 
relationship between author and translator are brought to light by the 
use of the ‘dialogue’ metaphor? What does a dialogic translation involve 
in practical terms? And to what extent is it reflexive? 
In this chapter I give a brief overview of Bassnett’s approach in ‘Writing 
and Translating’ and examine her essay in the context of a growing concern 
with subjectivity and creativity in translation studies. I then present a 
performative translation of her text in the form of an open letter addressed 
back to the author. My letter builds on Bassnett’s description of reflexivity as 
a dialogic relation between author and translator to present performativity 
in translation as a responsive enactment of a prior utterance. In the 
following section I discuss the ways in which my translation of Bassnett’s 
essay both enacts and questions her dialogic metaphor, and then reflect 
on my own theorisation of reflexivity in translation as a responsive and 
responsible enactment of a prior utterance. I argue that translation invokes 
a combination of sensorial and intellectual reactions that manifests in 
return the translator’s subjective perception of the translated text, and 
seals at the same time her responsibility towards it.
Creativity in translation
Written as part of a volume of essays she edited with Peter Bush under the 
title The Translator as Writer, Susan Bassnett’s ‘Writing and Translating’ 
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presents a personal account of translation, describing its process as a form 
of writing which engages the translator in ‘some kind of dialogue’ with 
the author of the source text.7 Bassnett’s essay aims to show, through 
examples of her own experience of translating authors such as Pirandello 
and Pizarnik, that the intimacy involved in the translator’s relationship 
with the author of the source text goes beyond the demand of fidelity with 
which it is usually associated. For Bassnett, translating is a creative activity 
that involves inspiration, transformation and rewriting. It is a dialogic 
process through which the translator discovers her own voice as a writer. 
Bassnett’s text forms part of what Paschalis Nikolaou and Maria-
Venetia Kyritsi describe as an ‘inward turn’ in translation studies,8 a 
movement within the discipline characterised by a growing interest in the 
creative, experiential and subjective aspects of translating. Closely related 
to the ‘translator’s turn’ and its focus on the translator’s consciousness, 
this greater emphasis on inner spaces goes hand in hand with a renewed 
attention to the translator’s creativity – as illustrated by recently edited 
volumes such as Jean Boase-Beier and Michael Holman’s The Practices 
of Literary Translation: Constraints and Creativity,9 Eugenia Loffredo 
and Manuela Perteghella’s Translation and Creativity,10 Peter Bush and 
Bassnett’s The Translator as Writer,11 and Loffredo and Perteghella’s One 
Poem in Search of a Translator.12 
In the Handbook of Translation Studies, Carol O’Sullivan provides a 
brief synopsis of creativity in translation, stressing that in translation 
studies uses of the term usually seek to challenge the perception that 
translating is a derivative form of writing. Thus, she explains: 
Eugenia Loffredo and Manuela Perteghella have usefully pointed 
out that distinctions between ‘original’ and ‘derivative’ writing 
are themselves cultural constructs and increasingly untenable in 
a postmodern critical era (2006: 3–6); if translation is a mode of 
writing, then it cannot be separated from the broader concept of 
literary writing itself: both are ‘creative writing’.13
Viewing translation as a creative practice is crucial to studies concerned 
with the translating ‘self’, notably those exploring how voice, style and 
subjectivity are formed through translation. As Nikolaou and Kyritsi 
underline in their introduction to Translating Selves, the conjoining of 
self and creativity within translation studies has led theorists themselves 
to depart from academic discourse and to adopt a more personal tone in 
theorising translation.14 This is precisely what Bassnett does in ‘Writing 
and Translating’. Often diverging from scholarly considerations, her 
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essay mostly centres on her own creative and translation practice. In this 
text, Bassnett embarks on a personal process of self-discovery whereby 
she theorises translation primarily on the basis of her own experience 
and subjective perception of the translating task.
Bassnett’s discussion of her literary experiments with Pirandello, 
Pizarnik and poetic writing not only seeks to reveal that literary translators 
often have unspoken parallel lives as writers, but also serves to highlight 
that ‘in an adverse environment of sustained self-suppression required 
for the channeling of another literary voice, the experiential actuality is 
often one of dialogue and influence, of creative alchemy and meaningful 
ventriloquism’.15 Using the reflexive method of folding a theory back on 
itself, I inquire into this proposition through a performative translation of 
Bassnett’s essay which, following her own approach, invokes a personal 
and subjective engagement with the source text. In my translation, 
theorising becomes a creative form of writing, one that does not seek to 
provide an all-encompassing view of translation, but rather a personal 
account of a specific encounter with a text through translation. 
Letter to Susan Bassnett: example of a creative critical 
translation
The critical translation below is a creative commentary on the following 
essay: 
Susan Bassnett, ‘Writing and Translating’, in The Translator as Writer, 




Le 18 mai 2018,
Chère Susan,
Je t’écris en réponse à ton texte « Writing and Translating », paru 
dans l’anthologie d’essais intitulée  The Translator as Writer, qui 
m’a beaucoup interpellée, non seulement en tant que traductrice et 
chercheuse mais aussi en tant que lectrice et amatrice de littérature. 
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Dans ce texte, tu nous dis que tu n’as jamais réussi à savoir 
exactement quand la distinction entre écriture et traduction est 
devenue hégémonique. Tout ce que tu sais, expliques-tu, c’est 
qu’une telle distinction existe et qu’elle semble avoir lieu depuis 
quelque temps déjà, conduisant le plus grand nombre à percevoir la 
traduction comme la fille maudite de l’écriture, quant à elle qualifiée 
d’« originale » ou de « créative », et considérée comme supérieure.
Ce que l’on oublie souvent, soulignes-tu, c’est que de nombreux 
écrivains sont également traducteurs, et que, contrairement à la 
croyance populaire, pour eux la distinction hiérarchique entre ces 
deux activités n’existe pas. Tout comme l’imitation, la traduction 
peut servir à l’apprentissage de l’art de l’écriture, car si les écrivains 
ont la capacité d’imaginer et de faire parler plusieurs personnages, 
ils devraient être en mesure de se forger leur propre voix.
Ton premier mémoire de recherche portait sur James Joyce et 
Italo Svevo, et l’intérêt pour le modernisme que ce projet éveilla en 
toi te conduisit dans les bras de Pirandello. Tu écrivis trois livres et 
plusieurs articles sur Pirandello, et traduisis un certain nombre de 
ses pièces pour la radio, le théâtre et l’édition, ainsi que des essais et 
des nouvelles. Cet intérêt pour Pirandello dura une bonne vingtaine 
d’années, puis disparut complètement. Avec ses contorsions 
intellectuelles et la structure complexe de ses phrases, ses intrigues 
à fin ouverte et son sens de l’humour sombre, Pirandello, celui qui 
t’avait intriguée pendant des années, perdit toute son importance.
Tu étais tombée amoureuse d’un auteur d’un style 
complétement différent, la poétesse argentine Alejandra Pizarnik. 
Traduire Pizarnik et traduire Pirandello furent des expériences 
complètement différentes, nous expliques-tu. Hormis la différence 
de style, de contenu et de genre, tu te vis aborder la tâche de manière 
tout à fait différente. Lorsque tu traduisais Pirandello, et lorsque 
tu traduis n’importe quelle œuvre complète d’ailleurs (qu’il s’agisse 
d’une pièce de théâtre, d’un roman, d’une nouvelle ou d’un essai), 
tu commences par écrire une version manuscrite, sur laquelle tu ne 
reviens souvent jamais. Pour toi, cette étape est indispensable, c’est 
une étape qui consiste à « matérialiser l’acte de lecture » par l’écriture. 
Écrire machinalement page après page fixe en quelque sorte la 
lecture de chaque phrase ; cela révèle les aspects problématiques du 
texte, les difficultés de compréhension et les passages qu’il faut 
retravailler. L’étape suivante, qui constitue d’après toi la tâche de 
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traduction réelle (ou « translation proper » comme tu l’appelles dans 
ton texte, certainement en référence indirecte à l’expression de Roman 
Jakobson), est une étape d’écriture et de réécriture, qui consiste à 
formuler des phrases, utiliser des dictionnaires, des encyclopédies 
et des dictionnaires de synonymes. Il y a donc pour toi une 
distinction claire entre la traduction et d’autres formes d’écriture : 
traduire implique selon toi un travail d’écriture conscient et délibéré 
en plusieurs étapes. Cela comporte un aspect ludique, un enjouement 
qui ne se manifeste pas dans d’autres activités d’écriture, où le jeu 
(si on peut l’appeler ainsi) se produit intérieurement, avant même 
que l’étape d’écriture concrète ne commence. Bien que la traduction 
soit elle-même une forme d’écriture, sembles-tu suggérer ici, elle 
s’en distingue par le fait qu’elle opère une réflexivité particulière, 
un retour du texte sur lui-même, une distance du traducteur vis-
à-vis de l’activité qu’il pratique – distance réflexive dont l’expérience 
serait exacerbée comparativement à d’autres formes d’écriture. Cette 
idée que la traduction est une activité intrinsèquement réflexive, 
c’est précisément ce que cette traduction de ton texte sous forme de 
réponse épistolaire se propose d’explorer. Ma démarche interroge la 
capacité d’un texte à en énoncer un autre, et les modalités selon 
lesquelles il pourrait le faire, par le biais d’une représentation 
formelle des problèmes que soulève une théorisation de la traduction 
comme forme d’écriture singulièrement critique et réflexive. Peut-
on incarner, actualiser, exprimer formellement le discours d’un(e) 
autre  sans s’en dissocier, autrement dit sans manifester du 
même coup son propre positionnement face au texte traduit? Cette 
question, et l’approche performative que j’adopte ici pour y répondre, 
ont un caractère volontairement ludique et ironique. Car il est 
bien question ici d’aborder la traduction comme performativité et 
performance, comme représentation, comme jeu d’acteur—c’est-à-
dire comme dédoublement et redoublement de l’énoncé auquel le 
traducteur prête sa voix. 
Traduire les poèmes de Pizarnik et traduire d’autres écrivains 
étaient des activités très différentes de ton point de vue. Pour 
Pizarnik, tu traduisais plusieurs poèmes d’une traite, presque 
toujours le weekend, aux heures perdues lorsque les enfants étaient 
occupés et que tu pouvais te détendre. Traduire Pizarnik était une 
sorte de récréation. Tu ne rédigeais pas de brouillons comme tu le 
faisais pour les autres écrivains, et avec le recul, tu te rends compte 
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que le processus de traduction des textes de Pizarnik s’apparentait 
bien plus à une pratique d’écriture qu’à celle de la traduction. Tu te 
sentais en quelque sorte prise dans un dialogue avec elle, comme si 
en traduisant ses textes tu parvenais à mieux comprendre tes propres 
pensées. On pourrait presque dire que traduire Pizarnik équivalait à 
écrire du Bassnett – et ceci, malgré bien évidemment le grand fossé 
entre vos cultures, vos religions, vos éducations et vos expériences 
de vie.
En 2002, tu as publié un petit livre dans lequel tu essayais 
de mieux comprendre les motifs de l’écriture et de la traduction, la 
relation qui peut s’établir entre l’écrivain et le traducteur, les notions 
d’influence et de transmission qui sous-tendent la traduction. Tu 
l’as intitulé Exchanging Lives (« Échange de vies »). Il s’agit d’un 
recueil divisé en quatre parties : tes traductions de Pizarnik avec 
le texte original espagnol sur les pages opposées, un mélange de 
traductions et de poèmes que tu avais rédigé et présenté sous forme 
de dialogue. La quatrième partie était consacrée à ce poème épitaphe 












dans lequel tes deux noms d’usage dans les deux différentes sphères 
linguistiques font écho à la double signification du mot « lying », 
de même que l’utilisation du mot « debajo » par Pizarnik évoque des 
significations multiples—et de même que dans ma version, l’emploi 
de mes deux noms d’usage en français et en anglais rappellent la 
duplicité phonologique du mot « latente », qui peut aussi s’entendre 
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« l’attente ». Il te semblait, et je te rejoins là-dessus, que la meilleure 
traduction que tu pouvais proposer de la structure serrée du poème 
si court de Pizarnik était d’en donner ta propre alternative. Surgit 
encore une fois, à travers cette volonté de détacher la traduction 
des préoccupations de stricte équivalence, la question du statut du 
texte traduit dans son rapport à l’original. Tes choix manifestent 
une approche phénoménologique de la traduction conçue non pas 
comme un processus visant à reproduire une signification soi-
disant objective de l’œuvre originale, mais comme un acte de lecture 
personnel au sein duquel le traducteur exprime ses propres réactions 
face à sa rencontre subjective et intime avec le texte source. En ce 
sens, ta traduction, que tu appelles ici de façon suggestive un 
« contre poème », fonctionne (pareillement à cette lettre) comme une 
réponse au texte qu’elle propose d’incarner. 
Tu n’as pas retraduit Pizarnik depuis que tu as fini le 
manuscrit d’Exchanging Lives. La réception du livre fut mitigée  : 
certains commentateurs ont aimé l’idée de deux écrivains pris dans 
une sorte de dialogue à travers la traduction, d’autres se sont plaints 
des « inexactitudes » dans les textes traduits. Je fais, quantà moi, partie 
d’une troisième catégorie de commentateurs : ceux qui se demandent 
ce que l’idée de «  deux écrivains pris dans une sorte de dialogue à 
travers la traduction  » veut dire concrètement—question que la 
présente traduction tente d’explorer par la pratique, en actualisant 
formellement ta vision de la traduction comme dialogue intime 
entre auteur et traducteur.  La forme épistolaire, combinée ici avec 
l’interpellation directe « Susan » et l’utilisation du pronom personnel 
«  tu » qui témoigne d’un registre de discours informel, fonctionne 
comme une mise en application réflexive de la notion d’intimité que 
tu décris dans ton essai. Par ailleurs, dans ma version l’alternance des 
pronoms personnels « je » et « tu » met en jeu la dimension dialogique 
qui sous–tend selon toi l’interaction entre auteur et traducteur dans 
l’acte traductif. Le style d’écriture du traducteur serait, de ton point de 
vue, influencé par celui de l’auteur, inévitablement imprégné de la voix 
qu’il traduit, inéluctablement transformé par le rapport dialogique 
que constitue le processus de traduction. Ce point essentiel, qui est 
aux fondements de ton appel en faveur de la revalorisation du traduire 
comme forme d’écriture créative, est représenté dans mon texte par la 
fusion ponctuelle des pronoms personnels « je » et « tu » en un « nous » 
silencieux et indivisible.
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La multiplicité des voix à l’œuvre dans cette traduction 
performative se divise principalement en trois catégories: adresse 
directe par l’interpellation « tu » ; emploi de la première personne du 
singulier «  je  »  ; superposition des voix auctoriale et traductive à 
travers un « nous » implicite. Ces catégories soulignent trois aspects 
essentiels de la dynamique complexe entre « je » et « tu » à l’œuvre 
dans le processus traductif  : d’une part, le traducteur parlant au 
nom de l’auteur, dont il articule  les mots dans une autre langue 
et à qui il confère explicitement la provenance du discours; d’autre 
part, le traducteur assumant sa voix de traducteur comme réponse 
au discours de l’auteur et devenant lui-même agent du discours, 
c’est-à-dire un auteur à part entière  ; et enfin, une superposition 
des voix de l’auteur et du traducteur qui résulte en une sorte de 
polyphonie invisible, en une fusion des voix, où instances auctoriale 
et traductive se confondent.
Bien qu’incarnant tous ces aspects importants de ta théorie, 
ma performance de ton texte soulève aussi plusieurs questions. En 
essayant de mettre en application l’interaction dialogique entre 
auteur et traducteur par exemple, la forme épistolaire montre en retour 
que le type de texte auquel on a affaire dans une traduction n’est 
justement pas un dialogue, puisque l’auteur ne peut pas y répondre, 
et que cet auteur n’y est d’ailleurs pas à proprement parler l’agent 
de l’énonciation. L’utilisation de la seconde personne rend compte 
de cette contradiction en montrant que l’auteur est l’agent d’un 
discours dont il est dépossédé. En effet, l’emploi du « tu » indique 
que, même si l’énoncé en question t’est explicitement attribué (« tu 
nous dis que tu »), tu (en tant qu’auteur) es en réalité absente, car 
ce n’est pas toi qui parles, mais moi qui te fais parler sur le mode du 
discours indirect. Cette traduction met ainsi en scène l’appropriation 
de la voix auctoriale par le traducteur, qui de ce fait rend impossible 
l’utilisation du « je » par l’auteur. En tant qu’auteur, tu ne peux pas 
me répondre, à moins bien sûr que j’en décide autrement et choisisse 
de te faire répondre de manière fictive—mais cela ne serait qu’une 
autre manière de continuer à te faire parler, à affirmer ma position 
auctoriale, à conserver le pouvoir de parler en ton nom.
L’emploi des pronoms personnels « je » et « tu » dans cette lettre 
suggère qu’une conception dialogique de la traduction ne peut être 
qu’imaginaire et métaphorique—sauf si l’auteur et le traducteur 
entreprennent véritablement de traduire ensemble. De plus, en s’efforçant
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d’actualiser l’intimité du rapport entre auteur et traducteur que tu 
décris, la forme épistolaire défie, par la même occasion, la possibilité 
même de cette intimité. Par-delà son registre discursif informel et son 
ton familier, cette lettre souligne délibérément sa propre incapacité à 
construire une expérience totalement intime car, en tant que lettre 
ouverte, c’est-à-dire en tant qu’écrit expérimental destiné à être lu par 
d’autres lecteurs que toi, Susan, elle est constamment hantée par la 
figure de cet autre lecteur, qui n’est pas toi. Représentant et contestant 
à la fois la possibilité d’une intimité dans l’activité traductive, ma 
réponse à ton texte suggère que le processus traductif n’est ni totalement 
dialogique, ni entièrement privé, mais au mieux un mise en scène de 
ces concepts. Ma version épistolaire substitue ainsi à ta théorisation de 
la traduction comme dialogue intime entre auteur et traducteur une 
performance de la traduction comme réponse à un énoncé antérieur, 




Adresse directe à travers l’emploi du pronom personnel « tu » (« nous 
expliques-tu », etc.)
Voix du traducteur exprimée notamment par l’utilisation du pronom 
personnel « je » (« je t’écris en réponse à », etc.)
Superposition des voix (aucun recours aux pronoms personnels)
Commentaire (expression de l’opinion personnelle du traducteur)
Citation dans la langue de l’original (mise en abyme de 
l’intertextualité, qui accentue l’effet polyphonique)
Citation en langue étrangère dans l’original (mise en abyme du 
plurilinguisme, qui accentue l’aspect multilingue)
Traduction de citation (traduction d’un texte cité par l’auteur)
Interventions para-textuelles (explication de mots étrangers, 
références à d’autres textes, etc.)
Traduction indirecte (traduction d’une citation sous forme de 
discours indirect)
Genre épistolaire (conventions du genre épistolaire)
Contre-signature (contre-signature du texte qui scelle l’appropriation 
de l’énoncé par le traducteur)
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Creative critical translating
Dialogic translation?
My performative translation of ‘Writing and Translating’ into French 
focuses primarily on the dialogic metaphor developed by Bassnett in this 
essay. This metaphor is the locus of the reflexive translation practice she 
describes in this piece – translating as an empowering form of writing that 
prompts awareness and creativity. My translation attempts to perform 
her perception of translation as an intimate dialogue in the form of an 
open letter, addressed back to the author. The epistolary form, combined 
with the direct interpellation ‘Susan’ and the use of the personal pronoun 
‘tu’ (a rather informal and intimate address in French), functions as a 
reflexive application of the notion of intimacy described by Bassnett. 
Furthermore, the alternation of the first- and second-person pronouns 
‘je’ and ‘tu’ aims to stage, in a rather extreme manner, the dialogic 
dimension of translation as verbal interaction between translator and 
author. In this essay, Bassnett also draws on her personal experience as a 
translator to show how much translation has influenced her own writing 
and style. This last, but central, argument in Bassnett’s theory, which 
sets the ground for re-establishing the status of translation as a creative 
form of writing, is made visible in the numerous passages where, in my 
translation, the personal pronouns ‘tu’ and ‘je’, initially distinct, blend 
into an invisible, silent ‘us’. 
The various layers of my reflexive performance of Bassnett’s theory 
can be summarised using the colour code below: direct address to 
the author (yellow); use of the first-person in addressing the author 
(orange); superposition of the author’s and translator’s voices (light 
blue). For example:
Chère Susan,
Je t’écris en réponse à ton texte « Writing and Translating », paru 
dans l’anthologie d’essais intitulée  The Translator as Writer, qui 
m’a beaucoup interpellée non seulement en tant que traductrice et 
chercheuse mais aussi en tant que lectrice et amatrice de littérature. 
Dans ce texte, tu nous dis que tu n’as jamais réussi à savoir 
exactement quand la distinction entre écriture et traduction est 
devenue hégémonique. Tout ce que tu sais, expliques-tu, c’est 
qu’une telle distinction existe et qu’elle semble avoir lieu depuis 
56 REFLEXIVE TRANSLATION STUDIES
quelques temps déjà, conduisant le plus grand nombre à percevoir 
la traduction comme la fille maudite de l’écriture, quant à elle 
qualifiée d’«  originale  » ou de «  créative  », et considérée comme 
supérieure.
Ce que l’on oublie souvent, soulignes-tu, c’est que de nombreux 
écrivains sont également traducteurs, et que, contrairement à la 
croyance populaire, pour eux la distinction hiérarchique entre ces 
deux activités n’existe pas. Tout comme l’imitation, la traduction 
peut servir à l’apprentissage de l’art de l’écriture, car si les écrivains 
ont la capacité d’imaginer et de faire parler plusieurs personnages, 
ils devraient être en mesure de se forger leur propre voix.
These categories highlight three different aspects of the complex je/
tu dynamics at play in translation: firstly, the translator speaking in 
the name of the author, enacting her words in another language and 
explicitly attributing ownership of these words to the author (yellow); 
secondly, the translator taking ownership of her voice as a translator, 
responding to the author’s discourse and becoming herself an authoring 
agent, an author (orange); and thirdly, a superposition of the author’s 
and translator’s voices creating an invisible polyphony, a confusion of 
voices, where authoring and translating agencies become inseparable 
(light blue). 
Even while it enacts crucial elements of Bassnett’s translation 
theory, though, my performance of her text also challenges several of her 
central arguments. Indeed, in its attempt to stage the dialogic interaction 
between author and translator, for example, the epistolary form makes 
evident that the type of text we are dealing with in translation is not a 
dialogue at all, since the author cannot respond and is not even speaking 
in the first place. The use of the second-person address epitomises this 
contradiction, for it signals both the author’s ownership and also her 
loss of her own utterance. In ‘[d]ans ce texte, tu nous dis que tu n’as 
jamais réussi à savoir exactement quand la distinction entre écriture et 
traduction est devenue hégémonique’, for instance, the use of ‘tu’ makes 
clear that, while the utterance is explicitly attributed to the author (‘tu 
nous dis que tu’), the author is in fact absent, for it is not the author who 
is speaking, but the translator who is making the author speak through 
indirect discourse (‘tu nous dis que tu’). By using both first- and second-
person pronouns, my translation performs an appropriation of the 
author’s utterance, making it impossible for the author, Susan Bassnett, 
to say ‘I’. 
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Bassnett cannot respond unless I decide to stage or imagine a possible 
response, which would be another way of continuing to make her speak, 
of retaining the authoring agency, of retaining the agency to speak in her 
name. Here, the use of the personal pronouns ‘je’ and ‘tu’ shows that a 
dialogic conception of translation can only be imaginary and metaphoric. 
Moreover, by its effort to enact the concept of intimacy developed in 
Bassnett’s text, the epistolary form simultaneously questions the very 
possibility of full intimacy between author and translator in translation. 
Despite its direct address, informal register and intimate tone, my letter 
to Bassnett shows its own deliberate failure to build an entirely intimate 
experience because, as an open letter – that is, as an experimental letter 
designed to be read by other readers than Bassnett – it is constantly 
haunted by the figure of this other reader, a reader of my letter to 
Bassnett who is other than Bassnett. Staging yet defying the possibility of 
performing intimacy, my translation is at best a mise en scène of intimacy. 
Neither fully dialogic nor private, my epistolary version of Bassnett’s text 
questions the idea of an intimate dialogue between author and translator, 
for which it substitutes a view of translation as a subjective response to 
an anterior utterance, thus literally performing a responsive translation. 
Responsive translations
My approach to translation as a response to an anterior utterance is in part 
inspired by a relatively recent series of translation experiments collected 
in a book entitled One Poem in Search of a Translator: Rewriting ‘Les 
Fenêtres’ by Apollinaire. Edited by Loffredo and Perteghella, the volume 
consists of twelve translations into English of Guillaume Apollinaire’s 
poem ‘Les Fenêtres’. Translators from different backgrounds and working 
contexts (poets, professional translators, academics, visual artists, etc.) 
were asked to engage with the multimodal dimension of this poem, 
which is inspired by Robert Delaunay’s ‘Les Fenêtres’ series of paintings. 
The final product showcases a broad spectrum of creative techniques, 
ranging from machine translations to inventive uses of colour and collage. 
Each translation is accompanied by a self-reflective commentary which 
provides insight into the complex process and experience of translating 
Apollinaire’s text. 
The choice of poem is itself self-reflexive: it ‘embodies the notion 
of translation suggested by the “creative turn” which, after an initial 
resistance, achieves a liberation of the reading process by promoting 
the explosion of multiple readings elicited by the text’.16 As Loffredo and 
Perteghella clearly outline in their preface, their experimental approach 
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follows the footsteps of Clive Scott’s ‘experiential’ view of translation as a 
reading experience, as ‘the ultimate performance of reading’.17 Reading, 
according to Scott, is not an interpretative activity (a ‘post-textual’ 
operation), but a phenomenological process (an ‘in-textual’ operation) 
whereby ‘the reader actualises or embodies her individual experience of 
the text’.18 In his view, ‘it is translation’s business to capture the perceptual 
experience of reading/performing one text into another’.19 For Scott, 
as in the reflexive method I deployed to translate Bassnett, translation 
consists of reworking the source text into a reflection of the translator’s 
own reading, an experience wherein what the words do on a sensorial 
level (their impact on the reader) cannot be separated from what they 
say (the way they are interpreted). 
Drawing from Scott’s phenomenological approach, Loffredo and 
Perteghella’s experiment in One Poem in Search of a Translator relies 
explicitly on the idea of translation as an enactment of the translator’s 
sensory response to a source text. The multiplicity of methods and 
media used to perform the translations testifies to the subjectivity and 
creativity at play when reading and responding to a text, emphasising that 
translating is as much to do with expressing how the source text affects 
the translator as with what it says, or what it means. In my experience of 
translating translation theory, reading – and translating, as a response to 
a previous utterance – is indeed inseparable from interpretation. In fact, 
my experimentation raises the question of whether it is ever possible to 
separate what a text does from what it says in any translation act. For while 
Loffredo and Perteghella, following Scott, emphasise the purely sensorial 
and experiential dimension of reading and translating, their project also 
suggests that the performance of a text is in reality inseparable from its 
analysis, from its context and from the enactment of its potential meaning. 
As mentioned previously, Loffredo and Perteghella’s choice of a 
poem which embodies the liberation of the reading process is itself self-
reflexive, and suggests an engagement with the source text that exceeds 
the senses. Further, as ‘paratextual spaces where translators act as 
“textual critics” intervening and discussing “alternative textual variants” 
or showing “the elusive nature of translation”’,20 the commentaries take 
the translations another step beyond the purely sensorial. Similarly, in my 
epistolary translation of Bassnett’s text, using a colour code to map out 
the different voices, registers and levels of discourse deployed in response 
to her essay serves to symbolise the dynamic interaction of sensorial 
and interpretative elements at play in my approach to translation. The 
colours signify in both form (visually, each produces a different sensory 
effect) and content (analytically, each represents a particular mode of 
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discourse), thus concretely highlighting the sensorial and critical aspects 
of my response to Bassnett. 
If the translatorly readings proposed in One Poem in Search of a 
Translator, and in my response to Bassnett, are interpretative, they are 
not interpretative in a hermeneutical, explanatory sense, for they are 
not just the expression of a rational interpretation of the source text. 
In my experiment, the intellectual component of translation cannot be 
separated from its sensorial performance. Interpretation, in my approach, 
is simultaneously experiential and analytical, practical and theoretical, 
emotional and critical. In this way I follow Douglas Robinson, who, in 
the Translator’s Turn, suggests that translating is an activity in which the 
rational and the emotional are intertwined, indivisible: 
That our understanding of language, our memories of language, 
our use and reuse of language, our language-related choices and 
decisions are all ‘somatically marked’. That we have feeling for 
words and phrases, registers and styles, either when someone else is 
speaking or writing or when we are doing so ourselves, either when 
we are working in a single language or when we are engineering 
a transfer from one to another; and that all of our decisions about 
language, including what word or phrase would be best or what 
would be most ‘equivalent’, are channeled through these feelings.21
From this point of view, there can be no thinking without feeling. Just as 
in One Poem in Search of a Translator translating poetry and expressing 
one’s sensory perception of it requires a degree of analytical engagement, 
so does critical interpretation involve an amount of sensuous interaction 
with the source text when translating translation theory. 
Translating ‘Writing and Translating’ proves a particularly creative 
and sensory task given that in this text Bassnett deliberately employs a 
subjective tone, incorporating personal anecdotes and references into her 
poems, some of which she actually cites in her piece. Translating such 
a hybrid essay highlights the difficulty of enacting a text without also 
engaging with it theoretically and reacting to it on a sensory level – that is, 
without responding to it both analytically and aesthetically. My translation 
of Bassnett involved enacting a meaning in construction, a meaning that 
was being created during the very act of performing that translation. 
Responding, from this perspective, required interpreting in a performative 
way. It meant performing according to my own understanding and 
sensitivity. It meant interpreting in the two-fold etymological sense: ‘to 
declare’ (to make an utterance) and ‘to explain’ (to construct meaning). 
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Modern acceptations of the term reflect both these aspects: ‘to 
translate orally’ and ‘to give or provide the meaning of’.22 In the verb 
‘interpret’, enactment and the creation of meaning are inseparable, as 
the ambiguous status of the ‘I’ in professional interpreting illustrates. In 
professional interpreting, the ‘I’ simultaneously enacts both authoring 
and translating instances, the initial utterance and its response, the act of 
speech and its interpretation. As Theo Hermans explains:
the necessary illusion is one of transparency and coincidence (…). 
As the interpreter’s voice falls in, coincides with and in so doing – 
paradoxically – disappears behind [the author’s] voice, the physical 
experience of hearing two distinct voices speaking more or less 
simultaneously is suppressed, or sublimated, and in practice we 
consider the two voices to be wholly consonant.23
And yet, Hermans further clarifies, ‘the translation never coincides with 
its source, it is not identical or equivalent in any formal or straightforward 
sense’.24 In fact, the translation’s non-identity to (or distance from) the 
original is precisely where the translator’s response is located. It is the 
locus of a meta-text whereby the translating subject expresses her own 
relation to, view on and position toward the text she translates. 
Translating compels the translator to transform the original text. The 
translator’s role as mediator – ‘the extent to which translators intervene 
in the transfer process, feeding their own knowledge and beliefs into 
their processing of a text’25 – makes non-intervention impossible. In fact, 
the decision to remain neutral and stay as close as possible to the source 
text is itself a form of positioning. As Theo Hermans suggests: 
Translation, as the retrieval and representation of an anterior 
discourse, can be viewed as a form of quotation. In this view the 
translator is a reporter who simulates, re-enacts, reproduces the 
reported discourse mimetically. That makes translation a form of 
direct speech, with as a consequence, limited to minimal reporter 
control over the reported words. However, even a simulation 
contains a deictic aspect, which we attribute to the simulator. 
The matter is complicated further, first by the selectivity of the 
representation, which again reveals the simulator’s agency, then by 
the problem of clearly telling the mimetic from the diegetic, and 
thirdly, and most importantly, by the fact that in an interlingual 
translation the words we encounter are unmistakably those of the 
translating reporter.26
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For Hermans, it is precisely to the extent that the translator is more than 
just a soundbox or mouth-piece animator that the translator’s subject-
position becomes discernible in translation. When translating translation 
theory and engaging with a text on a theoretical level in particular, 
the translator’s perspective on the theory translated creates room for 
the expression of an attitude which works as a response to the theory 
expressed in the source text. 
My reflexive translation of Bassnett’s essay actualises this responsive 
aspect of translation as a process through which the translator explores 
her own reaction to a given text. In attempting to enact Bassnett’s 
description of translation as an intimate dialogue between author and 
translator, I also construct my own approach to translation as critical 
response. Just as, according to Bassnett, ‘translating Pizarnik was 
Bassnett writing’,27 so was translating Bassnett a pathway to articulating 
my own perspective on translation. In fact, many translation theories 
are formulated in response to prior texts. Lawrence Venuti’s concept of 
foreignization, for instance, was partly inspired by Antoine Berman’s 
approach in ‘La traduction comme épreuve de l’étranger’, which Venuti 
translated into English as ‘Translation and the Trials of the Foreign’. 
Berman’s own theory was developed in reaction to the theories of the 
German Romantics (including Friedrich Schleiermacher), as well as in 
response to Walter Benjamin’s ‘The Task of the Translator’, a text with 
which Berman engages performatively in L’Âge de la traduction.
Jacques Derrida’s ‘Des Tours de Babel’ provides another example of 
a translation theory developed in response to a prior text. As explained 
in the introduction to this monograph, in this essay Derrida undertakes a 
translation of Benjamin’s ‘The Task of the Translator’ in order, ultimately, 
to present his own approach to translation – which both enacts and 
transgresses Benjamin’s theory. Derrida’s translation elaborates the 
idea that translating operates a ‘conserving-and-negating lift’,28 thereby 
actualising Benjamin’s view that translation functions as an organic 
extension of the original. However, Derrida also pushes the limits of 
Benjamin’s text, for, by choosing to translate a French translation of it 
(instead of the German original), he also challenges Benjamin’s idea 
that translating a text which is itself a translation is an impossible task. 
‘Translations’, Benjamin claims, ‘prove to be untranslatable not because 
meaning weighs on them heavily, but rather because it attaches to them 
all too fleetingly’.29 With his intralingual translation of ‘The Task of the 
Translator’, Derrida responds to Benjamin’s theory by extending it, and 
suggests that to respond to a text also implies going beyond it. 
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Similarly, in my practice, translating entails developing a critical 
stance. It involves reflecting and commenting on the text’s key arguments 
while attempting to enact them. In my translation of ‘Writing and 
Translating’, the genre of the open letter itself epitomises this critical 
approach, which is further enhanced by the colouring of the letter and the 
different categories of speech the colours represent. The passages in red, 
for example, draw attention to the meta-textual aspect of my response to 
Bassnett’s text. They signal my comments and highlight the fact that my 
letter is not a transparent, identical reproduction of Bassnett’s essay, but 
an expression of my own perspective on the issues that she raises. Overall, 
the colour code functions as a self-reflexive commentary that seeks to 
explain visually the text’s underlying structure, its internal design.
Response and responsibility
Portraying translation as an operation of response highlights the subjective 
dimension of the translator’s relation to the source text. This does not 
mean, however, that the response is unreflective in relation to the writing it 
incarnates. Far from being removed from its source, the translator’s response 
to a text is inevitably indebted to it. In very simple terms, the translation 
needs the original in order to come into being; it inevitably reflects an aspect 
of the work to which it responds. Derrida’s essay ‘What is a “Relevant” 
Translation?’ provides a penetrating discussion of the indebtedness of 
translation to the source text. Having described the task of the translator as 
a ‘duty’ (or ‘debt’), which is ‘as inflexible as it is unpayable’,30 Derrida then 
literally inscribes the notion of indebtedness into his writing by deliberately 
inserting problems of translation for the future translators of his text. The 
use of the word relevante, for example – a multilingual term, borrowed from 
the English but marked by the meanings of the French verb ‘relever’ and 
noun ‘relève’ – epitomises this challenge, for, as Derrida explains, the term 
is not only ‘in translation’ but it also serves ‘to qualify translation and to 
indicate what a translation might be obliged to be, namely relevant’.31
Derrida’s concept underlines the necessity yet impossibility for 
translation to constitute itself as a fully adequate response to the 
source text. This tension is actualised in Lawrence Venuti’s own English 
translation of Derrida’s text. As Venuti explains:
Key terms like relève, which Derrida describes as untranslatable, 
have remained untranslated in most passages. But because relève 
is the object of a richly detailed interpretation, I have rendered 
it expansively in some instances, making explicit the range of 
meanings that it accumulates in Derrida’s discussion.32
63SUBJECT IV ITY AND CREATIV ITY:  SUSAN BASSNETT
Venuti’s decision to maintain and clarify the word relève exemplifies the 
double bind of relevance as concurrently an adequate response to, and an 
enhancement of, the source text – thus showing that enacting a previous 
utterance means both remaining at the mercy of the original and going 
beyond it. By often anticipating its own possible translations, Derrida’s 
writing suggests that the response brought about during the translating 
process is already at play, as a possibility, in the source text. It implies that 
responding to a text is also, to a certain extent, to actualise its potentialities. 
My theorisation of translation as a response to a previous utterance is 
itself conceived and elaborated as a possible interpretation of Bassnett’s 
own account of translation in ‘Writing and Translating’. Even though her 
essay explicitly formulates the idea of translation as dialogue, several 
other elements in her text point toward a view of translation as response. 
Throughout the essay Bassnett stresses the important role that translating 
authors such as Pizarnik and Pirandello played in the development 
of her own voice; she insists on the ideas of writing under influence, 
expressing herself in reaction to other texts and writing counter-poems. 
Her approach to translating recalls the experiential perspective of Clive 
Scott, who in Translating Baudelaire describes translation as a process of 
self-discovery: 
What if we read and translate in order to situate the ST in our own 
psycho-physiological response to it? I read Baudelaire in order to 
transpose him to my psychic, emotional and vocal range. This is 
not to confine the ST, but to be liberated by it, liberated not into 
Baudelaire so much perhaps as into territories of myself that 
Baudelaire makes available to me. (2000: 249)
From this point of view, translating is a self-expressive response through 
which the translator develops her own sense of self. 
The translator responds to the source text on the basis of her own 
experience of it. In the words of Yves Bonnefoy, ‘if the translation is 
not a crib, a mere technique, but an inquiry and an experiment, it can 
only inscribe itself – write itself – in the course of a life; it will draw 
upon that life in all its aspects, all its actions.’33 Translating, from this 
perspective, is an operation of response which both calls upon and 
creates the translator’s perception of herself, as though the ‘self’ of the 
translator were being constructed through translation. This self, Scott 
suggests, we might want to imagine as ‘something unitary, something 
which has a particular style, something which has a certain vision of the 
text. But each translational act defines the translator in different ways.’34 
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In fact, each translation is also a translation of the self – the creation of 
a certain style, of a certain perception of oneself, of a certain vision of 
translation itself. The moment we acknowledge the subjective dimension 
of translational work, we become aware of various senses in which the 
translator is responsible to and for her work.35
Responsibility in translation lies in the translator’s response to the 
source text, in the way she interprets it, represents it and expresses her 
own experience of it. As David Wills puts it in Matchbook, a collection of 
essays devoted to Derridean deconstruction, ‘responsibility is precisely 
a gesture of response’.36 The translator’s responsibility resides in the 
articulation of her own perception of the source text, while making a claim 
of fidelity to that text. Responding, in this context, means both enacting 
and transforming the prior utterance; it implies saying something more 
than (or different from) the original. A response, in this approach, is 
not a folding back, or a return to the first utterance, but a displacement, 
a new act of communication. As Susan Petrilli suggests in Translation, 
Translation, to be adequate (I would say relevant) ‘the translation-text 
must not simply repeat the [source text], but must establish a relation 
of answering comprehension to it’.37 The responsible translator must 
respond to the original: she must render the source text, but she can only 
do so by interpreting it, reacting to it and transforming it. 
As Petrilli points out, translation emphasises the responsive aspect of 
all writing (the fact that we write within a given context and respond to 
a certain tradition on the basis of our own history, expressing ourselves 
in response to other texts): ‘To speak, to be a speaking subject, to be 
an author’, she explains, ‘is always to respond, and in fact all texts are 
a response.’38 For Petrilli, the subject and the text can decide anything 
except the conditions that make them possible. ‘This’, she indicates, 
‘already emerges from the fact that every time the subject speaks, every 
time it produces a text, it is responding.’39 Translation in this view is a 
response to a call, but as such it also formulates a call of its own:
That to speak is to respond and that speaking can do nothing 
without presupposing that someone is listening, says clearly that 
this initiative does not belong to the subject, to the I, but, on the 
contrary, to the other: another with whom the subject is already 
communicating, to whom it must respond and answer to.40
Responsibility in translation is never just a movement of response – or 
rather, the response it articulates is also concurrently, and inevitably, an 
address. 
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A double sense of responsibility is thus at play in translation, 
for while responding to the source text the translator also addresses 
someone else: a reader, an audience. Even when literally responding to 
a text – as I do in my open letter to Bassnett – the response constitutes 
a new interpellation, an address which displaces the initial act of 
communication and its reception. My response to (and interpretation of) 
Bassnett’s text does not end with my personal reading of it, nor does it 
simply return to the author. Although explicitly addressed to Bassnett, 
my open letter also calls upon other readers, implicitly asking to be seen 
and read by a wider audience. Response in translation is not circular; it 
does not go back to the first sender. Instead it establishes a new address 
that transforms the first utterance into a new act of communication. This 
is why a dialogic view of translation is questionable. By simultaneously 
responding to and addressing a call, translation shows that dialogue itself 
is not a reflexive operation whereby the message completes a full circle. 
For every utterance is to a certain extent part of a dialogue, a speaking 
with, an address to someone; and yet every act of communication is also 
threatened by the possibility that this address, this message, misses its 
destination.
In The Postcard: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond,41 Derrida explains 
that the very structural condition of the act of sending a message is that 
it may not arrive. According to Derrida, as soon as we send a letter, we 
take the risk of it not arriving, for there is always a chance that the letter 
will get lost, that it will not reach its intended addressee. As Derrida 
makes clear, this does not imply that the letter will never arrive. Rather, 
it means that it ‘may always not arrive’.42 For Derrida, there would be no 
letter without the possibility of it not arriving. This possibility is what 
defines its very structure as a letter, as envoi. Translating exacerbates this 
impossibility of securing delivery, and this is precisely what my letter 
to Bassnett aims to demonstrate, both metaphorically and literally – or 
‘letterally’ as David Wills playfully puts it in relation to Derrida’s own 
performative approach in The Postcard.43 From my perspective, response 
in translation is a deferred transmission, a displaced address which the 
sender can never fully control or direct. 
Translating requires taking responsibility for one’s personal response 
to a text – both with regard to the author of the original and to the reader 
of the target text. Translators are concurrently bound to the source text 
to which they must respond and exposed to an audience that they cannot 
entirely anticipate. As Walter Benjamin succinctly phrases it in ‘The Task 
of the Translator’, ‘[n]o poem is intended for the reader, no picture for 
the beholder, no symphony for the listener’44 – or in Antoine Berman’s 
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French version: ‘Il n’est pas un poème qui soit fait pour celui qui le lit, pas 
un tableau pour celui qui le contemple, pas une symphonie pour ceux qui 
l’écoutent.’45 According to Derrida, even when it is addressed to someone 
we know, the addressee of our text is not knowable, because the structure 
of the envoi makes its destination inescapably uncertain: 
J’écris non seulement parce que j’écris à quelqu’un que je connais 
ou que je suis supposé connaître, mais j’essaie d’instituer, par 
l’inscription d’une trace nouvelle [cf. l’acte d’écriture] qui doit être 
un évènement, le ou la destinataire, autrement dit l’autre. Ça peut 
être quelqu’un que je connais, mais ce quelqu’un que je connais ne 
sera le ou la destinataire de cette  lettre qu’en la recevant, qu’en 
l’acceptant, qu’en la contresignant en quelque sorte. Donc ça veut 
dire que, au moment où je l’écris, l’autre n’existe, d’une certaine 
manière, pas encore.46
I write not only because I write to someone I know or whom I am 
supposed to know, but I try to institute the addressee (i.e. the other) 
through the inscription of a new trace (i.e. the act of writing) which 
must be an event. It can be someone I know, but this someone I 
know will become the addressee of this letter only when they 
receive it, accept it and counter-sign it, so to speak. This means that 
at the moment of writing the letter, the other does not, to a certain 
extent, yet exist.47
For Derrida, the addressee of a letter does not exist until she receives it, 
accepts it, and counter-signs it. This means that when addressing a letter 
to someone, this someone is, ironically, not yet determined. 
Just as it is impossible for a writer to predict every translatorly response 
to her work, so the translator is unable to guarantee who the reader of her 
text will turn out to be. Paradoxically, at the very moment of addressing a 
text to a specific audience, the translator faces the impossibility of securing 
the specificity of this address. My open letter to Bassnett thematises and 
formalises this uncertainty, as my direct appeal is continuously threatened 
by the irruption of another, unknown reader. Further, because I did not 
send the letter to its primary addressee, its audience remains deliberately 
undecided, open and unknowable. Even if I decided to send the letter to 
the author, there is no guarantee that she would respond to it or even 
consider it. In fact, the very possibility of a lack of response signals that no 
address – even one which thematises its own displacement – can secure 
its own arrival. Destination cannot be controlled prior to reception, just 
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as meaning cannot be decided before the act of reading. In my letter to 
Bassnett, the colour code seeks to provide guidance on how to read my 
French rendering of ‘Writing and Translating’. It literally highlights and 
makes visible my response to Bassnett’s theory. And yet it is up to the 
reader to decipher it, interpret it and respond to it. It is up to the reader to 
make my responsive translation relevant. 
Conclusion: from dialogue to response
My examination of Susan Bassnett’s approach to translation in this 
chapter suggests that, far from establishing ‘some kind of dialogue’ 
between author and translator, translating rather produces ‘activations 
of the self’.48 My own practice highlights this idea by showing that, 
as a subjective and creative act of reading, translation involves both 
enacting the source text and responding to it – that is, expressing one’s 
personal, sensory and intellectual perception of it. In the process of 
performing the other text, the translator also, and inevitably, presents 
her own interpretation of the original, positions herself in relation to 
it and develops her own understanding of what translating is about. 
Translation in this sense is metatextual. It does not only represent the 
source text, but also expresses the translator’s attitude towards it. The 
process of translating creates a subject-position – a sense of self and a 
point of view – which gets inscribed in the translated text itself. 
For Theo Hermans, translation studies needs a model which 
‘accounts for the way in which the translator’s voice insinuates itself into 
the discourse and adjusts to the displacement which translation brings 
about’.49 This model, according to Hermans, must view the translator 
as ‘constantly co-producing the discourse, shadowing, mimicking […], 
but occasionally – caught in the text’s disparities and interstices; and 
paratextually – emerging into the open as a separate discursive voice.’50 
This is exactly what my performative translation of Bassnett’s text strives 
to do by simultaneously reproducing her text and responding to it, 
concurrently confusing voices and distinguishing between them. In my 
letter, translation becomes a reply, a retort (une réplique). It presents 
an act of interpretation, similar to acting. Just as an actor’s unique way 
of embodying and performing a script expresses her singularity and 
subjectivity, so does, in my practice, the translator’s representation and 
re-enactment of the source text reflect her own vision of translation. In 
the process of performing a text, the translator creates a difference which 
functions as an embodied critical position.
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Responsibility in translation resides in this difference. It lies in the 
translator’s response to the source text, in this new act of communication 
which is not just a folding back, a reply, but also, synchronously and 
inevitably, a deferral, a new interpellation, a call. From this perspective, 
being responsible in translation is not just a matter of choosing between 
being faithful to the author of the original or serving the reader of the 
target culture, as Friedrich Schleiermacher’s famous formula tends to 
suggest: ‘Either the translator leaves the author in peace, as much as 
possible, and moves the reader towards him; or he leaves the reader in 
peace, as much as possible, and moves the author towards him.’51 Instead, 
accountability in translation means answering to both author and reader, 
even while knowing that, as a heterogeneous address, this answer is itself 
subject to displacement and deferral. 
A translator must account for her own impersonation of the source 
text. She must answer for the changes produced as a result of her 
subjective engagement with it. At the same time, the meaning of the text 
she creates is itself unstable and open, calling for further interpretation. 
Regardless of the amount of colouring and guidance provided, translation 
ultimately remains at the mercy of the reader, of this unknown and 
unknowable figure who always threatens to be other than the one I intend 
– a figure ingrained in her own subjectivity, historicity and experience. 
Responsibility resides in this deferred act of communication – in the 
displacement of the translator’s response, in the uncertainty surrounding 
the reception of the call it formulates and in the indefinite deferral of this 
responsive call. 
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Chapter 3
Human vs. Machine Translation
Henri Meschonnic’s poetics of translating
What bothers me about some of the people who identify with 
scientism is that their mechanical models often fall far short of 
the hypercomplexity of the machines, real or virtual, produced by 
humans and to which, for example, all the aporias or the ‘impossibles’ 
taken up by deconstruction bear witness, precisely there where 
it puts the most powerful formalizing machines to the test, in 
language; and it does this not in order to disqualify the ‘machine’ in 
general, quite the contrary, but in order to ‘think’ it differently (…).
Jacques Derrida1 
This chapter explores the hierarchy underlying Henri Meschonnic’s 
poetics of translation, as developed throughout half a dozen of his texts, 
including Éthique et politique du traduire.2 In this work, Meschonnic 
presents an overview of the translational issues he had been dealing with 
for decades as a poet, a translator and a critical thinker in rather lengthy 
theoretical works such as Critique du rythme3 and Poétique du traduire.4 
Focusing more intensely on the question of ethics, Meschonnic’s Éthique et 
politique du traduire emphasises the inseparability of theory and practice 
in translation, drawing partly on his own experience of writing poems, 
translating the Bible and composing essays about translation. 
In this text, Meschonnic presents translation as an intrinsically reflexive 
practice, an activity which necessarily implies theoretical thinking. Thus, 
he explains:
On peut donc considérer (…) que le problème majeur de la 
traduction est sa théorie du langage. Ce qui est bien, d’emblée, 
impliquer deux choses : l’inséparabilité entre ce que l’on appelle 
une théorie et ce qu’on appelle une pratique, c’est-à-dire qu’une 
pratique n’est pas une pratique si elle n’est pas réflexive ou 
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réfléchie, ce n’est qu’un ânonnement de recettes apprises, et si elle 
est cette réflexivité, cette pratique implique nécessairement une 
théorie d’ensemble du langage ; et réciproquement une théorie de 
la traduction qui ne serait pas la réflexion d’une pratique ne serait 
que de la linguistique de la langue appliquée sur du discours, c’est-
à-dire de la non-pensée.5
We can therefore consider that the main problem of translation is 
its theory of language. From the outset, this implies two things: 
the inseparability of what is known as theory and what is called 
practice, that is to say that a practice is not a practice if it is not 
reflective or thoughtful, it is just a hesitant repetition of pre-existing 
codes [un ânonnement de recettes apprises]; but if it is reflective, such 
practice necessarily involves a comprehensive theory of language; 
and conversely, a translation theory that is not also a reflection on 
a particular practice would just be linguistics applied to discourse, 
that is to say non-thinking.6
For Meschonnic, there exists no practice of translation that is not also 
metatextual and reflective. Theory and practice cannot be separated 
in translation, according to Meschonnic, because, except when it is 
mechanical, the practice of translation always involves a thinking process, 
a form of decision-making, which manifests in return the translator’s 
own perception of language and of translation. 
The mechanical approach Meschonnic indirectly refers to in this 
passage is machine translation, a computerised translation practice 
which, according to Meschonnic, has contributed to the proliferation of 
non-reflective uses of language in translation. In this chapter, I address the 
question of reflexive decision-making in translation through comparative 
analysis of several automated and human translations of the above-quoted 
extract from Meschonnic’s Éthique et politique du traduire. I examine 
Meschonnic’s opposition of reflexive and unreflexive, doing so in light of 
Derrida’s concept of undecidability – the idea that in order to come into 
being a decision must resist calculability. For Derrida, undecidability does 
not, as one might expect, refer to the inability to act or decide, but rather 
to the very ‘condition of possibility of acting and deciding’.7 We must be 
careful, Derrida stresses, not to confuse undecidability with indecision. 
The undecidable is not a pathos, but a structural condition. It is what 
remains unpredictable and exceeds the mechanical.8
Addressing the confusion surrounding Derrida’s concept of 
undecidability, John Caputo explains:
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Undecidability is taken, or mistaken, to mean a pathetic state of 
apathy, the inability to act, paralyzed by the play of signifiers that 
dance before our eyes, like a deer caught in a headlight. But rather 
than an inability to act, undecidability is the condition of possibility 
of acting and deciding. For whenever a decision is really a decision, 
whenever it is more than a programmable, deducible, calculable, 
computable result of a logarithm, that is because it has passed 
through the ‘ordeal of undecidability.’ One way to keep this straight 
is to see that the opposite of ‘undecidability’ is not ‘decisiveness’ but 
programmability, calculability, computerizability, or formalizability. 
Decision-making, judgment, on the other hand, positively depends 
upon undecidability, which gives us something to decide.9
For Derrida, every decision is structured by the experience of 
undecidability because a decision that doesn’t go through the ordeal of 
the undecidable is not a decision: it is only the programmable application 
or unfolding of a calculable process.10 A decision is a decision only if it 
exceeds the application of a rule or law. 
In the following pages, I use Derrida’s concept of undecidability to 
investigate the implications of a translation theory based on the binary 
oppositions human vs. machine, poetics vs. sign, reflexive vs. non-reflexive 
that underlie Meschonnic’s approach in Ethics and Politics of Translating. 
Are such oppositions viable in practice? What do they mean concretely? 
And what are their consequences with regards to the development of 
machine translation? In answer to these questions, I explore the nature 
of reflexivity in translation through comparison of a series of human and 
machine translations of Meschonnic’s comment about reflexive decision-
making in translation. I interrogate the foundations of Meschonnic’s 
definition of reflexivity in terms of an opposition to non-reflexivity, and 
suggest that a reflexive translation practice must go beyond the antinomy 
poetics vs. mechanics that guides Meschonnic’s thought on translation. 
Poetics vs. mechanics
Henri Meschonnic is a relatively unknown figure in the Anglophone 
world. A French poet, linguist and translator, he is the author of over a 
dozen texts about translation, only one of which has been translated into 
English thus far: Ethics and Politics of Translating. The main reason for this 
relative lack of recognition is to be found in Meschonnic’s controversial 
positioning and deliberate isolation throughout his career, especially in 
74 REFLEXIVE TRANSLATION STUDIES
opposing influential movements such as hermeneutics, structuralism 
and deconstruction. In France, Meschonnic is probably best known 
for his translations of the Old Testament. His key notions of rhythm 
and continuum (which rely on the use of appositions, alliterations, 
breaks and other devices aimed at recreating the flow of language) 
are directly related to his own experience of translating the Bible. For 
Meschonnic, translation is not just about rendering meaning, but also 
about reinventing the echo of words, the silences and pauses articulated 
in speech, the other ways in which meaning is created and conveyed. It 
is about expressing the physicality of language, its prosodic, consonantal 
and vocalic patterns.
The premise behind Meschonnic’s approach is that the subject’s 
relation to the world and to oneself is always mediated by language. 
Access to truth is never direct, as thoughts get created in and through 
language. Language is therefore always a creative activity for 
Meschonnic. It is an act of poiesis in the etymological sense (from the 
Greek ‘to make’). Meschonnic’s theory contrasts the creative process 
at play in poetic translation with non-reflective, mechanical uses of 
language. Machine translation, a ‘translation which is performed wholly 
or partly by a computer,’11 is the most obvious example of an unreflective 
translation practice, according to Meschonnic. In ‘Traduire au XXIè siècle’, 
Meschonnic firmly criticises representations of language that rely on the 
discontinuity signifier-signified of the linguistic sign, which, in his view, 
have been enforced by the development of automation in the second 
half of the twentieth century: ‘The attempts at machine translation since 
the end of the Second World war’, he explains,  ‘have contributed to 
developing a linguistics of translation [based on] the conceptualisation 
of language in the dualist terms of the sign.’12 For Meschonnic, the 
discontinuity signifier-signified characteristic of machine translation 
constitutes a major obstacle to the advent of a practice based on the 
continuum of rhythm and poetics. 
In Meschonnic’s view, translating must go beyond the sign to perform 
not what the words say but what they do. For Meschonnic, language 
and life are interactive: ‘Since any human relation has to take place 
through language, a linguistic relation takes on ethical and political 
dimensions, and since translation links together different linguistic 
systems, it deepens those dimensions.’13 His approach is profoundly 
performative, and his aim, as Alexis Nouss notes in his preface to Ethics 
and Politics of Translating, is to destroy the binary conception of language 
and its binary organisation into sound and sense.14 In seeking to do so, 
however, Meschonnic’s theory establishes a new opposition between, 
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on the one hand, automated translation – a mechanical and non-
reflective activity, which relies on the ‘repetition of pre-existing codes’ 
(‘un ânonnement de recettes apprises’) – and, on the other hand, human 
translation – a creative and reflexive practice, which ‘necessarily involves 
a comprehensive theory of language’.
Meschonnic’s clear-cut distinction between mechanics and poetics in 
establishing the inseparability of theory and practice is contradictory and 
requires further investigation. For if there is no translation practice that 
is not also reflexive, machine translation should either not be considered 
a practice in the first place, or the idea that theory and practice cannot 
be separated only holds true for certain types of translation. In the next 
section, I put Meschonnic’s comment about reflexive decision-making to 
the test of its own theory by presenting machine translation outputs of 
his text alongside human translations of it. Using once again the reflexive 
method deployed in the first two chapters of this book, I question the 
potency of a reflexive approach defined in opposition to non-reflexivity, 
mechanicity and discontinuity, while exploring the possibilities of a 
practice that strives to recognise uncertainty within mechanicity and 
offers to open the mechanical to the uncertain, regardless of whether it 
appears in human or in machine translation.
Translating Meschonnic reflexively: examples of 
human & machine translations
The translations below are based on the following excerpt:
On peut donc considérer (…) que le problème majeur de la 
traduction est sa théorie du langage. Ce qui est bien, d’emblée, 
impliquer deux choses : l’inséparabilité entre ce que l’on appelle 
une théorie et ce qu’on appelle une pratique, c’est-à-dire qu’une 
pratique n’est pas une pratique si elle n’est pas réflexive ou 
réfléchie, ce n’est qu’un ânonnement de recettes apprises, et si elle 
est cette réflexivité, cette pratique implique nécessairement une 
théorie d’ensemble du langage ; et réciproquement une théorie de 
la traduction qui ne serait pas la réflexion d’une pratique ne serait 
que de la linguistique de la langue appliquée sur du discours, c’est-
à-dire de la non-pensée.
Henri Meschonnic, Éthique et politique du traduire (Paris: Verdier, 2007), 
p. 43.
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Human and Machine Translations
of
An excerpt from Henri Meschonnic’s
Éthique et politique du traduire
We can therefore consider that the major problem 
of translation is his theory of language. That 
is, from the outset, involve two things: the 
inseparability of what is known as a theory and a 
practice called, that is to say that practice is 
not a practice if it is not reflective or thoughtful, 
it is learned that ânonnement of revenue and if 
it is this reflexivity, this practice necessarily 
involves a comprehensive theory of language, and 
conversely a theory of translation would not the 
reflection of a practice would only the language 
of the language applied to the discourse, that is 
to say the non-thinking.
(Google Translate,
1 September 2014)
We can therefore consider that the major problem 
of translation is his theory of language. That 
is, from the outset, involve two things: the 
inseparability of what is known as a theory and a 
practice called, that is to say that practice is 
not a practice if it is not reflective or thoughtful, 
it is learned that ânonnement of revenue and if 
it is this reflexivity, this practice necessarily 
involves a comprehensive theory of language, and 
conversely a theory of translation would not the 
reflection of a practice would only the language 
of the language applied to the discourse, that is 
to say the non-thinking.
(Babelfish,
1 September 2014)
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It can therefore be assumed that the major 
problem of the translation is his theory of 
language. This is good, from the outset, involve 
two things: the inseparability between what is 
called a theory and what is called a practice, 
that is to say that a practice is not a practice 
if it is not reflexive or reflected, this is only a 
ânonnement of revenue learned, and if it is this 
reflexivity, this practice necessarily implies a 
theory of all of the language ; and conversely 
a theory of translation which would not be the 
reflection of a practice would be that of language 
of the language applied to the speech, that is 
to say the non-thinking.
(Dictionary.com,
1 September 2014)
We can therefore consider that the major problem 
of translation is his theory of language. What 
is good from the outset involve two things: the 
inseparability between what is called a theory 
and a practice called, that is to say that a 
practice is not practice if it is not reflexive 
or reflected, this is just droning of recipes 
learned and if this reflexivity, this practice 
necessarily imply a general theory of language; 
and conversely a theory of translation that is 
not the reflection of a practice would be only 
linguistic language applied to the speech, that 
is to say, non-thought.
(Google Translate,
20 January 2015)
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We can therefore consider (…) that the main 
problem of translation is its theory of 
language. Which really implies two things: the 
inseparability of what we call theory and what 
we call practice, which is to say that a practice 
is not a practice if it is not reflexive or 
reflected, is but a babble of memorized recipes, 
and if it is reflexive, this practice necessarily 
implies an inclusive theory of language; and 
reciprocally, a theory of translation which 
would not be the reflection of a practice would 
merely be a linguistics of langue applied to 
discourse, that is to say a non-thought.
(Meschonnic 2007/2011: 61;
trans. Pier-Pascale Boulanger)
We can therefore consider (…) that the main 
problem of translation is its theory of language. 
From the outset, this implies two things: the 
inseparability of what is known as theory and 
what is called practice, that is to say that a 
practice is not a practice if it is not reflective 
or thoughtful, it is just a hesitant repetition 
of pre-existing codes (un ânonnement de recettes 
apprises); but if it is reflective, such practice 
necessarily involves a comprehensive theory of 
language; and conversely, a translation theory 
that is not also a reflection on a particular 
practice would just be linguistics applied to 
discourse, that is to say non-thinking.
(Meschonnic 2007: 43;
My translation)
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The poetics of uncertainty
The limits of certainty
My exploration of Meschonnic’s comment about the lack of reflexivity 
in automation starts with an analysis of its English translation by three 
online translation tools: Google Translate, Babelfish and Dictionary.com. 
Below is the result provided by Google Translate on 1 September 2014:
We can therefore consider that the major problem of translation is 
his (1) theory of language. That is, from the outset, involve (2) 
two things: the inseparability of what is known as a theory and a 
practice called (3), that is to say that practice is not a practice if it 
is not reflective or thoughtful, it is learned that ânonnement (4) 
of revenue (5) and if it is this reflexivity, this practice necessarily 
involves a comprehensive theory of language, and conversely 
a theory of translation would not (5) the reflection of a practice 
would only (6) the language of the (7) language applied to the (8) 
discourse, that is to say the (9) non-thinking.
As any fluent reader of English will notice immediately upon reading 
these lines, Google’s translation presents several syntactical and lexical 
problems, which I will use as examples in my attempt to delineate the 
nature of reflexivity in translational decision-making processes. In 
(1), the masculine possessive determiner ‘his’ serves to translate the 
French word ‘sa’ in ‘sa théorie du langage’, instead of the neuter English 
possessive adjective ‘its’, which must be used alongside neuter nouns in 
English. In (2), the verb ‘involve’ is missing a grammatical subject. In (3), 
the subject and the complement are inverted (‘ce que l’on appelle une 
pratique’ becomes ‘a practice called’). In (4), the tool fails to translate 
the term ânonnement into English and chooses to use the French term 
instead. In (5), the verb ‘to be’, which appears in the conditional mode 
in Meschonnic’s French text, is omitted by the computer, which only 
manages to render the mode (‘would’). Lastly, in (7), (8) and (9), the 
definite article ‘the’ is used incorrectly with English mass nouns such as 
‘language’, ‘discourse’ and ‘non-thinking’. 
Each of these errors highlights in its own way the limits of machine 
translation as a mechanism based on pre-existing terminological 
correspondences. In the example given above, the machine proves unable 
to deal with lexical ambiguity (e.g. the polysemy of the term recettes), 
syntactic complexity (e.g. the use of neuter possessive pronouns) 
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and idiomatic singularity (the occurrence of the word ânonnement). 
Google’s mistakes suggest that the limits of a translating activity which 
is not ‘reflective or thoughtful’15 reside in its impossibility to deal with 
ambiguity, complexity and singularity. 
Judging from the following example, moreover, Google’s tool is not 
the only system to experience such limitations. Indeed, on the same day, 
Babelfish offered a translation of Meschonnic’s comment which was 
exactly the same as Google’s: 
We can therefore consider that the major problem of translation is 
his (1) theory of language. That is, from the outset, involve (2) 
two things: the inseparability of what is known as a theory and a 
practice called (3), that is to say that practice is not a practice if it 
is not reflective or thoughtful, it is learned that ânonnement (4) 
of revenue (5) and if it is this reflexivity, this practice necessarily 
involves a comprehensive theory of language, and conversely 
a theory of translation would not (5) the reflection of a practice 
would only (6) the language of the (7) language applied to the (8) 
discourse, that is to say the (9) non-thinking.
In addition to highlighting their mechanicity, the perfect identity of 
the translations provided by Babelfish and Google Translate indicates 
the difficulty of finding a so-called ‘mechanical’ practice of translation 
which does not contain grammatical or lexical errors, even at the most 
basic level, for in both cases the results obtained are incongruous 
(‘the non-thinking’), incoherent (‘his theory of language’) or entirely 
incomprehensible (‘it is learned that ânonnement of revenue’).
As has been widely acknowledged and discussed by translation 
scholars,16 machine translation tends to produce poor-quality results, 
despite the wide variety of tools available. The following example, 
which is taken from Dictionary.com, provides additional support for the 
view that, in the main and for the moment, machine translation seems 
unable to produce intelligible and adequate texts, regardless of the tool 
employed:
It (1) can therefore be assumed (2) that the major problem of the 
(3) translation is his (4) theory of language. This is good (5), from 
the outset, involve (6) two things: the inseparability between what 
is called a theory and what is called a practice, that is to say that a 
practice is not a practice if it is not reflexive or reflected, this is only a 
ânonnement of revenue learned (6), and if it is this reflexivity, this 
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practice necessarily implies a theory of all of the (7) language; and 
conversely a theory of translation which would not be the reflection 
of a practice would (8) be that of language of the (8) language 
applied to the speech (9), that is to say the (10) non-thinking.
In this translation, words are underlined when the result given by 
Dictionary.com differs from the one proposed by Google Translate and 
Babelfish. We note, for instance, that the personal pronoun ‘we’ is replaced 
by ‘it’ in (1); that a passive voice is used where Google and Babelfish used 
an active structure in (2); and that ‘discours’ is translated as ‘speech’ 
rather than as ‘discourse’ in (9). Items in bold indicate grammatical and 
lexical errors which, like in the translations by Google and Babelfish, 
impede readability, as well as syntactical and terminological elements 
which modify the meaning of the source text.
For example, the active construction ‘On peut donc considérer que’ 
is replaced by the passive form ‘It can therefore be assumed’, the French 
adverb ‘bien’ is translated as the English adjective ‘good’, and ‘recette’ is 
translated as ‘revenue’ instead of ‘recipe’. The translations provided by 
Dictionary.com in this passage are not wrong in themselves: the passive 
formulation ‘It can therefore be assumed’ is grammatically correct; the 
term bien may indeed be translated as ‘good’ in some cases; and the 
equivalent term for ‘recette’ in an economic context would certainly 
be ‘revenue’. Instead, problems in comprehension arise because of 
the translation’s contextual inadequacy to the source text, because of 
the system’s incapacity to offer an English translation that matches 
the meaning and/or the construction of the source text, because of its 
inability to take into account the context in which the utterance takes 
place. As these examples suggest, reflexivity in translation does not 
only reside in producing an intelligible text in the target culture, it also 
relies on the faculty to interpret the source text in context. Thus, the 
major obstacle to machine translation appears to be the equivocality 
and context-dependency of language itself, the fact that there may exist 
several interpretations of any given text and that in any given language 
an idea may be expressed in multiple ways. From this point of view, 
reflexivity consists above all in the ability to deal with ambiguity.
According to Basil Hatim and Ian Mason, however, if the limits of 
automation raise problems of a linguistic order, they do not constitute 
genuine problems of translation. In their view, the challenges of 
automation are not translation challenges per se, because they are not the 
product of a genuine decision-making process. This is why, they claim, 
despite the significant development and improvement of translation 
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tools in the past few decades, the main task of translators remains the 
same: to decide.17 Hatim and Mason describe the reflexivity deployed 
during translation processes as follows:
1. Comprehension of source text:
a. parsing of text (grammar and lexis)
b. access to specialised knowledge
c. access to intended meaning
2. Transfer of meaning:
a. relaying lexical meaning
b. relaying grammatical meaning
c. relaying rhetorical meaning, including implied or inferable 
meaning, for potential readers.
3. Assessment of target text:
a. readability
b. conformity to generic and discoursal TL conventions
c. judging adequacy of translation for specified purpose.18
Deliberately simplified though it is, this list of the faculties at play in a 
translating task provides a good illustration of the scope of translational 
decision-making, from the comprehension of the source text to the 
evaluation of the target text. 
Unlike a machine, a human will seek to preclude the grammatical 
errors or semantic differences that arise during the translating process. 
For example, it would be very unlikely for a qualified translator to use 
definite articles with abstract nouns in English, or translate ‘recette’ as 
‘revenue’ in the context of Meschonnic’s comment. On the contrary, a 
human translation, like the one I propose below, will strive to prevent 
possible lexical and syntactic mistakes in order to ensure that the 
translated text is intelligible and that it represents the source text 
accurately:
We can therefore consider that the main problem of translation is 
its theory of language. From the outset, this implies two things: the 
inseparability of what is known as theory and what is called practice, 
that is to say that a practice is not a practice if it is not reflective 
or thoughtful, it is just a hesitant repetition of pre-existing codes 
[un ânonnement de recettes apprises]; but if it is reflective, such 
practice necessarily involves a comprehensive theory of language; 
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and conversely, a translation theory that is not also a reflection on 
a particular practice would just be linguistics applied to discourse, 
that is to say non-thinking.19
The reflexivity at play in translation goes beyond the capacity to avoid or 
correct linguistic anomalies. It relies on decision-making – that is, on the 
aptitude to choose beyond existing propositions. This is demonstrated, for 
example, in the case of the expression ‘ânonnement de recettes apprises’, 
which finds no direct correspondence in English. Being unable to find, 
like Google Translate, Babelfish and Dictionary.com, an equivalent for 
the term ânonnement in the bilingual dictionaries I consulted,20 I decided 
to offer an alternative translation – one which seemed to best represent 
the idea in English: ‘a hesitant repetition of pre-existing codes’. In this 
framework, then, reflexivity in translation lies in the faculty to choose 
when no choices are available, the capacity to decide when faced by 
uncertainty.
Beyond certainty
Meschonnic’s criticism of machine translation in Ethics and Politics of 
Translating is emblematic of a wider opposition in translation studies 
between literary translation and automation. Antoine Berman, for 
example, distinguishes la traductologie (the study of translation centred 
on linguistics, comparative literature and poetics) from la traductique, 
a new-born discipline which, in the wake of computer science and 
computer-integrated manufacturing, strives, according to him, to 
annex translational processes to systems of computation.21 Even if, 
as Pier-Pascale Boulanger notes in her introduction to the English 
version of Éthique et politique du traduire, Meschonnic’s theory seeks 
to override ‘the traditional opposition that is made between poetry and 
ordinary language, verse and prose as well as writing and translation’,22 
his description of machine translation as a non-reflexive practice 
corroborates the distinction poetics-mechanics at the centre of Berman’s 
differentiation between traductologie and traductique.
In translation studies, the opposition human vs. machine is based on 
the idea that, since automation operates according to fixed rules and pre-
established terminological correspondences, machine translation does 
not require decision-making. However, opposing automated and human 
translations in these terms does not take into account the fact that the 
equivalences that make machine translation possible are themselves the 
product of human decisions. There are currently three types of machine 
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translation (or MT): rule-based MT, statistical MT and hybrid systems.23 
Rule-based MTs generate translation outputs on the basis of syntactic 
and semantic information retrieved from dictionaries and grammars. 
Statistical MTs, on the other hand, translate on the basis of statistical 
models whose parameters are derived from the analysis of bilingual text 
corpora. Hybrid systems, lastly, combine the properties of rule-based 
and statistical models.24 In each case, the machine relies on human 
decision: with rule-based MT, lexical correspondences and syntactic 
rules are established by linguists, terminologists and computer scientists; 
in statistical MT, computation is based on existing human translations; 
and in hybrid models, the machine combines the linguists’ expertise with 
real-life translation decisions.25
Human intervention is therefore omnipresent at each and every 
stage of machine translation, from selecting the source text and 
target language to post-editing the results provided by the computer. 
Furthermore, most automated translation systems deploy a decision-
making process which is similar to human translation (selection of 
terms according to a complex combination of semantic, grammatical 
and contextual parameters). Not only this, statistical translation systems 
like Google also translate on the basis of existing human translations so 
they have, in that sense, the faculty to learn from real-life translational 
choices.26 Thus,  while in September 2014 Google Translate was unable 
to find an equivalent for the term ânonnement, and proposed to translate 
‘recipe’ as ‘revenue’, a more recent search (in January 2015) showed that, 
in the meantime, the machine had ‘learned’ the signification of the word 
ânonnement (‘droning’) and that it was now capable of choosing a more 
relevant  translation for the word recette (‘recipe’):
We can therefore consider that the major problem of translation is 
his theory of language. What is good from the outset involve two 
things: the inseparability between what is called a theory and a 
practice called, that is to say that a practice is not practice if it is 
not reflexive or reflected, this is just droning of recipes learned and 
if this reflexivity, this practice necessarily imply a general theory 
of language; and conversely a theory of translation that is not the 
reflection of a practice would be only linguistic language applied to 
the speech, that is to say, non-thought.
The result given by the machine is still clumsy (‘droning of recipes’), but 
it confirms the tool’s capacity to evolve and develop, while highlighting 
the important role that human translators play in this learning process, 
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since they are the ones who provide the knowledge on which these 
automated models are based.27 The fact that human input is so essential 
to machine translation, and that the interaction between humans and 
computation is so intricate, suggests that automated translation may not 
be as unreflective as it first seems – or rather, that what is unreflective 
and mechanical about it is not to be opposed to human translation, but 
understood as deriving from it.
Saying that translation is an intrinsically reflexive process presumes 
that human translation is always the result of a reflective decision-
making process. However, as a linguistic operation, human translation 
itself can never fully escape codification. For it is precisely the codification 
of linguistic signs that makes translation possible. If, like Meschonnic, 
Derrida questions a one-dimensional distinction signifier/signified (by 
showing, for example, that each signified also occupies the position of 
a signifier),28 contrary to Meschonnic, he also insists upon the necessity 
of maintaining this difference without which no practice of translation 
would be possible: 
nor is it a question of confusing at every level, and in all simplicity, 
the signifier and the signified. That this opposition or difference 
cannot be radical or absolute does not prevent it from functioning, 
and even from being indispensable within certain limits – very wide 
limits. For example, no translation would be possible without it.29
For Derrida, translation is inherent to the concept of sign itself, since 
in a relation of semiosis a sign always refers to another sign, which 
functions as its signifier, as its interpretant. The difference between 
signifier and signified is made possible, not because the signifier refers 
to a non-linguistic reality, but because ‘language accrues, through fairly 
regulated repetition of signifiers in a general code, certain instituted 
meaning effects’.30 What establishes the sign as code in Derrida’s view 
is repeatability. It is precisely the codification and repeatability of which 
linguistic units are capable – their ‘iterability’, to use Derrida’s terminology 
– that makes translation possible, for a sign or a mark that was not 
repeatable would not be a sign or a mark in the first place; it would not 
be an element in a language or a code. This goes for all marks, for marks 
as such, even if one could be found that had occurred only once. When 
it was uttered or written as a mark, it was constituted by the fact that it 
was repeatable, by its iterability.31 Without the repeatability of linguistic 
signs in different contexts, translation, as a work of recontextualisation, 
would be impossible.
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As David Bellos points out in Is That a Fish in Your Ear, a great deal 
of human translation relies on codification and repetition. Experienced 
professional translators who work in a familiar domain, for example, ‘know 
without thinking that certain chunks of text have standard translations 
that he or she can slot in.’32 At an even more basic level, Bellos explains, 
any translator knows that there are some regular transpositions between 
the two languages she is working with: the French personal pronoun 
on, for example, will almost always require the English sentence to be in 
the passive. Moreover, translators often develop their own automatisms 
as they gain more experience (mechanisms which they use to varying 
degrees depending on their familiarity with the source text, the time 
allocated to the translation task, etc.). In this respect, they behave like 
Google Translate, ‘scanning their own memories in double-click time 
for the most probable solution to the issue at hand’.33 Just like machine 
translation, human translators rely on the mechanicity of language, on 
the repeatability of the linguistic sign. And yet, because of its iterability, 
every sign also goes beyond the codification that makes it possible. The 
occurrence of a sign in a given context highlights its double status as a 
code which, because of its possible transposition to a different situation, 
exceeds the codification that produces it. ‘There is some machine 
everywhere, and notably in language’, Derrida explains. ‘As soon as there 
is any calculation, calculability, and repetition, there is something of a 
machine.’ However, ‘in the machine there is an excess in relation to the 
machine itself: at once the effect of a machination and something that 
eludes machinelike calculation’.34 
What exceeds calculation, for Derrida, is the undecidable – that 
domain which doesn’t pertain to the ordeal of calculability, the event 
‘which in essence should remain unforeseeable and therefore not 
programmable’.35 In translation, the undecidable can erupt anywhere, 
in human activity as well as in the machine. The treatment of the 
word ânonnement in translating Meschonnic’s comment provides a 
good illustration of this. Its non-translation by Google Translate, for 
example, signals both the mechanicity of the computing system (its 
programmability) and the excess of the machine in relation to itself 
(the fact that not everything can be calculated, that the incalculable is 
everywhere, including in the machine). Moreover, the tool’s capacity to 
translate a word whose meaning it did not know just a few months earlier 
shows that every new association of words, every linguistic combination 
(even one that takes place in or with the machine) is the result of a 
decision-making process, of something which at a given moment in 
time resisted mechanicity and programmability. In my translation of 
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Meschonnic’s comment, the untranslatability of the term ânonnement 
(the fact that there exists no lexical unit corresponding to this word in 
the dictionaries examined) put me face to face with the incalculable, 
since I could not simply choose among pre-existing translations: I had to 
create my own translation, my own terminological correspondence. At 
once challenging and highlighting the codification at play in translation, 
the word ânonnement forced me to generate a new code, to associate 
‘ânonnement’ with ‘hesitant repetition’. 
In fact, an English translation of Meschonnic’s phrase already exists 
in Pier-Pascale Boulanger’s version of Éthique et politique du traduire. In 
her English rendering of Meschonnic’s comment, Boulanger translates 
‘ânonnement’ as ‘babble’ (‘a babble of memorized recipes’) and, unlike 
me, she does not use the original French word in brackets to indicate 
the singularity of Meschonnic’s expression. I decided not to follow her 
translation because ‘babble’ (defined as ‘the confused sound of a group 
of people talking simultaneously’ or ‘the continuous murmuring sound of 
water flowing over stones in a stream’)36 does not convey the paradoxical 
combination of hesitation and iteration invoked by the term ânonnement, 
which is crucial to my critical reading of Meschonnic’s comment. In my 
version, the word encapsulates the very uncertainty at play in translation 
– the fact that hesitation is intrinsic to iteration, that repetition itself 
contains an element of indecision, that regardless of whether it is human 
or automated, translating involves both mechanical reflexivity and 
critical reflexiveness, automatisms and creativity. 
Towards more uncertainty
In translation, making a decision requires deciding beyond pre-existing 
options. It means developing new possibilities, creating alternative word 
associations, uncertainly and hesitantly. According to Derrida, without an 
experience of uncertainty, there would be no responsible decision. In his 
view, there is no ethical decision that does not pass through the trials of 
the ‘perhaps’, for a decision is responsible only if it exceeds calculability: 
The crucial experience of the perhaps imposed by the undecidable 
– that is to say, the condition of decision – is not a moment to be 
exceeded, forgotten, or suppressed. It continues to constitute 
the decision as such; it can never again be separated from it; it 
produces it qua decision in and through the undecidable; there is 
no other decision than this one (…) the instant of decision must 
remain heterogeneous to all knowledge as such, to all theoretical or 
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reportive determination, even if it may and must be preceded by all 
possible science and conscience. The latter are unable to determine 
the leap of decision without transforming it into the irresponsible 
application of a programme, hence without depriving it of what 
makes it a sovereign and free decision – in a word, of what makes it 
a decision, if there is one.37
From this perspective, a responsible translation is one that goes beyond 
the mechanicity of language, one that is turned towards the unknown. 
A responsible translation in this view does not merely require taking 
decisions as the French saying goes (choosing among available options) 
but making them (creating new, unprecedented correspondences). This 
is in fact exactly how Meschonnic himself defines translation. Translating 
for Meschonnic is an act of creation, a process of transformation, a poetic 
activity in the etymological sense of the word poiesis, ‘to make’. However, 
while Meschonnic perceives creativity as a distinguishing feature of 
human reflexivity, I argue that it is a possibility integral to any linguistic 
activity, regardless of whether or not it involves automation. 
Every translating act is potentially creative, whether it is literary 
or mechanical, operated by a human or a machine, since textual 
signification is always to a certain extent unstable, subject to uncertainty 
and open to the unknown. ‘Even in technical translations, traditionally 
thought of as the least creative realm of professional translation’, Douglas 
Robinson explains, ‘the translator may well profit from a brainstorming 
technique involving divergent thinking and wild imagination – when 
faced by a truculent syntactic structure, for example’.38 As Kathleen 
Davis further stresses, ‘[t]he meaning of any text is undecidable, since 
it is an effect of language and not something that can be extracted and 
reconstituted. Translators must therefore make decisions in this strong 
sense’.39 In my translation, the untranslatability of the word ânonnement 
comes to symbolise the double bind of reflexivity in translation, as 
simultaneously invoking uncertainty and mechanicity, continuity and 
discontinuity, repetition and undecidability. The untranslatability of 
the term ânonnement (the fact that there were no English equivalents 
for this term in the dictionaries consulted) reminds us that even when 
words are translatable (when correspondences are already established 
between them in a given language pair), a decision remains to be made, 
since reusing a particular association of words, repeating it in a different 
context, can itself produce a new meaning, create something novel. In 
that respect, using automated translation is itself the expression of a 
decision, for which translators must be made responsible. The main 
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question then is not how to distinguish the automated from the human, 
the machinelike from the poetic, the sign from rhythm, but how to open 
the mechanical to the uncertain, regardless of where it appears, in human 
or machine translation. 
The machine is everywhere, in computer programmes as well as in 
human language; and yet all language, as codified as it may be, exceeds 
the programmability and calculability that makes its existence possible. 
All language is haunted by the possible irruption of the unknown. All 
linguistic decision is marked by the ‘crucial experience of the perhaps 
imposed by the undecidable’.40 This is why, according to Derrida, we 
must think the undecidable with the machine, not against it.41 Exploring 
the unpredictable, the uncertain and the poetic within automation 
is exactly what Barbara Godard undertakes in her series of machine 
translations of Apollinaire’s poem ‘Les Fenêtres’. In One Poem in Search of 
a Translator, Godard uses machine translation tools such as Systran and 
Promt to explore the idea of the poem as a ‘machine’, where translation 
plays a critical role as ‘developer’ or ‘multiplier’, generating new poems.42 
Showing that automation works ‘with the found materials of language 
as “ready-made” […] to fashion new utterances’, Godard’s experiments 
draw attention to ‘the process of continuous reframing of any translating 
project’, and suggest that machine translation can itself be creative.43 
Staging the mechanicity of the poetic object as well as the machine’s 
potential for creativity, Godard’s translations highlight the doubly 
mechanistic and unpredictable character of automated translation. 
Recognising the undecidable and the creative within the machine 
does not mean negating or rejecting mechanicity altogether. On the 
contrary, if the decision is that which must remain unforeseeable and 
non-programmable, in order to accede to the decision we must also ‘take 
programming, the machine, repetition, and calculation into account’.44 
The stakes, from this point of view, are not to know whether translators 
should be advised to use machine translation or not, but to encourage 
a responsible practice of computer-assisted translation. Many machine 
translation tools available online today give the impression that human 
participation is superfluous.45 Because they are simple to use, they tend 
to make users believe that translation can rely entirely on automation, 
that automation does not require human agency, that it is not traversed 
by ambiguity and uncertainty. However, ultimately it is the users of these 
tools who will be held responsible for the translation, since they are the 
ones who will decide what to do with the computer’s results, in which 
context to reemploy them and/or how to transform them. If a responsible 
translation requires that we take into account the uncertainty at play 
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in any translation task, how can we encourage a responsible usage 
of machine translation? How can we prompt users to question the 
results provided by the machine? And conversely, how can we cultivate 
uncertainty within the computer itself? 
There are no definite answers to these questions. One possibility 
would be to have automated systems offer several translations of the 
same text, or to contextualise the use of its key words, or even to indicate 
the probability of their occurrence in different contexts. A machine that 
accounts for its own limits and acknowledges the element of uncertainty 
necessary to its responsible use would not only help professional 
translators to identify particularly complex translation problems (such as 
the translation of the word ânonnement), but also warn non-professional 
translators about possible errors and incongruences. Responsible usage 
of machine translation should also be a primary concern of translator 
training, according to Dorothy Kenney and Stephen Doherty. In their 
view, in an industry where professional translators rely increasingly on 
computer-assisted tools, educating translators who can demonstrate 
competencies in translation technology is essential.46 Translators, they 
explain, must be able to evaluate the results given by the computing 
system and, when such evaluation is itself automated, be able to 
analyse the metrics and identify their limits. Furthermore, using online 
machine translation tools for professional purposes raises thorny ethical 
and legal questions, since in many cases translators must sign clauses 
of confidentiality which forbid them to upload originals into public 
platforms such as Google Translate. Training translators who are aware 
of these issues is therefore crucial for encouraging a responsible use of 
machine translation. 
Conclusion: from poetics to undecidability
In this chapter, I have shown that in its attempt to undermine binary 
organisations of language into sound and sense, signifier and signified, 
continuum and discontinuum, Meschonnic’s theory establishes 
another series of oppositions (human vs. machine, reflexive vs. non-
reflexive, poetics vs. sign), which are in turn challenged, deconstructed 
and rethought in my practice by means of a performative translating 
approach that mirrors Meschonnic’s own description of translation as 
an ‘experimentation field of theories of language’.47 The main and most 
urgent objective of Meschonnic’s poetics of translating is to give (or give 
back) to translation its role as a tool for testing language theories and 
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practices.48 For Meschonnic, translating is an instrument of investigation, 
a laboratory of research – just as in my practice, I undertake reflexive 
translations of Meschonnic’s comment in order to examine the limits 
of his critique of mechanicity. My experimentation with machine 
translation in this chapter both performs and enhances the performative 
and investigative aspects of Meschonnic’s approach to translating, which, 
in The Ethics and Politics of Translating, he summarises as follows: ‘The 
role of theory is to transform practices, the role of practices is to reveal 
theories.’49 
Ultimately, my experimentation with Meschonnic’s text suggests 
that a theory that opposes poetics and mechanics in translation is 
untenable in practice because programmability and reflexivity are both 
integral parts of human language, which the machine merely extends 
and reflects. Just like human translation, machine translation contains 
an element of uncertainty and ambiguity, an excess in relation to its 
own programmability, epitomised by the term ânonnement, the mark 
of hesitancy within repeatability. An automated translation will be 
considered responsible if it realises the full extent (and failure) of its own 
mechanicity – that is, if it accounts for the transgression of the code that 
it establishes, if it recognises the part of the undecidable at play in its 
own computability. In other words, a responsible practice of automated 
translation must account for its own limits as a linguistic operation, 
which remains inescapably unstable, open and uncertain; it requires 
that, through its operation, translators experience the impossible 
certainty of language itself. For if taking reflexivity out of the translation 
process means depriving translators of their faculty to decide when faced 
by the undecidable, a responsible practice of machine translation must 
conversely foster incalculability within the programmable, and recognise 
uncertainty within the certain. 
The question of ethics in translation cannot be posited in terms of 
a pure opposition between a reflexive, thoughtful practice based on 
a performative view of language, on the one hand, and a machinelike 
activity relying on the duality of the linguistic sign, on the other. For 
performativity itself, as it is defined by Meschonnic (performing what the 
words do, their sensory effect, rather than what they say, their content), 
reproduces the binary division of the linguistic sign into form and content 
– a distinction which, I argue, language can never entirely escape, even 
(or perhaps even more so) when it attempts to overcome it. Today, 
machine translation is used across many domains, both professional 
and non-professional. And yet, not everyone is aware of the shortfalls 
and imperfections of the tools available. Inexperienced users are often 
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oblivious to the fact that, behind the appearance of certainty, the results 
provided by the machine will necessarily require human decision-making, 
and that they (as users) are responsible for endorsing these results. 
Current machine-translation systems would certainly benefit from taking 
into consideration the elements of uncertainty at play in their mode of 
operation. Conversely, translation theory would surely profit from being 
more mindful of automation when thinking about translation, and of the 
undecidability at work in any translation task, regardless of whether or 
not it involves machine translation. 
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Chapter 4
Criticism and Self-Reflection
Antoine Berman’s disciplinary reflexivity
The response to the question, ‘Why is error, illusion, immanent to 
truth? Why does truth arise through mistakes?’, is therefore quite 
simply: because substance is already subject. Substance is always 
already subjectivized: substantial Truth coincides with its very 
progression through ‘subjective’ illusions. At this point, another 
response to the question ‘Why is error immanent to the truth?’ 
emerges: because there is no metalanguage. The idea that one is able 
from the outset to account for error, to take it under consideration 
as error, and therefore to take one’s distance from it, is precisely the 
supreme error of the existence of metalanguage, the illusion that, 
while taking part in illusion, one is somehow also able to observe 
the process from an ‘objective’ distance. By avoiding identifying 
oneself with error, we commit the supreme error and miss the truth, 
because the place of truth itself is only constituted through error. 
Slavoj Žižek1
This chapter examines Antoine Berman’s approach to reflexivity in 
translation. In Berman’s theory, developed throughout half a dozen 
texts including L’épreuve de l’étranger,2 ‘La traduction comme épreuve de 
l’étranger’3 and Pour une critique des traductions,4 reflexivity in translation is 
conceived as a form of criticism. Himself a translator of literary texts (from 
German and Spanish into French), Berman perceives translation primarily 
as a critical activity. For him, translating is a process through which a literary 
work is analysed and judged. Reflexivity in this view refers to the translator’s 
reflection and judgment on the original work, to the role of translation as a 
metatext, to its function as a text commenting another text. Through this 
act of criticism, the translated text makes visible hidden or latent aspects 
of the original, according to Berman, and as such it fulfils the ethical aim of 
translation, which, he argues, is to be ‘an opening, a dialogue’.5
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The type of reflexivity invoked by Berman’s theory is reflexive objectivation, 
a critical revaluation of what members of a given field take for granted. This 
is why retranslation occupies such a central role in his theory. Retranslating 
is ethical for Berman because it not only involves reflecting upon a literary 
piece and thinking on the basis of that text, but also requires positioning 
oneself in relation to its previous translation(s) and glossing the choices 
involved through the prism of the translator’s own decisions. In this respect, 
Berman’s approach goes beyond establishing a purely analogical relation 
between translation and criticism. In Berman’s view, like in the reflexive 
method deployed in this book, the critical nature of translational reflexivity 
is realised in the process of translating itself. However, while Berman’s 
theory establishes a hierarchy between first translations and retranslations, 
the reflexive method adopted in my experimental translations of his work 
shows that any translating task involves positioning. 
Berman’s theorisation of translation as a form of criticism combines 
the various facets of reflexivity discussed so far in this monograph: the 
question of visibility (Lawrence Venuti), translation as a form of dialogue 
(Susan Bassnett), and metatextuality (Henri Meschonnic). Like each of 
these theorists, Berman insists on the need for increased self-awareness 
in translation. In the opening paragraph of L’épreuve de l’étranger, for 
example, he explains: 
The domain of translation has always been the site of a curious 
contradiction. On the one hand, translation is considered to be a 
purely intuitive practice – in part technical, in part literary – which, 
at bottom, does not require any specific theory or form of reflection. 
On the other hand, there has been – at least since Cicero, Horace, and 
Saint Jerome – an abundance of writings on translation of a religious, 
philosophical, literary, methodological or, more recently, scientific 
nature. Now, though numerous translators have written on their 
discipline, it is undeniable that until recently the bulk of these writings 
has come from non-translators. The definition of the ‘problems’ 
of translation has been undertaken by theologians, philosophers, 
linguists, or critics. This has had at least three consequences. First, 
translation has remained an underground, hidden activity because 
it did not express itself independently. Second, translation as such 
has largely remained ‘unthought’, because those who dealt with it 
tended to assimilate it to something else: (sub-)literature, (sub-)
criticism, ‘applied linguistics’. Finally, the analyses produced almost 
exclusively by non-translators, whatever their qualities may be, 
inevitably contain numerous ‘blind spots’ and irrelevancies.6
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For Berman, a reflexive study of translation is essential to an ethical 
translation practice. Reflection on translation has become, he argues, ‘an 
internal necessity of translation itself’.7 This reflexivity in response to the 
discipline, and at its heart, acquires a psychoanalytic dimension in his 
theory, as we shall see, and becomes the very condition for overcoming 
the ethnocentric violence at play in translation. 
In the following pages, I explore the scope and significance of 
Berman’s claim about the ethical necessity for reflexivity through an 
analysis of his main theoretical works, an inspection of their English 
translations, and a discussion of my own experience of back-translating 
these texts into French. Can reflexivity guarantee ethics in translation? If 
so, what would such reflexivity need to entail? And to what extent could 
it be systematised? My inquiry into reflexivity in this chapter draws a 
parallel between the productive criticism proposed by Berman and the 
reflexive method engaged in translating Berman. I start by providing a 
brief summary of Berman’s thought on translation, before presenting 
my critical translations of excerpts from English versions of his works, 
The Experience of The Foreign, ‘Translation and the Trials of the Foreign’8 
and Toward a Translation Criticism.9 I then offer an analysis of my back-
translations, suggesting that in Berman’s theory reflexivity is in fact 
inseparable from self-reflexivity. 
Reflexive criticism
Antoine Berman’s approach to reflexivity in translation is rooted in the 
belief that it is no longer possible to practise translation without reflecting 
on it.10 For him, the proliferation of theoretical texts on translation in the 
twentieth century indicates the will and need for translation to become 
an autonomous, reflective practice. Reflexivity, in Berman’s view, is not so 
much a matter of visibility, in the sense championed by Lawrence Venuti, 
but rather an operation of reflection and self-reflection. As Françoise 
Massardier-Kenney puts it in the introduction to her translation of Pour 
une critique des traductions, ‘the premise of Toward a Translation Criticism 
is that translation has reached a stage at which it aspires to be more than 
a practice’.11 It is ready ‘to reflect on the translation experience itself, to 
think about translation in a way that combines theoretical considerations 
with the experience of translation’.12 
Based on an analytical criticism of translations – which bears a close 
resemblance to the critical work at play in translation research in general, 
and in the reflexive method in particular – the new form of commentary 
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Berman advocates would give access, he claims, both ‘to the language 
of the original – to the way in which poetry and thought are deployed 
– and to the actual work of translation […] that becomes commentary 
of the original (of its letter) and analysis of its translation (of the way in 
which the letter of the original was transmitted)’.13 Insisting upon the 
need to bring closer together the discourse on translation and the work 
of translation itself, Berman’s approach suggests that translation ethics 
are not realisable without a reflexive analysis of practical translations.
Reflecting on the act of translating is crucial for Berman. Translation 
needs to be thought reflexively through an interpretative reading of 
texts because criticism and translation are structurally related: ‘Whether 
he feeds on critical works or not to translate such-and-such book, the 
translator acts like a critic at all levels.’14 Like criticism, translation is 
a form of reading, a way of commenting on the original work which 
reveals its hidden side (son versant caché). In Berman’s view, one ‘has 
never really analysed a text before translating it’.15 When translation is 
a retranslation, it further becomes a criticism of previous translations: 
it functions both as a developer, in the photographic sense of making 
the image visible (highlighting the historicity of translations), and as an 
evaluative analysis (showing that previous versions are either deficient 
or obsolete) – two aspects which, according to Berman, lie at the heart of 
the duality of any critical act.
Translation constitutes an analytical operation, in the psychoanalytic 
sense, for Berman. In L’épreuve de l’étranger, Berman opposes the impulse 
(or drive) of translation, ‘that species of narcissism by which every 
society wants to be a pure and unadulterated whole’, with the ethical 
aim of translation, its essence, which is to be ‘an opening, a dialogue, 
a cross-breeding, a decentering’.16 By extending the original and 
revealing its hidden potential, criticism would contribute, according to 
Berman, to realising translation’s essence as opening, and thus fulfil its 
ethical purpose. Since translation is itself perceived as a critical activity 
by Berman, ‘[t]he criticism of a translation is thus that of a text that 
itself results from a work of a critical nature’.17 As criticism of criticism, 
translation criticism would effect the ethical aim of translation by 
allowing it to gain access to its own being as opening, as dialogue and 
as mise en rapport.18 According to Berman, the meta-critical process at 
play in translation criticism enables a form of reflexivity that questions 
existing assumptions about translation and accomplishes its ethical 
nature.
Framing my own reflexive approach as a response to Berman’s call for 
productive criticism, in the following pages I undertake back-translations 
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of selected passages from some of Berman’s most influential writings to 
inquire into his characterisation of translation as opening and dialogue. 
The sample translations I present in the next section, which are taken from 
The Experience of the Foreign, ‘Translation and the Trials of the Foreign’ and 
Toward a Translation Criticism, exemplify the challenges of an ethics of 
translation based on self-awareness, as defined by Berman in these works. 
Far from fostering an opening to the other, I suggest, Berman’s theorisation 
of reflexivity rather instigates a return to oneself. My translations question 
the possibility of an ethics of translation based on reflexivity, where 
reflexive thinking is understood as increased self-knowledge or heightened 
self-awareness. In exploring the contradictions of Berman’s theory, these 
retranslations also highlight the limits of the reflexive method itself, as a 
possible application of Berman’s concept of productive criticism. 
Back-translating Berman into French: example of a 
productive retranslation
The following critical translations/commentaries are based on excerpts 
from:
Antoine Berman, The Experience of the Foreign, translated by Stefan 
Heyvaert, © 1992, reproduced by permission of SUNY Press.    
Antoine Berman, ‘Translation and the Trials of the Foreign’, in The 
Translation Studies Reader, edited and translated by Lawrence Venuti 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2004).
Antoine Berman, Toward a Translation Criticism, translated by Françoise 
Massardier-Kenney (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2009).
L’expérience de l’Autre
ou le jugement de l’étranger :
vers une critique des traductions
Les extraits ci-dessous sont tirés des traductions en langue anglaise de 
plusieurs textes d’Antoine Berman: la traduction de L’épreuve de l’étranger 
(1984) par Stefan Heyvaert intitulée The Experience of the Foreign 
(1992), une traduction de l’essai «  La traduction comme épreuve de 
l’étranger » (1985) par Lawrence Venuti qu’il intitule « Translation and the 
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Trials of the Foreign  » (2000) et la traduction par Françoise Massardier-
Kenney de Pour une critique des traductions (1995), qu’elle traduit par 
Toward a Translation Criticism (2009).
Ces fragments ont été sélectionnés sur la base de leur pertinence pour l’étude 
du concept de réflexivité dans la théorie de la traduction chez Berman. Ils 
ont été retraduits en français en s’inspirant des principes développés par 
Berman lui-même dans ses écrits, à savoir la traduction littérale, l’analytique 
traductologique et la critique productive des traductions.
Les concepts centraux de l’œuvre de Berman sont traduits ici sur plusieurs 
niveaux. Tout d’abord, ces traductions sont conçues comme une mise 
en pratique directe de la théorie bermanienne et des questionnements 
qu’elle soulève. La réflexivité y est donc avant tout abordée comme mise 
en application des principes de littéralité, d’analytique et de critique 
des traductions. D’autre part, ces extraits sont des retraductions vers le 
français de textes anglais eux-mêmes traduits à partir du français. Ils 
déploient par-là un mouvement circulaire réflexif qui consiste à replier les 
textes de Berman sur eux-mêmes. En tant que traductions de traductions, 
ces versions fonctionnent comme des doubles des textes originaux, dont ils 
visent à manifester d’« autres versants ». Il s’agit enfin de penser la notion 
de réflexivité par-delà la singularité des langues en question, c’est-à-dire au 
niveau de la réflexivité du langage au sens large, à travers des traductions 
commentées qui miroitent l’approche analytique proposée par Berman.
Cette démarche se veut plurielle, à commencer par le titre choisi qui reflète 
non seulement la multiplicité des textes sources mais aussi la variété des 
interprétations possibles.
Dans les pages qui suivent, les voix de Berman, de ses traducteurs et de ses 
commentateurs sont délibérément assemblées de façon polyphonique.
A. L’expérience de l’Autre
Les extraits qui suivent apparaissent dans le préambule de Berman à 
L’épreuve de l’étranger.
Ils ont été traduits à partir de la traduction de Stefan Heyvaert (The 
Experience of the Foreign), dont une partie de mon titre (L’expérience de 
l’Autre) s’inspire. La formulation de Heyvaert, reprise dans ma traduction, 
met en lumière une ambivalence cruciale dans l’œuvre de Berman : la 
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question du point de vue. En effet, de quelle expérience parle-t-on lorsque 
l’on dit l’expérience de l’étranger ? De mon expérience de l’Autre et de son 
altérité ? Ou bien de l’expérience éprouvée par un autre, cet autre pour qui 
l’Autre, c’est moi ? La question reste ouverte. Les réponses sont multiples.
Dans la traduction qui suit, les mots du texte de Berman et de Heyvaert ont 
été ajoutés entre parenthèses pour signaler non seulement les différences 
principales entre l’original, sa traduction et/ou ma propre version, mais 
aussi pour souligner leurs ressemblances, en particulier lorsque cette 
similitude peut sembler inattendue.
Par ailleurs, les notes de bas de page ont été insérées afin de clarifier certains 
aspects de l’œuvre de Berman, mettre en lumière les principaux choix de 
Heyvaert ou expliquer mes propres décisions en réaction à ces deux textes.
La traduction manifeste
Ainsi s’ouvre L’épreuve de l’étranger.
Le titre dans le texte original de Berman est « La traduction au manifeste ». Il 
évoque l’idée d’un mouvement à travers l’article contracté « au », qui suggère 
le passage d’une pratique concrète de la traduction à l’élaboration d’une 
théorie de cette activité. «  Un manifeste » désigne un «  exposé théorique  » 
présentant les fondements conceptuels d’un mouvement ou d’une activité. 
Une autre reformulation possible du titre d’origine serait : «  Vers une 
théorisation de l’acte traductif  ». Car c’est bien de cela dont il s’agit dans 
cette introduction pour Berman : souligner la nécessité d’une réflexion sur 
l’acte du traduire qui aille au-delà de ses expériences singulières.
En anglais, Stefan Heyvaert choisit de traduire ce titre par : « The manifestation 
of translation ». « Manifestation » en anglais fait référence à « un évènement, une 
action, ou un objet qui montre de manière concrète quelque chose d’abstrait ou 
théorique » (OED 2011; ma traduction). Autrement dit, « the manifestation of 
translation » serait l’acte par lequel certains aspects de la traduction, considérés 
comme abstraits, théoriques ou dissimulés, deviendraient visibles, concrets, 
manifestes. La traduction de Heyvaert dénote une interprétation psychanalytique 
du titre original de Berman : manifestation comme symptôme, comme expression 
d’autres aspects du texte, comme réflexion de ses versants refoulés.
Les choix de ces titres ne sont pas anodins. Ils reflètent la démarche singulière 
propre à chacun des deux auteurs dans le cadre de leur projet respectif. 
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Dans ce texte, Berman part de traductions réelles (celles des Romantiques 
allemands) en vue d’élaborer une théorie de la traduction comme épreuve 
de l’étranger. Heyvaert, quant à lui, prend pour point de départ la pensée 
de Berman, qu’il cherche, par l’acte de traduction, à communiquer dans un 
contexte anglophone. Ainsi, le projet de Berman s’inscrit dans une démarche 
théorisante de la traduction en tant que produit, texte, œuvre culturelle – 
tandis que l’approche de Heyvaert est celle d’un traducteur qui, en s’efforçant 
de reconstruire le discours de Berman dans une autre langue, dévoile 
en même temps sa propre expérience de la traduction comme processus 
analytique.
Mon choix «  la traduction manifeste  » se situe dans ce va-et-vient entre 
la démarche théorisante de Berman (La traduction au manifeste  ») et 
l’approche analytique de Heyvaert (« La manifestation de la traduction »). 
Dans «  la traduction manifeste  », la traduction rend visible, manifeste, 
comme chez Heyvaert, mais elle le fait de manière active : elle devient 
agent de l’action de manifester. L’accent est mis sur le processus de mise en 
lumière lui-même (la traduction comme acte de manifester), plutôt que sur 
le résultat (la traduction comme symptôme d’autre chose). L’absence de 
complément d’objet souligne par ailleurs la multiplicité des objets possibles 
(que manifeste-t-elle ?), tandis que la formulation nominative de Heyvaert 
(« the manifestation ») n’autorise pas cette pluralité.
« La traduction manifeste » est très proche du titre original de Berman (« La 
traduction au manifeste  »). Cependant, l’idée de mouvement du pratique 
vers le théorique qu’évoque ce dernier disparaît avec l’effacement du « au ». 
De ce fait, la temporalité du devenir (sous-entendue dans la formulation 
« [de] la traduction [jusqu’] au manifeste ») est remplacée par celle de la 
simultanéité (le présent de l’indicatif). Ce synchronisme c’est celui de la 
théorie et de la pratique, leur inséparabilité. Le passage du pratique vers le 
théorique que Berman cherche à théoriser dans L’épreuve de l’étranger, fait 
ainsi place, dans ma traduction, à un processus de concomitance : pratique 
et théorie sont indissociables. La traduction manifeste. La pratique théorise.
Dans ce sens, la traduction manifeste également en termes de « résistance »  : 
elle résiste à la reproduction aussi bien de l’original que de sa traduction. 
Elle va au-delà de l’original de Berman puisqu’elle remplace le devenir par 
la simultanéité. Et elle conteste la version de Heyvaert car la traduction y 
est comprise comme réflexion plutôt que comme révélateur de l’original. 
Dans « la traduction manifeste », les symptômes ne préexistent pas à l’acte 
du traduire, ils sont créés à travers le processus traductif lui-même. Ma 
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traduction manifeste certains aspects du texte original bermanien et de la 
traduction de Heyvaert, non pas en rendant visibles leurs versants cachés, 
mais en choisissant d’en actualiser certains aspects.
Le domaine de la traduction a toujours été le site d’étranges [curious, 
curieuses]1 contradictions. D’un côté, la traduction est considérée comme 
une pratique purement intuitive – en partie technique, en partie littéraire 
– qui, au fond, ne requiert pas une théorie ou une réflexion particulières. 
De l’autre, il existe – au moins depuis Cicéron, Horace et Saint Jérôme – 
une abondance de textes [writings, écrits] qui traitent de la traduction 
d’un point vue religieux, philosophique, littéraire, méthodologique et, 
enfin, scientifique. Or, bien que de nombreux traducteurs commentent 
leur activité [discipline, métier], jusqu’à récemment la majorité de ces 
écrits provenait de non-traducteurs. La définition [definition, définition] 
des «  problèmes  » de la traduction est ainsi l’œuvre des théologiens, 
des philosophes, des linguistes et des critiques. Ceci a au moins trois 
conséquences. D’abord, la traduction est restée une activité souterraine, 
cachée, car elle ne s’exprimait pas de manière autonome [did not 
express itself independently, ne s’énonçait pas elle-même]. Par ailleurs, la 
traduction en tant que telle demeure largement « impensée » (unthought, 
«  impensée comme telle  ») car ceux qui s’y intéressent jusqu’à présent 
ont tendance à l’assimiler à autre chose : à de la (sous-)littérature, 
à de la (sous-)critique, à de la «  linguistique appliquée  ». Enfin, les 
analyses produites quasi-exclusivement [exclusively, fatalement] par 
des non-traducteurs, indépendamment de leurs qualités, contiennent 
inévitablement des «  angles morts  » et des éléments inadéquats 
[irrelevant, non pertinents].
Notre siècle a connu un changement progressif et la constitution d’un vaste 
corpus de textes de traducteurs.2 De plus, la réflexion sur la traduction est 
devenue une nécessité interne de la traduction même, comme cela avait été 
en partie le cas dans l’Allemagne classique et romantique. Cette réflexion 
ne prend pas exactement la forme [form, visage] d’une « théorie », telle 
qu’on la trouve dans Sous l’invocation de saint Jérôme par Valery Larbaud. 
Mais elle indique en tout cas la volonté qu’a la traduction de devenir une 
 1 Dans le texte de départ comme dans la traduction, Berman et Heyvaert utilisent respectivement 
les mots « curieux » et « curious » pour qualifier les contradictions qui sous-tendent la pratique 
de la traduction. J’ai choisi pour ma part d’employer le terme «  étranges  » qui fait écho et 
rappelle le concept d’« étranger », central à la traductologie bermanienne.
 2 Dans le texte original de Berman, le terme «  corpus  » est mis en italiques. Cette emphase 
disparaît dans la traduction de Heyvaert.
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pratique autonome, capable de se définir et de se situer soi-même, et par 
conséquent de se communiquer, de se partager et de s’enseigner.3
Une condition ancillaire
Notre préoccupation est de savoir ce que la traduction signifie dans le 
contexte culturel actuel. Cette question s’accompagne d’un problème d’une 
intensité presque douloureuse. Je fais référence ici à quelque chose qu’on 
ne peut pas ne pas mentionner – la condition obscure, refoulée, interdite 
[reprieved, réprouvée] et ancillaire de la traduction, qui se répercute 
[reflects upon, répercute] sur la condition du traducteur de sorte qu’il est 
impossible de nos jours de faire de cette pratique une discipline autonome.
La condition de la traduction est non seulement ancillaire ; elle est, aux 
yeux du public et aux yeux des traducteurs eux-mêmes, suspecte [suspect, 
suspecte]. Après tant de réussites, de chefs-d’œuvre, de soi-disant 
impossibilités vaincues, comment l’adage italien traduttore tradittore 
peut-il encore servir de [still remain in place, encore fonctionner comme] 
jugement dernier sur la traduction? Pourtant il est vrai que dans ce 
domaine, la fidélité et la trahison font constamment l’objet de débats 
[are at issue, il est sans cesse question de…]. « Traduire, écrivait Franz 
Rosenzweig, c’est servir deux maîtres » : ainsi va la métaphore ancillaire. 
Il s’agit de servir l’œuvre, l’auteur, la langue étrangère (premier maître), 
mais aussi le public et sa propre langue (second maître). Ceci constitue ce 
qu’on peut appeler le drame du traducteur. (…)
Le temps est venu de méditer ce refoulement [repression, statut refoulé] 
de la traduction et les «  résistances » qui le sous-tendent. Le problème 
peut se formuler ainsi4  : toute culture résiste à la traduction, même si 
elle en a fondamentalement besoin [even if it has an essential need for it, 
 3 La structure passive employée dans la traduction anglaise n’est pas présente dans l’original. Elle 
reflète la lecture psychanalytique de Heyvaert : la traduction est personnifiée, elle possède une 
volonté, un désir, un pouvoir, mais elle devient passive, comme si « ça » parlait à travers elle. 
Cette passivité va toutefois à l’encontre de l’autonomisation que Berman cherche à attribuer à 
la traduction dans ce texte, à savoir « la volonté dont fait preuve la traduction de devenir une 
pratique autonome, capable de se définir et de se situer soi-même, et par conséquent de se 
communiquer, de se partager et s’enseigner. » L’emploi de pronoms et de verbes réflexifs n’y 
est pas anodin : il s’agit d’amorcer une autonomisation de la traduction par la réflexivité.
 4 Ici l’emploi du réflexif impersonnel « se formuler », qui s’éloigne de la traduction de Heyvaert 
(« We may formulate »), vise à rendre compte de la dimension psychanalytique de la question, 
puisqu’il s’agit d’exprimer le refoulé, de dire ce qui ne peut être dit, d’énoncer ce qui ne veut 
pas être énoncé. Le texte de Berman se situe entre la version de Heyvaert et la mienne ; il 
s’appuie sur une formule impersonnelle mais n’emploie pas le réflexif (« Ce que l’on pourrait 
formuler ainsi »).
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même si elle a besoin essentiellement de celle-ci]. La visée [aim, visée]5 même 
de la traduction – ouvrir à travers l’écriture un certain rapport à l’Autre, pour 
féconder ce qui est Propre [what is one’s Own ; le Propre] par la médiation 
de ce qui est Étranger [what is Foreign ; l’Étranger]6 – s’oppose à la structure 
ethnocentrique de toute culture7, cette espèce de narcissisme qui pousse 
chaque société à vouloir être un Tout pur et non mélangé. La traduction porte 
une trace de la violence du métissage.8 Herder en était bien conscient [well 
aware of, l’a bien senti] lorsqu’il comparait une langue qui n’a pas encore 
traduit, ou une langue qui n’a jamais été traduite, à une jeune vierge.9 Peu 
importe qu’une langue et une culture vierges soient en réalité aussi fictives 
qu’une race pure. Nous avons affaire ici à des traits inconscients [wishes, 
souhaits]. Chaque culture se veut [wants, voudrait être] auto-suffisante et 
utilise cette auto-suffisance imaginaire pour briller sur les autres et s’approprier 
leur patrimoine. La culture romaine antique, la culture française classique et 
la culture nord-américaine moderne en sont des exemples frappants.
 5 J’ai choisi de traduire « aim » par « visée » (plutôt que par « but » ou « objectif ») car « visée » 
se rapproche plus de l'idée de quête, d'idéal, élaborée par Berman. Notons par ailleurs l’absence 
d’italiques dans le texte anglais pour « aim ». L’emphase originale de Berman, effacée en anglais, 
est rétablie dans ma version.
 6 L’approche de Heyvaert diffère de celle de Berman. Dans la version de Heyvaert (« what is 
Foreign/one’s Own »), l’Etranger et le Propre sont définis dans leur rapport au sujet, et non 
pas dans l’absolu. Berman, quant à lui, emploie une formulation plus abstraite : il parle « du » 
Propre et « de l’ » Etranger. Chez Berman ce sont « le Propre » et « l’Etranger » universels. En 
ce qui me concerne, j’ai décidé de suivre la version de Heyvaert pour souligner la contingence 
de ces deux catégories, qui ne peuvent exister que du point de vue d’un sujet historique. Car si 
l’on admet que la visée de la traduction est d’ouvrir un certain rapport à l’Autre, la question est 
aussi de savoir comment définir le « Propre », par rapport à qui et par rapport à quoi. 
 7 Heyvaert emploie à nouveau une forme passive («  is opposed  »), là où Berman utilise une 
tournure active (« heurte de front »). Pour ma part, j’ai opté pour un réflexif (« s’oppose ») pour 
mettre en scène l’autonomisation réflexive recherchée par Berman.
 8 Dans ma version la traduction devient le sujet grammatical de la phrase : c’est elle qui porte la 
« trace de violence du métissage », contrairement aux formulations passives de l’original (« il y 
a ») et de la traduction américaine (« there is »). Par ailleurs, mon emploi du mot « trace » est 
inspiré de la formulation de Heyvaert (« a tinge of violence »), qui est plus spécifique que celle 
de Berman (« quelque chose de la violence ») et évoque l’image d’une cicatrice – symbole de 
l’impossibilité d’une culture à être « un Tour pur et non mélangé ».
 9 Remarquons ici une différence majeure entre Berman et Heyvaert. Dans ce passage, Berman 
fait référence à une analogie de Herder, comparant « une langue qui n’a pas encore traduit », 
c’est-à-dire une langue qui n’a jamais entrepris une activité traduisante, à une jeune vierge. 
Cette idée de culture ou langue «  vierge  » que Berman qualifie aussitôt de «  fictive  » est 
difficile à cerner et conduit à un contresens chez Heyvaert qui la traduit par son contraire : 
« une langue qui n’a jamais été traduite ». Ainsi, la «  langue qui n’a pas encore traduit » se 
transforme en «  langue qui n’a jamais été traduite  ». Cette inversion est intéressante car 
elle reflète non seulement l’ambiguïté de ce concept purement imaginaire de langue qui n’a 
jamais traduit, mais aussi parce qu’elle met en lumière la question de point de vue qui sous-
tend les oppositions binaires propre/étranger, soi/autre, langue traduisante/langue traduite 
qui régissent la théorie bermanienne. En inversant la dynamique proposée par Berman, la 
traduction de Heyvaert révèle, sans doute involontairement, à la fois le parti pris de Berman et 
son propre positionnement. Dans ma version, j’ai choisi de conserver les deux pôles proposés 
par Berman et Heyvaert afin de rendre compte de cette pluralité de points de vue.
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Pourtant la traduction occupe une position ambiguë. D’une part elle se 
soumet à cette injonction appropriatrice et réductrice, elle se constitue 
comme l’un de ses agents. Ce qui produit des traductions ethnocentriques, 
ou ce que l’on appelle de « mauvaises » traductions. Mais d’autre part, la 
visée éthique du traduire est par nature contraire à cette injonction [emphase 
originale]10 : l’essence de la traduction est d’être une ouverture, un dialogue, 
un croisement [cross-breeding, métissage]11, un décentrement. La traduction 
est « une mise en rapport », ou elle n’est rien [emphase originale].12
Cette contradiction entre la visée réductrice de la culture et la visée 
éthique du traduire se retrouve à tous les niveaux – au niveau des théories 
et des méthodes de traduction (comme, par exemple, dans l’opposition 
perpétuelle [perennial, sempiternelle] entre les défenseurs de la « lettre » et 
 10 J’ai retranscrit la tournure passive de l’anglais de Heyvaert, plutôt que la version active de 
Berman, car l’emploi du verbe d’état «  être  » préfigure l’idée d’essence développée plus en 
détail dans la phrase suivante. Mon objectif est de mettre en avant ce qui constitue, me semble-
t-il, une limite majeure de la pensée bermanienne dans ce texte : son besoin de définir l’essence 
du traduire, sa visée « pure ». Je considère qu’il s’agit d’une limite car l’essence d’une chose est 
par définition ce qui, en elle, ne peut changer ou se transformer. Or la traduction, en tant que 
pratique, ne peut être définie de façon permanente ni abstraite, c’est-à-dire par-delà ou en-
dehors des actes de transformation singuliers et contingents qui l’incarnent.
 11 En traduisant «  métissage  » par «  cross-breeding  », Heyvaert opte pour une interprétation à 
connotation biologique, qui renvoie à l’idée d’instinct, plutôt qu’à celle de dépassement des 
pulsions. J’ai décidé de garder cette notion de « croisement » suggérée par Heyvaert pour deux 
raisons : d’une part, car le terme soulève une contradiction majeure dans la théorie bermanienne 
entre le croisement comme ouverture (la visée éthique de la traduction), et le croisement dans 
sa manifestation animale (l’instinct éthnocentrique de toute culture); et d’autre part, car 
« croisement » ajoute une dimension spatiale, présente dans « cross » de « cross-breeding », qui 
renvoie à l’étymologie latine de la traduction, translatio (« carried across », « crossing »).
 12 Heyvaert traduit « une mise en rapport » littéralement par « a putting in touch with », suivant ainsi 
la méthode littérale bermanienne, inspirée de Schleiermacher, qui préconise un rétablissement de 
la lettre de l’original. Toutefois sa formulation est maladroite en anglais et souligne indirectement 
à mon sens les limites du littéralisme recommandé par Berman. Car qu’est-ce que la lettre ? Qu’est-
ce traduire à la lettre ? Celle-ci se trouve d’ailleurs le plus souvent être un mot (un mot-à-mot). Et 
c’est bien là tout son problème : la lettre ne veut rien dire en elle-même. Ou, pour le dire autrement, 
en termes derridiens, elle ne peut signifier que par différance. Ce n’est que dans le contexte de sa 
mise en rapport aux autres graphèmes, et à leur espacement, que la lettre peut créer du sens – 
de même que la signification d’un mot isolé, hors contexte, reste flottante, multiple, ambigüe. 
Le littéralisme c’est l’illusion du hors contexte. Or la lettre agit toujours dans un contexte, même 
lorsque ce contexte se donne pour but d’en faire abstraction. C’est pour cela que les traductions 
littérales paraissent souvent étranges ou déconcertantes. Ce ne sont pas les mots « a » « putting » 
« in » « touch » « with » en eux-mêmes qui sont incongrus, mais leur assemblage, leur inadéquation 
dans la langue anglaise. En ce sens, une traduction littérale est tout aussi déformante qu’une 
traduction dite « non-littérale », qui privilégierait le sens. D’ailleurs, et c’est là un paradoxe majeur, 
l’idée de littéralisme ne peut fonctionner que si la lettre permet de conserver non seulement la 
forme du texte source mais aussi son sens, c’est-à-dire la singularité de son mode de signification. 
Or cette conservation opère forcément un déplacement. Dans ma version, j’ai conservé l’expression 
originale de Berman (« mise en rapport ») car c’est la seule à pouvoir véritablement reproduire la 
lettre de Berman – c’est-à-dire réactualiser littéralement toutes les lettres de l’expression employée 
par Berman (« m », « i », « s », « e », « e », « n », « r », « a », « p », « p », « o », « r », « t »). Mais j’ai ajouté 
des guillemets pour signaler le fait qu’il s’agit d’un concept emprunté à l’auteur, d’une citation, 
d’une recontextualisation, d’une nouvelle mise en rapport, qui opère forcément un déplacement de 
la lettre, une nouvelle adresse, une nouvelle « mise en rapport ».
107CRIT IC ISM AND SELF-REFLECT ION: ANTOINE BERMAN
ceux de « l’esprit » [spirit, sens], ainsi qu’au niveau de la pratique traduisante 
[translating practice, pratique traduisante]13 et de l’être psychique du 
traducteur. Ici, pour que la traduction puisse accéder [gain access, accéder] à 
son être propre, une éthique et une analytique de la traduction sont requises.14
Ethique de la traduction
Au niveau théorique, l’éthique de la traduction consiste à faire ressortir, 
affirmer et défendre la visée pure de la traduction en tant que telle. Elle 
consiste à définir ce qu’est la fidélité. La traduction ne peut pas seulement 
se définir15 en termes de communication, ou de transmission de messages, 
ou de rewording élargi.16 Elle ne peut pas non plus se concevoir17 comme 
une activité purement esthétique ou littéraire,18 même lorsqu’elle est 
intimement liée à la pratique littéraire dans un espace culturel donné. 
Traduire [translation, traduire]19 c’est bien sûr écrire et transmettre. 
Mais cette écriture et cette transmission ne prennent leur vrai sens qu’à 
partir de la visée éthique qui les régit. En ce sens, la traduction est plus 
proche de la science que de l’art, pour ceux qui considèrent que l’art est 
éthiquement irresponsable.20 
 13 Berman s’intéresse clairement ici au processus traductif plutôt qu’au produit « traduction », 
comme l’indique l’expression « pratique traduisante ».
 14 Notez de nouveau le choix de la structure passive de Heyvaert (« are required »), là où Berman 
a recours à une tournure active (« la traduction… exige une éthique et une analytique »).
 15 J’ai choisi encore une fois d’employer un verbe réflexif («  se définir ») au lieu de conserver 
la tournure passive de Heyvaert (« cannot be defined »), qui reproduit mimétiquement celle 
de Berman («  ne peut être traduite  »). Par ce choix, je souhaite souligner réflexivement le 
problème central que Berman aborde dans ce passage, à savoir comment définir la fidélité 
en traduction  : s’agit-il de coller à la lettre de l’original (comme Heyvaert le conçoit et le 
matérialise ici en conservant la structure passive de Berman) ou bien de la réinterpréter en lui 
donnant une autre forme (comme j’ai décidé de le faire, en préférant actualiser formellement 
l’autonomisation de la traduction à travers l’utilisation d’un verbe réflexif) ?
 16 Dans l’original «  rewording  » est écrit en italiques, en référence à la première catégorie de 
traductions identifiée par Roman Jakobson dans «  Aspects linguistiques de la traduction  » 
(1963). L’italique et la référence sont maintenus dans la traduction de Heyvaert. En revanche, 
l’aspect multilingue y disparaît.
 17 Ici, l’utilisation de verbes réflexifs est filée, répétée, pour maintenir une continuité avec la 
phrase précédente, comme c’est le cas dans l’original (voir note 15).
 18 L’original et la traduction de Heyvaert utilisent tous deux une barre oblique entre « esthétique » 
et «  littéraire  » (respectivement «  littéraire/esthétique  » et «  literary/esthetical  »), donnant 
ainsi l’impression que les deux termes sont interchangeables. Par souci de clarté, j’ai décidé de 
remplacer la barre oblique par la conjonction de coordination « ou » qui rend à chacun de ces 
termes leur particularité et marque leur différence.
 19 Tandis qu’ici Berman fait clairement référence à l’activité de « traduire » (« translating »), Heyvaert 
utilise quant à lui le mot « traduction », qui peut aussi bien désigner le produit que le processus.
 20 En choisissant la formulation «  for those who  », Heyvaert ne s’inclut pas parmi ceux qui 
considèrent que l’art est éthiquement irresponsable, et suggère ainsi qu’il s’oppose à ce point 
de vue. Le positionnement de Berman est plus ambigu car il se veut moins partial, plus objectif, 
comme l’illustre l’emploi du pronom impersonnel « on » et le modérateur « du moins » : « si l’on 
pose du moins l’irresponsabilité éthique de l’art » (Berman 1984: 17).
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Définir plus précisément cette visée éthique, et libérer par-là la traduction 
de son ghetto idéologique, voilà l’une des tâches d’une théorie de la 
traduction.
Mais cette éthique positive suppose à son tour deux choses. D’abord 
une éthique négative [emphase originale], c’est-à-dire une théorie 
des valeurs idéologiques et littéraires qui ont tendance à dévier [turn 
away, à détourner]21 la traduction de sa visée pure [pure aim, pure 
visée].22  La théorie de la traduction non ethnocentrique est aussi une 
théorie de la traduction ethnocentrique, c’est-à-dire de la mauvaise 
traduction [emphase originale]. J’appelle mauvaise traduction la 
traduction qui, généralement sous couvert de transmissibilité, opère 
une négation systématique de l’étrangeté [strangeness, étrangeté] de 
l’œuvre étrangère.
Analytique de la traduction
Par ailleurs cette éthique négative devra [must, devrait]23 être complétée 
par une analytique de la traduction et du traduire [emphase originale].24 
La résistance culturelle produit une systématique de déformations25 
 21 J’ai choisi le terme « dévier » plutôt que « détourner » pour renforcer la connotation négative 
suggérée par la traduction anglaise et rendre compte du contexte sociologique dans lequel 
s’inscrit l’emploi de ce mot dans la phrase originale, à savoir «  les valeurs idéologiques 
et littéraires  ». La déviance fait en effet référence à la position de quelqu’un qui conteste, 
transgresse ou se met à l’écart des normes en vigueur dans un système social donné. Ce 
choix souligne une contradiction fondamentale. En principe, dévier c’est transgresser, or 
chez Berman dévier devient presque une norme – puisqu’en établissant l’ouverture vers 
l’Autre comme essence ou visée pure de la traduction, sa théorie systématise le refus de 
l’ethnocentrisme, ce qui a pour effet de le normaliser. En établissant ce qu’est ou doit être 
une bonne traduction, cette visée de la traduction devient un modèle à suivre, une norme 
prescriptive, un impératif catégorique.
 22 J’ai choisi de dévier et de l’original et de la version anglaise, en remplaçant « pure visée » par 
« visée pure », car cette formule inversée imite la structure de l’expression « visée éthique » 
à laquelle elle fait écho. Ce parallélisme soulève plusieurs questions. En quoi cette visée est-
elle pure ? Pourquoi la pureté de cette visée serait-elle nécessairement éthique ? Comment 
différencier une visée pure d’une visée impure ?
 23 Noter la force du modal prescriptif « must » de Heyvaert, par opposition au conditionnel de 
Berman « devrait ». J’ai choisi quant à moi d’employer le futur qui renvoie au concept de visée, 
à l’idéal de quelque chose à venir (voir note 5).
 24 Ce qui est intéressant dans la formulation de Berman, qui est imitée par Heyvaert et que j’ai 
également conservée, c’est la distinction entre la traduction comme produit et le traduire 
comme activité. D’emblée Berman esquisse l’idée d’une analytique qui se préoccupe non 
seulement du texte traduit, mais qui fait partie intégrante de l’acte du traduire – idée que 
Berman développe plus en détail dans Pour une critique des traductions.
 25 L’emploi du pluriel chez Heyvaert, là où Berman utilise le singulier, montre que le premier 
conçoit la déformation à l’œuvre dans la traduction comme une opération multiple, pouvant 
prendre plusieurs formes, tandis que le second la considère dans son unicité, ne faisant pas de 
distinction entre les différentes sortes de déformation.
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[deformations, déformation] qui s’opèrent26 aux niveaux linguistique et 
littéraire et qui conditionnent le traducteur, qu’il le veuille ou non, qu’il le 
sache ou non. La dialectique réversible de la fidélité et de la trahison est 
présente chez le traducteur, même dans sa position ambiguë d’écrivant27 : 
le pur traducteur est celui qui a besoin d’écrire à partir d’une œuvre 
étrangère, d’une langue étrangère et d’un auteur étranger.28 Détour 
notable. Sur le plan psychique, le traducteur est ambivalent. Il veut forcer 
des deux côtés : forcer sa langue à se lester d’étrangeté29  et forcer l’autre 
langue à se dé-porter (trans-port, se déporter) dans sa langue maternelle.30 
Il se présente comme un [presents himself, se veut] écrivain, mais n’est que 
ré-écrivain. Il est auteur – mais jamais L’Auteur. Son œuvre de traducteur 
est une œuvre, mais elle n’est jamais L’Œuvre. Ce réseau d’ambivalences 
tend à déformer la visée pure de la traduction et à se greffer sur le 
système idéologique de déformations [ideological deformation, système 
idéologique déformant]31 évoqué plus haut. À le renforcer.
Pour que la visée pure de la traduction soit autre chose qu’un vœu pieux ou 
un « impératif catégorique », on se doit d’ajouter à l’éthique de la traduction 
 26 Dans cette phrase, l’emploi du verbe réflexif « s’opérer », là où Berman et Heyvaert utilisent la 
forme simple « opérer », vise à souligner la contradiction qui sous-tend le processus traductif en 
tant qu’activité réflexive. Il s’agit de la coexistence d’un agent actif qui décide des changements 
(une opération de transformation qui a conscience d’elle-même) et d’une certaine dépossession 
dans cette action (comme si les changements s’opéraient aussi malgré soi). Cette interprétation 
du texte bermanien est d’ailleurs confirmée par le reste de la phrase : « déformations (…) qui 
conditionnent le traducteur, qu’il le veuille ou non, qu’il le sache ou non ».
 27 Noter que Heyvaert efface complètement la notion d’« ambiguïté » dans sa traduction anglaise : 
dans sa version la «  position ambiguë d’écrivant  » devient «  his position as a writer  » (une 
« position d’écrivain »). De plus, la traduction de Heyvaert omet la distinction que Berman 
établit entre les positions d’« écrivain » et d’« écrivant » – concepts empruntés à Barthes pour 
désigner respectivement l’activité de celui qui « ne cesse de provoquer (…) une interrogation 
au monde » et l’action de celui qui « considère que sa parole met fin à une ambiguïté du monde, 
institue une explication irréversible. » (Barthes 1964 : 154-156).
 28 Noter la répétition de l’adjectif foreign (« étrangère ») chez Heyvaert, tandis que chez Berman 
l’épithète n’apparaît qu’une seule fois à la fin de la phrase pour qualifier les trois substantifs 
qui le précédent. Le choix de Heyvaert est sans doute motivé par le propos de Berman lui-
même dans ce texte, et en particulier son insistance sur le rapport à l’œuvre et à la langue 
étrangères, qu’il ne cesse d’opposer à la culture et à la langue maternelles. Heyvaert ne fait 
donc que reproduire le binarisme propre/étranger qui sous-tend l’œuvre de Berman, même 
si paradoxalement dans ce cas précis sa traduction s’éloigne de la lettre bermanienne. J’ai 
décidé de conserver la répétition de Heyvaert pour rendre compte de la volonté excessive de 
Berman de définir le processus traductif en termes d’opposition propre/étranger, comme s’il 
était possible de démarquer définitivement ces catégories.
 29 Noter le choix de Heyvaert de rendre «  étrangeté  » par «  strangeness  » (subjectif, 
psychanalytique), plutôt que par « foreignness » (social, culturel). 
 30 Voir Berman 1984 : 18.
 31 Heyvaert omet le mot «  système  », inverse «  idéologie déformante  » et «  déformation 
idéologique », et ne conserve pas la forme plurielle employée plus haut (voir note 21). J’ai 
décidé quant à moi de rester fidèle à mes choix antérieurs, c’est-à-dire de souligner l’idée de 
système et l’idée de pluralité.
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une analytique.32 Le traducteur doit «  se mettre en analyse », repérer les 
systèmes de déformation33 qui menacent sa pratique et opèrent de façon 
inconsciente au niveau de ses choix linguistiques et littéraires – systèmes 
qui dépendent simultanément des registres de la langue [language, langue], 
de l’idéologie, de la littérature et du psychisme [make-up, psychisme] 
du traducteur. On peut presque parler de psychanalyse de la traduction 
comme Bachelard parlait d’une psychanalyse de l’esprit scientifique : elle 
implique la même ascèse, la même opération scrutatrice sur soi. Cette 
analytique peut se vérifier [be verified, se vérifier], s’effectuer [be carried 
out, s’effectuer] par des analyses globales et restreintes. Dans un roman, 
par exemple, on peut étudier le système de traduction employé. Dans le cas 
d’une traduction ethnocentrique, ce système tend à détruire le système de 
l’original. Tout traducteur peut observer en lui-même [within himself, sur 
lui-même] la réalité redoutable de ce système inconscient. Par sa nature, 
ce travail analytique [this analytic, ce travail analytique], comme tout 
travail d’analyse, doit être pluriel. Ainsi on s’acheminerait vers une pratique 
ouverte, et non plus solitaire, du traduire. Et vers l’institution d’une critique 
des traductions [criticism of translation, critique des traductions]34 parallèle 
et complémentaire à la critique des textes. De plus, à cette analytique de 
la pratique traduisante devrait s’ajouter une analyse textuelle35 effectuée 
dans l’horizon de la traduction [carried out in the background of translation, 
effectuée dans l’horizon de la traduction]36 : tout texte à traduire présente 
une systématicité propre, que le mouvement de la traduction rencontre, 
 32 Heyvaert choisit une formulation inversée qui l’oblige non seulement à répéter le mot 
« traduction » là où Berman ne l’emploie qu’une seule fois, mais aussi à clore sa phrase (et donc 
à mettre l’accent) sur la question « éthique » plutôt que sur celle d’« analytique » : « an analytic 
of translation should be added to the ethics of translation » (Heyvaert 1992: 6).
 33 Ici Heyvaert décide de coller à l’expression de Berman « systems of deformation » (« systèmes 
de déformation »), contrairement aux occurrences précédentes (voir notes 21 et 25).
 34 Notons l’emploi du singulier dans la traduction de « critique des traductions » par Heyvaert, 
repris également par Massardier-Kenney dans sa traduction de l’ouvrage de Berman du même 
titre, Pour une critique des traductions. En anglais, le singulier suggère une critique de l’activité 
traductive en général (c’est-à-dire une théorie du traduire), tandis que Berman parle d’une 
critique des traductions au pluriel, c’est-à-dire dans leurs manifestations multiples, qu’il met 
sur un plan parallèle aux critiques d’autres textes.
 35 Il y a encore une fois chez Heyvaert inversion des éléments de la phrase présentés dans l’original 
de Berman : l’analyse textuelle est antéposée de sorte que l’emphase de Berman est atténuée.
 36 C’est en réponse à cet appel de Berman en faveur d’une analyse textuelle en arrière-plan de 
la traduction que la présente retraduction de son œuvre propose de faire sa propre analyse, 
en même temps que celle des textes qu’elle incarne, à travers ces notes de bas de pages, ainsi 
que par le biais de commentaires explicatifs et l’insertion de fragments de l’original entre 
parenthèses. C’est en effet une pratique analytique elle-même engagée dans l’acte du traduire 
que Berman semble esquisser ici, à travers la formulation « dans l’horizon de la traduction », 
que j’ai choisi de conserver.
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affronte et révèle.37 En ce sens, Pound pouvait dire que la traduction est 
une forme sui generis de critique, dans la mesure où elle rend manifeste les 
structures cachées d’un texte. Ce-système-de-l’œuvre est à la fois ce qui offre 
le plus de résistance à la traduction et ce qui la permet et lui donne un sens.
B. Le jugement de l’étranger
Le texte qui suit est extrait d’un article de Berman paru en 1985, intitulé 
« La traduction comme épreuve de l’étranger ». Il a été traduit ici à partir de 
sa traduction en langue anglaise par Lawrence Venuti, publiée sous le titre 
« Translation and the Trials of the Foreign » (2000).
Contrairement à Heyvaert, Venuti choisit de traduire « épreuve » non pas 
par « expérience », mais par « trial ». Ce mot a deux acceptations en anglais : 
au sens large, il renvoie à un test, un essai ou un examen visant à déterminer 
la qualité d’un objet d’étude ; d’autre part, il désigne une affaire de justice 
portée devant un tribunal. Qu’il s’agisse d’une appréciation qualitative ou 
d’un dossier juridique, le terme implique un acte de jugement. 
En traduisant «  épreuve  » par «  trial  », Venuti met l’accent sur un aspect 
particulier de la traductologie bermanienne. Chez Venuti, il ne s’agit plus 
de faire l’expérience personnelle et subjective de l’Autre, comme c’était le cas 
chez Heyvaert, mais plutôt d’établir l’étrangeté comme critère de jugement. 
Car pour Venuti la traduction doit avant tout être l’expression du point de 
vue de l’étranger, de son étrangeté, de sa différence. A travers la traduction 
de ce mot pivot dans la théorie bermanienne, ce sont des interprétations 
très différentes qu’esquissent chacun des traducteurs : Heyvaert se centrant 
principalement sur l’expérience subjective du traducteur dans la culture 
d’accueil, tandis qu’en faisant de l’étrangeté un gage de qualité, Venuti 
cherche surtout à défendre la spécificité de la culture source.38
 37 Heyvaert ne garde pas l’idée de «  mouvement  » dans sa traduction, dont il omet le terme. 
Par ailleurs, il substitue une voix passive («  Every text to be translated presents its own 
systematicity, encountered, confronted, and revealed by the translation  ») à la structure 
active de Berman, que ma version rétablit, en vue (encore une fois) d’actualiser formellement 
l’autonomisation de la traduction revendiquée par Berman. 
 38 Ces deux positions sont bien sûr plus complexes qu’il n’y paraît. La lecture psychanalytique de 
Heyvaert évoque l’étrangeté non pas dans sa manifestation culturelle (l’étranger comme celui 
qui est hors de la culture nationale), mais comme faisant partie intégrante de l’identité (le 
sujet comme étranger à lui-même). L’expérience de l’étrangeté, qui chez Heyvaert régit aussi le 
rapport du sujet à lui-même, va au-delà de l’opposition culture d’accueil/culture source, telle 
qu’elle est articulée par Berman. D’autre part, en établissant l’étrangeté comme critère principal 
de la bonne traduction, Venuti choisit effectivement le point de vue de l’étranger, celui du texte 
source. Or cette position est en soi ambiguë puisqu’elle n’est concevable que dans la perspective 
de la culture d’accueil, sans laquelle l’étranger ne serait ni défini ni même perceptible.
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Avec le terme «  trial  », Venuti se concentre sur l’aspect critique de l’acte 
traductif et souligne que, pour Berman, traduire c’est juger. C’est interpréter 
l’original, analyser et apprécier ses caractéristiques propres. C’est aussi 
évaluer les choix opérés dans les traductions précédentes, lorsque celles-
ci existent. C’est enfin juger ses propres choix, faire l’auto-critique de ses 
propres décisions de traducteur.
Cette traduction d’une traduction du texte de Berman interroge la 
conception de l’acte traductif comme jugement. Comment différencier une 
bonne traduction d’une mauvaise ? L’étrangeté est-elle toujours adéquate ? 
Comment adopter une position de juge ? Et comment définir la position de 
juge en traduction ?
Dans les pages qui suivent, ces questions sont abordées, et représentées 
formellement, à travers une mise en page en colonnes qui témoigne d’une 
démarche performative critique. Les colonnes évoquent les sections 
verticales d’un dictionnaire ou d’un journal. Elles visent à reproduire 
visuellement la fonction à la fois explicative et normative des dictionnaires, 
en tant qu’ouvrages de référence proposant des traductions jugées bonnes 
ou adéquates. Comme dans un dictionnaire, chacune des trois colonnes 
démarquées dans ma traduction explique le concept dont il est question : 
respectivement l’analytique négative, l’analytique positive et la critique des 
traductions. Or comme elles fournissent les variantes d’une même explication, 
ces colonnes établissent aussi des équivalences entre elles, c’est-à-dire entre 
le texte de Berman, la traduction de Venuti et ma traduction de la version de 
Venuti. L’explication s’opère donc à la fois de façon monolingue, au sein de 
chacune des trois colonnes en question, et de manière interlinguistique, dans 
le passage d’une colonne à l’autre. 
Dans le domaine journalistique, les colonnes renvoient souvent par 
métonymie à une tribune critique, une rubrique de journal dans laquelle une 
personnalité exprime publiquement ses opinions sur un sujet d’actualité. Une 
tribune est habituellement l’œuvre d’une personnalité externe à la rédaction. 
Elle exprime une voix distincte de celle du journal. Elle énonce, pour ainsi 
dire, le jugement d’un « étranger ». Au-delà de sa fonction comparatiste, la 
mise en page exploite donc la dimension journalistique des colonnes pour 
souligner la composition tripartite de cette traduction, à la fois compte-
rendu, analyse et critique.
Chez Berman, l’acte traductif est lui-même un acte de jugement, une tribune 
dans laquelle le traducteur exprime son interprétation de l’œuvre originale 
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et sa position par rapport aux traductions précédentes lorsqu’elles existent. 
Pour lui, la retraduction est un acte critique à part entière : « Toute traduction 
est défaillante, c’est-à-dire entropique, quels que soient ses principes. (…) La 
retraduction surgit de la nécessité non certes de supprimer, mais au moins 
de réduire la défaillance originelle » (Berman 1990 : 5). Cette retraduction 
réflexive des concepts d’analyse négative, positive et critique préconisés par 
Berman propose d’explorer formellement et conceptuellement le potentiel 
évaluatif, analytique et critique de l’acte traductif conçu comme jugement.
Analytique (négative)
Mon analyse de la traduction de Venuti repose sur le critère d’évaluation 
négative énoncé par Berman dans ce passage, c’est-à-dire le système de 
déformation textuelle qui opère dans toute traduction et qui l’empêche d’être 
« l’épreuve de l’étranger ». Il s’agit d’identifier et de signaler les déformations 
qui, dans le texte de Venuti, effacent la particularité du texte source. Or 
juger les changements opérés selon les critères proposés par Berman est plus 
complexe qu’il n’y paraît. Doit-on considérer la traduction d’«  épreuve  » 
par « trial » comme une déformation de la spécificité du texte d’origine ou 
bien comme l’actualisation de sa singularité ? Qu’en est-il du remplacement 
d’« épreuve » par « jugement » dans ma traduction ? Et comment établir la 
particularité du texte source en premier lieu ?
Le choix de «  trial  » par Venuti reproduit en partie la polysémie de 
l’original «  épreuve  » mais il la déplace, puisqu’il en accentue le caractère 
évaluatif («  trial  »). Ma traduction amplifie cet aspect en proposant de 
traduire « trial » par « jugement ». A chaque étape traductive le mot semble 
ainsi acquérir un sens de plus en plus spécifique, de moins en moins ambigu. 
Les traductions d’« épreuve » par « trial » et « jugement » seraient en ce sens des 
exemples de clarification et d’appauvrissement qualitatif – deux des douze 
tendances déformantes décrites par Berman dans ce texte. Or, dans les deux 
cas, si la traduction déforme la singularité du mot « épreuve », elle actualise 
en même temps son utilisation particulière dans ce contexte, en incarnant 
l’aspect évaluatif de l’approche traductive et analytique bermanienne.
L’instance la plus marquante de « déformation textuelle » dans la traduction 
de Venuti se trouve, me semble-t-il, dans la substantivation de l’adjectif 
« analytic ». Dans « the analytic of translation », l’épithète anglais est utilisé 
comme un substantif par mimétisme avec l’expression française « analytique 
de la traduction », employée par Berman. Or le nom « analytique » n’a pas 
d’équivalent grammatical en anglais. La traduction de Venuti reproduit donc 
la spécificité du texte source mais il introduit une distorsion grammaticale 
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qui n’existe pas dans le texte original : il déforme en conservant. La 
traduction de Venuti montre indirectement que la déformation est inévitable 
en traduction, qu’elle fait partie (comme l’indique Berman lui-même dans 
ce passage) de tout processus traductif – d’où mon choix de la traduire par 
«  déformation de la traduction  » et de la signaler visuellement par une 
déformation de la police.
(Ma traduction)
Je propose d’analyser 
brièvement le système de 
déformation textuelle qui 
opère dans toute traduction 
et qui l’empêche d’être « le 
jugement de l’étranger ». 
J’appellerai cet examen 
analytique la déformation 
de la traduction. Analytique 
dans les deux sens du 
terme – analyse détaillée 
du système déformant, et 
donc analyse dans le sens 
cartésien, mais aussi dans 
le sens psychanalytique, 
puisque le système est 
largement inconscient, 
comme ensemble de 
tendances ou forces qui 
conduisent la traduction 
à dévier de sa visée 
pure. L’analytique de la 
traduction est ainsi conçue 
pour découvrir ces forces 
et montrer où elles sont 
pratiquées dans le texte (…).
(Venuti 2004: 278)
I propose to examine 
briefly the system of textual 
deformation that operates 
in every translation and 
prevents it from being a 
“trial of the foreign.” I shall 
call this examination the 
analytic of translation. 
Analytic in two senses of the 
term – detailed analysis of 
the deforming system, and 
therefore an analysis in the 
Cartesian sense, but also in 
the psychoanalytic sense, 
insofar as the system is 
largely unconscious, present 
as a series of tendencies or 
forces that cause translation 
to deviate from its essential 
aim. The analytic of 
translation is consequently 
designed to discover these 
forces and to show where in 
the text they are practiced 
(…).
(Berman 1985: 279)
Je propose d’examiner ici 
brièvement le système de 
déformation des textes qui 
opère dans toute traduction, 
et qui l’empêche d’être une 
« épreuve de l’étranger ». 
Cet examen, je l’appellerai 
l’analytique de la traduction. 
Il s’agit d’une analytique au 
double sens du terme : d’une 
analyse, partie par partie, de 
ce système de déformation, 
donc d’une analyse au sens 
cartésien. Mais aussi au 
sens psychanalytique, dans 
la mesure où ce système 
de déformation largement 
inconscient, se présente 
comme une série de 
tendances, de forces déviant 
la traduction de sa pure visée. 
L’analytique de la traduction 
se propose par conséquent 
de mettre à jour ces forces 
et de montrer les points sur 
lesquelles elles s’exercent (…).
Analytique (positive)
L’analytique positive décrite par Berman est une analytique négative 
renversée : il s’agit cette fois d’identifier et d’analyser les opérations qui 
limitent, et non pas favorisent, les déformations traductives. Il s’agit en 
d’autres termes de reconnaître les stratégies qui conservent la particularité 
du texte source au lieu de les effacer. Or, comme suggéré précédemment, 
définir la particularité du texte source est une tâche difficile et inévitablement 
subjective, qui se révèle d’autant plus complexe lorsque le texte source est lui-
même une traduction d’un texte théorique sur la traduction, comme c’est 
le cas ici. Car il faudrait pouvoir non seulement caractériser la singularité 
de l’original mais aussi évaluer la qualité de sa traduction. Selon quels 
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critères dois-je juger la traduction de Venuti ? Selon les principes énoncés par 
Berman ou selon l’interprétation qu’en offre son traducteur ? Et comment, 
dans les deux cas, faire abstraction de mon propre positionnement face à ces 
deux textes ?
Qu’elle soit positive ou négative, une analytique qui détermine la qualité 
d’une traduction exclusivement sur la base du maintien de l’étrangeté du 
texte source est problématique car inévitablement relative. Le système 
d’analyse préconisé par Berman devient obsolète si je l’applique à ma 
traduction, puisque le rapport propre/étranger de la première traduction 
s’y trouve remis en cause. Dans ce redoublement de l’acte traductif, le texte 
de Venuti devient à son tour étranger. En tant que traduction qui est elle-
même traduite, son texte occupe ainsi une position double : il est à la fois le 
« propre » et l’« étranger » d’un autre texte ; il est en même temps texte cible de 
l’original de Berman et texte source de ma traduction. Ma traduction n’est 
en ce sens ni propre, ni étrangère. Elle est à la fois propre et étrangère : elle est 
double, elle est un autre double du texte de Berman.
Dans ma traduction, l’analytique devient elle-même déformation – 
littéralement (le mot «  déformation  » remplace le terme «  analytique  »), 
formellement (le texte est décomposé sous forme de colonnes) et 
théoriquement (l’acte analytique déconstruit la théorie bermanienne). 
Ma traduction cherche par-là, d’une part, à reproduire la déformation à 
l’œuvre dans la substantivation du mot « analytic » par Venuti, et d’autre 
part, à souligner la nature déformante de toute analytique de la traduction. 
L’analytique préconisée par Berman semble ignorer qu’en proposant de 
révéler les déformations traduisantes, elle contribue en même temps à les 
créer.
Les douze tendances déformantes identifiées par Berman dans ce texte ne 
sont négatives que parce qu’elles sont perçues et présentées comme telles (cf. 
vulgarisation, appauvrissement qualitatif, appauvrissement quantitatif, 
destruction des rythmes, etc.). La terminologie évaluative employée par 
Berman pour décrire ces tendances établit un cadre analytique binaire et 
prescriptif selon lequel l’altération du texte source est appréhendé en termes 
péjoratifs et la résistance au changement de façon positive. Or la traduction 
est par définition dé-formante dans la mesure où elle dé-(fait) le texte source 
pour le (re)-former. La question n’est donc pas de savoir si les choix effectués 
sont bons ou mauvais selon qu’ils limitent ou non les déformations, mais 
d’analyser ce que disent et font ces transformations.
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En traduisant « critique des traductions » par « critique of translations » au 
lieu de « translation criticism », par exemple, Venuti choisit de reproduire le 
terme français « critique » à la lettre, au lieu de lui substituer son homologue 
anglais «  criticism  ». Ce choix n’est ni bon ni mauvais en soi, puisque les 
deux termes sont acceptables en anglais. Ce qu’il montre, en revanche, c’est 
l’effort de Venuti de coller à la lettre de l’original et la priorité qu’il donne 
à l’exigence de littéralité revendiquée par Berman. Dans sa traduction de 
Pour une critique des traductions, Massardier-Kenney préfère quant à elle 
traduire critique par « criticism » qui, explique-t-elle, est la traduction du 
sens général du terme tel qu’il est employé dans la tradition romantique 
allemande à laquelle Berman s’affilie. Ici, chaque traduction opère une 
déformation, non pas au sens péjoratif du terme mais dans la mesure où elle 
engage un choix face à la pluralité des traductions possibles.
Dans ce projet traductif, et contrairement à Berman, l’analytique n’est 
pas conçue comme une analyse évaluative des déformations opérées au 
cours de l’acte traductif, mais comme une activité elle-même déformante, 
traduisante. Ainsi l’analyse voile en même temps qu’elle dévoile. En 
donnant une autre forme aux textes qu’elle incarne, elle les révèle autant 
qu’elle les dissimule. Elle en accentue certains aspects, et par-là en tempère 
d’autres. En soulignant le choix de «  critique  » par Venuti, par exemple, 
ma traduction met de côté ses autres décisions, comme celle d’accentuer 
«  negative  » par l’italique ou de remplacer «  analytique positive  » par 
« counterpart ». Mon approche de la traduction comme acte analytique et 
de l’analyse comme acte traductif substitue ainsi à la critique binaire de 
Berman (successivement négative puis positive) une analytique productive, 
dans laquelle les déformations traductives ne sont pas perçues en termes 
défavorables mais représentées visuellement, incarnées formellement, dans 
un but critique.
Dans ma traduction, la critique devient criticisme au sens kantien, c’est-à-
dire une forme d’examen qui vise à dépasser l’opposition traditionnelle entre 
empirisme et rationalisme. Dans la théorie kantienne de la connaissance, 
le criticisme stipule que si l’être humain ne peut pas connaître la vérité des 
choses en soi (noumènes), il peut expliquer ce qu’elles sont pour soi – ce qu’elles 
représentent pour lui (phénomènes). De même, ici, le criticisme désigne une 
pratique d’investigation des phénomènes traductifs qui refuse de s’instituer 
en juge, préférant au contraire incarner son propre positionnement et 
contribuer tangiblement aux déformations qu’elle décrit. Mon approche 
répond ainsi indirectement à l’appel de Berman en faveur d’une critique qui 
ne soit « ni simplement descriptive, ni simplement normative ».
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(Ma traduction)
Cette analytique négative 
devrait être accompagnée 
d’une contrepartie positive, 
une analyse des opérations 
qui ont toujours limité la 
déformation, bien que de 
manière intuitive et non-
systématique. Ces opérations 
constituent une sorte de 
contre-système destiné à 
neutraliser, ou atténuer, les 
tendances négatives.
Cette analytique rendra 
possible en retour un 
criticisme  –  une critique 
des traductions qui ne soit ni 
simplement descriptive, ni 
simplement normative.
(Venuti 2004: 278)
This negative analytic 
should be extended by 
a positive counterpart, 
an analysis of operations 
which have always 
limited the deformation, 
although in an intuitive and 
unsystematic way. These 
operations constitute a sort 
of counter-system destined 
to neutralize, or attenuate, 
the negative tendencies. 
The negative and positive 
analytics will in turn enable 
a critique of translations that 
is neither simply descriptive 
nor simply normative.
(Berman 1985 : 279)
Cette analytique, négative, 
devrait être prolongée par 
une analytique positive, soit 
une analyse des opérations 
qui, de tout temps, mais 
d’une manière intuitive et 
asystématique qui a limité 
leur portée–ont constitué 
une sorte de contre-système 
destiné à neutraliser, ou 
à atténuer, ces tendances 
négatives. Analytique 
négative et analytique 
positive devraient à leur tour 
permettre une critique des 
traductions qui ne soit ni 
simplement descriptive, ni 
simplement normative.
Critique des traductions
Pour Berman, l’analytique positive et l’analytique négative sont le point de 
départ de ce qu’il appelle la critique des traductions, c’est-à-dire une approche 
critique productive qui ne soit «  ni simplement descriptive ni simplement 
normative  ». Cette démarche, que Berman développe plus en détail dans 
Pour une critique des traductions, s’apparente étrangement à la méthode 
réflexive adoptée ici qui, elle, ne vise non pas à émettre un jugement évaluatif 
sur la qualité des traductions existantes ni à justifier ses propres choix en 
fonction d’un critère normatif, mais à explorer les manifestations, la portée 
et les limites de la critique des traductions proposée par Berman. Il ne s’agit 
donc pas de dire si les choix traductifs (en l’occurrence ici de Venuti) sont 
bons ou mauvais mais d’examiner ce qu’ils peuvent provoquer en moi : leurs 
effets potentiels et ma position par rapport à eux. Dans une telle démarche, 
le jugement n’est plus une évaluation des déformations, mais une analyse 
déformante. Ainsi, on se fait juge non pas dans le sens d’une impartialité 
présumée, mais plutôt dans un sens à la fois analytique (une critique des 
causes et des effets possibles d’une traduction dans un contexte donné) et 
performatif (une analytique productive reposant sur une proposition de 
choix alternatifs). Dans une telle démarche la traduction présente non 
pas un jugement de valeur absolue sur les traductions précédentes, mais 
son propre jugement, à la fois partiel et subjectif, contingent et relatif, 
indéfiniment ouvert à l’ajout potentiel d’une autre traduction, d’une autre 
colonne, d’une autre critique – la possibilité de cet autre jugement ajournant 
continuellement l’acte du jugement dernier.
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Dans l’extrait qui suit, l’acte traductif devient lui-même un acte analytique, 
une tribune dans laquelle je mets en analyse les textes de Venuti et de 
Berman, non pas en en dévoilant les aspects cachés pour les en libérer, mais 
en énonçant mon rapport à eux. Ce que j’exprime dans cette colonne, c’est 
l’inanité d’une analyse visant à révéler ou à étouffer les forces déformatrices 
à l’œuvre dans une traduction. Prenant pour point de départ l’argument 
de Berman selon lequel seule une «  mise en analyse  » de la pratique 
traductive permet de neutraliser l’inconscient, ma traduction amplifie le 
questionnement esquissé par la formulation hypothétique de Venuti « if the 
unconscious is to be neutralized » en substituant à l’analyse prétendument 
neutralisante de Berman une analytique transformatrice, qui voile en 
découvrant et dévoile en recouvrant. Cette ambivalence est représentée 
visuellement par un surlignage en gris, qui couvre autant qu’il signale. 
(Ma traduction)
Berman souligne ici 
un point essentiel : les 
déformations traductives 
sont non seulement 
inévitables mais aussi ce 
qui pousse inconsciemment 
les traducteurs à traduire. 
Il faudrait donc d’après 
lui examiner ces forces 
inconscientes pour s’en libérer. 
Or en devenir conscient ne 
suffit pas. Pour les neutraliser, 
Berman suggère, il faut 
mettre en analyse la pratique 
elle-même. C’est précisément 
ce que j’essaie de faire dans 
cette colonne : mettre la 
traduction en « analyse ». 
Mais pas dans l’espoir d’en 
« révéler » les aspects cachés 
ou d’en « neutraliser » les 
forces inconscientes. Ici, 
l’analyse est un acte lui-même 
transformateur, qui ne peut 
révéler qu’en dissimulant.
(Venuti 2004: 278)
The negative analytic 





imitation, adaptation, free 
rewriting), where the play 
of deforming forces is freely 
exercised. Every translator 
is inescapably exposed to 
this play of forces, even if 
he (or she) is animated by 
another aim. More: these 
unconscious forces form part 
of the translator’s being, 
determining the desire to 
translate. It is illusory to 
think that the translator 
can be freed merely by 
becoming aware of them. 
The translator’s practice 
must submit to analysis if 
the unconscious is to be 
neutralized.
 (Berman 1985: 279)
L’analytique négative 
concerne au premier chef les 
traductions ethnocentriques, 




libre) où le jeu des forces 
déformantes s’exerce 
librement. Mais en réalité, 
tout traducteur est exposé 
à ce jeu de forces, même s’il 
est animé d’une autre visée. 
Plus: ces forces inconscientes 
font partie de son être de 
traducteur, déterminent 
son désir de traduire. Il est 
illusoire de penser qu’il peut 
s’en délivrer en en prenant 
simplement conscience. 
Seule une « mise en analyse » 
de son activité permet de les 
neutraliser.
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C. Vers une critique des traductions
Ce troisième et dernier volet consacré à l’œuvre d’Antoine Berman aborde 
la traduction de Pour une critique des traductions (1995) par Françoise 
Massardier-Kenney, ouvrage publié en anglais sous le titre  : Toward a 
Translation Criticism (2009).
Ce choix signale de front une lecture spécifique du texte bermanien. « Toward » 
évoque effectivement une idée de mouvement, de direction, comme si cette 
critique n’était jamais entièrement réalisable ou complète, mais toujours 
en devenir, tournée vers («  toward  ») et productrice d’autre chose. J’ai 
décidé de reproduire cet effet dans ma version du titre (« Vers une critique 
des traductions ») car dans ma démarche, les actes critique et traductif ne 
sont pas une finalité, un objectif à atteindre ou un désir à réaliser, mais un 
processus d’investigation, de réflexion et de création, indéfiniment ouvert.
Par ailleurs, Massardier-Kenney substitue au pluriel de l’original (Pour une 
critique des traductions) le singulier de « translation criticism », dans lequel 
le substantif « translation » est antéposé à « criticism » et fonctionne comme 
un adjectif. Cette décision suggère que la critique en question a pour objet le 
concept de traduction au sens large et théorique, plutôt que les traductions 
réelles dans leurs manifestations concrètes et multiples. Ce choix diffère de 
celui de Venuti qui, dans « Translation and the Trials of the Foreign » (2000), 
décide de maintenir le pluriel en traduisant cette même expression par «  a 
critique of translations ». Dans ma traduction, j’ai choisi de conserver le pluriel 
de la formule bermanienne pour souligner l’aspect tangible de cette démarche 
critique, telle qu’elle est développée par Berman et mise en pratique ici à travers 
cette (non-)traduction réflexive d’extraits de Toward a Translation Criticism.
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Translation as self-reflection
Productive criticism
Berman’s project of a productive criticism stems from his observation that 
existing analyses of translation lack an autonomous form and distinct 
methodology.19 His purpose is to develop a method that is specific to 
translation and that can bring to light its capacity for self-reflection.20 In 
Toward a Translation Criticism, he describes the analytical practice that 
he advocates in the following terms:
I mean a discursive structure sui generis, adapted to its subject (the 
comparison between an original and its translation[s]), a form 
sufficiently individuated to be distinguished from other types of 
analysis. I also mean a form that is self-reflecting, that thematizes 
its specificity and, thus, produces its methodology; a form that does 
not only produce its methodology but attempts to found it upon an 
explicit theory of language, of the text, and of translation.21
The reflexive approach deployed in this monograph responds very closely 
to the analytical methodology called for by Berman. Using translation 
as a tool for critical reflection, the reflexive method is a discursive 
structure adapted to its subject (theories calling for greater reflexivity 
in translation); it is sufficiently individuated to be distinguished from 
other types of analysis (since it comments by reflexive enactment rather 
than by analysis alone); and it is a self-reflecting form that thematises its 
specificity and produces its own methodology (which varies according 
to the theory it proposes to enact). At once an analysis and an extension, 
an enactment and a commentary, a practice and a theory, the reflexive 
approach discussed and developed in this book exemplifies Berman’s 
idea of productive criticism, ‘a criticism that would not only explain and 
conserve, but that would be productive itself’.22
The reflexive method is a form of theory-in-the-making. It produces 
theories through the act of translating itself. As seen in previous 
chapters, performing a theory reflexively also involves going beyond 
its contexts and confines, responding to it, commenting on it. Through 
the reflexive lens, the translating act becomes the locus of a metatext 
that develops by enactment its own translation theory. The reflexive 
method echoes Berman’s description of translation criticism as an 
inquiry which ‘attempts to realize itself as a productive, life-giving, 
critical act’.23 In both approaches, works need the mirror of criticism 
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‘to communicate themselves, to manifest themselves, to accomplish 
themselves and perpetuate themselves’.24 If, as Berman argues, criticism 
is essential to fulfilling the ethical purpose of translation (as opening, 
dialogue and mise en rapport), then to what extent does the reflexive 
method, as a possible form of productive criticism, accomplish such an 
ethical aim? This question is central to my inquiry in this chapter. In the 
previous section, I presented back-translations of three texts by Berman, 
following Berman’s own claim that, as criticism of previous translations, 
retranslating is an ethical act which ‘makes translations visible as what 
they are (i.e. translations belonging to a specific time, a specific state 
of literature, language, culture, etc.)’.25 Retranslations are ethical in 
Berman’s view because they highlight their own historicity as critical 
reflections of prior texts. In response, my back-translations of Berman’s 
texts show that translating is a contingent, reflective and critical act, 
regardless of whether it is a retranslation or not. 
Back-translating Berman’s work into French does certainly function 
as a commentary on its previous translations – namely Stefan Heyvaert’s 
The Experience of the Foreign, Lawrence Venuti’s ‘Translation and the 
Trials of the Foreign’ and Françoise Massardier-Kenney’s Toward a 
Translation Criticism. My decision to conserve both interpretations of 
the term épreuve as ‘experience’ (Heyvaert) and as ‘trials’ (Venuti) in 
my back-translation of the title (L’expérience de l’Autre ou le jugement 
de l’étranger) enacts Berman’s idea of translation as an extension of the 
source text (as revealing its other sides), signalling overall the multiple 
meanings and possible interpretations of the word épreuve. As such, 
my translation also indirectly highlights the partiality of the readings 
underlying the prior translations, each of which focuses on a specific 
interpretation of Berman’s theory: Heyvaert’s choice of ‘experience’ 
expresses a psychoanalytic reading, whereas Venuti’s ‘trials’ emphasises 
the cultural issues at stake. And yet, my refusal to choose between these 
two interpretations, and my choice to keep them both in my translation, 
is just as partial as Heyvaert’s and Venuti’s decisions. Like the two other 
translations, my choice focuses on and emphasises a specific aspect of 
Berman’s theory: his idea that translation should function as a developer 
and multiplier of the original.26 In maintaining both interpretations 
of the term épreuve in the title, and furthermore adding a subtitle in 
reference to a third work, my back-translation expands Berman’s theory 
by actualising its various possible readings, and ultimately suggests that 
translating is always an interpretative act, regardless of whether it is a 
first, second or third translation. 
The reflexive approach adopted in my translation of Berman’s 
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texts, then, is no less partial than non-reflexive translation methods. 
Translating reflexively does not so much consist in applying a theory back 
on itself, as enacting one’s own understanding of a theory or concept 
when translating it into another form – starting with the selection of 
concept(s) to be investigated and performed. In the case of my reflexive 
translations of Berman, for example, I decided to focus on the concepts of 
analytics of translation, productive criticism and retranslation, precisely 
because of their resonance with the reflexive method. In fact, the 
selection of concepts to be enacted and performed forms a crucial part 
of the interpretative and critical work at play in a reflexive approach to 
translating translation theory, which my compilation of back-translated 
fragments of Berman’s work aims to represent. Choosing to assemble 
extracts from various texts, instead of following the linear structure of a 
specific work, seeks to highlight the interventionist nature of translating 
as a process of decision-making. It also raises the question of the limits of 
any thinker’s theory, and therefore of how to best translate it. Where does 
a concept like productive criticism begin and end? Should the translator 
translate the theorist’s whole body of work? Should she also take into 
account the theorist’s own practice as a translator? And what if this 
theory differs from his practice, as in Berman’s case?27 More generally, to 
what extent should a translator draw on any other knowledge she has of 
the work of a theorist and of its context to translate it into another form 
or idiom?
In the introduction to her translation of Pour une critique des 
traductions, Massardier-Kenney makes clear that her approach to 
translating Berman’s book into English was deliberately performative – 
that is, informed by Berman’s own translation theory. ‘The principles I 
used to translate Berman’s text’, she explains, ‘were those proposed by 
Berman in the text itself.’28 Even though it is seemingly similar to my 
own approach, however, Massardier-Kenney’s performative practice 
differs in that it does not thematise its own partiality. For identifying 
and interpreting the principles proposed by Berman in the text itself is 
not straightforward. While opting ‘for clarity and directness’ following 
‘Berman’s own avoidance of jargon and technical terms’, Massardier-
Kenney also acknowledges ‘the presence of this tension between 
[Berman’s] lucid prose and some terms that may seem jargony’.29 Her 
translation strives ‘to preserve his fluid, direct, clear style’ while at 
the same time trying to ‘keep some specialized terms when […] their 
precision of expression seem[s] integral to Berman’s thought’.30 Here, 
‘Berman’s thought’ is in fact inseparable from Massardier-Kenney’s 
own reading of it, for her translation of Berman’s theory also gives an 
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indication of her own view of translation, based on her interpretation 
of Berman’s hermeneutic approach. ‘[E]very translation is at the same 
time an interpretation’, Massardier-Kenney stresses in her introduction, 
quoting Gadamer,31 to explain Berman’s concept of translation criticism, 
thus echoing Berman’s own claim that ‘[t]here is no translator without 
a translating position’.32 Like any translation, reflexive translations 
are the product of a decision-making process, which reflects in return 
the translator’s own perception of the source text. The relation to this 
prior text, or to the ‘Other’, as Berman calls it, is therefore never just a 
movement of opening in translation, but is also ineluctably a return to 
oneself. As such, reflexivity in translation is in fact inseparable from self-
reflexivity. 
Self-reflexivity
It is indeed as a means towards increased self-knowledge and self-
awareness, rather than as a simple opening towards the Other, that 
Berman’s ethics of translation based on reflexivity must be understood. 
In Berman’s theory, critical reflexivity – the pre-condition for the 
actualisation of an ethical approach to translation – does not so much 
give access to the foreign, as he claims, but rather reinforces a sense of 
selfhood. Despite its call for a ‘reflection on the properly ethical aim of the 
translating act’ which would involve receiving the ‘foreign as foreign’,33 
Berman’s theory at best enables ‘self-recognition’.34 For Berman, an 
ethical approach to translating involves transforming the translating 
language by accentuating the foreignness of the foreign work; and 
yet, Berman admits, the foreign text becomes intelligible only through 
‘mirroring’ and ‘reflection’, when the reader recognises himself or herself 
in the translation.35 As Barbara Godard further explains in ‘L’Éthique du 
traduire: Antoine Berman et le “virage éthique” en traduction’: 
Berman, en somme, ne s’intéresse pas à l’Autre en tant qu’Autre 
dans toute sa discontinuité historique, ni à l’Autre en tant que 
radicalement Autre et hétérogène comme Levinas, mais à l’Autre du 
Même, l’Autre absorbé par le Même dans son devenir ou Bildung, ce 
mouvement circulaire du ‘passage par l’étranger pour accéder au 
propre’ qu’il avait lui-même tant critiqué.36
Berman, in other words, is neither interested in the Other as Other, 
in its historic discontinuity, nor in the Other as radically Other, like 
Levinas, but in the Other of the Same, the Other incorporated in 
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the Same, in its becoming or Bildung, in this circular movement 
of ‘passing through the foreign to reach the self’ which he had so 
much criticised.37
For Godard, Berman is less concerned with the ‘Other as radically Other’ 
than with the ‘Other as Same’, in a circular movement which consists 
of ‘passing through the foreign in order to reach the self’.38 Ultimately 
then, I argue that in Berman’s theory, a reflexive, analytical approach to 
translation is considered ethical not because it establishes a relation to 
the Other but because it reveals one’s own positioning in relation to this 
Other. 
My reading of Berman’s theory suggests that an ethical translation 
for him is not a translation that makes readers aware that they are 
reading a translation, but one that makes translators aware of their 
own positioning in relation to the source text and culture. In putting 
self-reflexive criticism at the centre of an ethics of translation, Berman’s 
approach echoes Pierre Bourdieu’s emphasis on self-reflexivity as crucial 
‘to keep[ing] closer watch over the factors capable of biasing research’.39 
For Berman,
[e]very translator has a specific relationship to his own activity, a
certain conception or perception of translation, of its meaning, its
purpose, its forms and modes. Conception and perception are not
purely personal, since the translator is indeed marked by a whole
historical, social, literary, and ideological discourse on translation
(and on the writing of literature). The translating position is, so to
speak, the compromise between the way in which the translator
(…) perceives the task of translation, and the way in which he
has internalized the surrounding discourse on translation (the
norms).40
In Berman’s theory, a self-reflexive study of translation is essential for 
fulfilling translation’s ethical aspiration towards self-knowledge. This is 
why, in Berman’s view, the ethics of translating must be complemented 
by an analytic of translation in the psychoanalytic sense. According to 
Berman, the translator has to ‘subject himself to analysis’ to ‘localise 
the systems of deformation that threaten his practice and operate 
unconsciously on the level of his linguistic and literary choices’.41 One 
could almost call this, he stresses, a ‘psychoanalysis of translation’.42
Berman’s analytics of translation are rooted in the Benjaminian 
conception of translation as a potentiation of the original. ‘Every text 
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to be translated’, Berman explains, ‘presents its own systematicity, 
encountered, confronted, and revealed by the translation’.43 As ‘a sui 
generis form of criticism [that] lays bare the hidden structures of a text’,44 
translation calls for an analytical approach which would bring to light 
the system of deformation that prevents it from fulfilling its ethical 
aim, which is ‘to open up in writing a certain relation with the Other, 
to fertilize what is one’s Own through the mediation of the Other’.45 
Berman’s analytics are primarily negative: they consist of identifying a 
bad translation, one ‘which, generally under the guise of transmissibility, 
carries out a system of negation of the strangeness of the foreign work’.46 
Berman does stress the need for a positive counterpart, but he does not 
explicitly formulate what it would entail. In fact, the only operation 
that combines the negative and positive analytics which, according to 
Berman, can form the groundwork for a critique of translations that is 
‘neither simply descriptive nor simply normative’, is retranslation.47 
Retranslation constitutes the best form of analytics for Berman, one which 
at once allows a criticism of prior translations and offers the possibility 
for better alternatives to existing translations. Reflection must be the task 
of analysis, he argues: ‘to criticize in all fairness the translator’s choices, 
(…) to open the horizon for other choices, other solutions’.48 In his view, 
it is only through a succession of retranslations that the work can actually 
reach ‘its whole and utter “revelation”’.49 In fact, in Berman’s theory 
retranslating represents an analytical process in the psychoanalytic sense 
of uncovering a hidden or repressed truth, of making the unconscious 
conscious. Through its analysis of prior translations, he perceives that 
retranslation would liberate translation from its deforming drive, and 
allow it to uncover latent aspects of the original. 
In the same way as the principal aim of psychoanalysis is to unleash 
unconscious thoughts, retranslating for Berman should seek to give rise 
to the voice of the Other, to the foreignness of the original suppressed in 
prior translations. It is all the more important to ‘liberat[e] the violence 
repressed in the [foreign] work [by] accentuating its strangeness’ since, 
for Berman, history abounds with examples of ethnocentric translations:
A superficial glance at the history of translation suffices to show that, 
in the literary domain, everything transpires as if [ethnocentric] 
translation came to usurp and conceal [literal translation]. As if it 
were suddenly driven to the margins of exception and heresy. As 
if translation, far from being the trials of the Foreign, were rather 
its negation, its acclimation, its ‘naturalization.’ As if its most 
individual essence were radically repressed.50
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Hence the necessity for reflection on the properly ethical aim of the 
translating act.51 The repressed status of translation, the negation of 
its essence as access to the foreign, creates the need for an analytic of 
translation ‘that shows how (and why) the aim has, from time immemorial 
(although not always), been skewed (...) and assimilated to something 
other than itself’.52 It is in this sense that, for Berman, retranslating 
exemplifies an ethical practice of translation: 
The ‘solutions’ brought by each translator to the translation of a 
work (which depend on their respective projects) are so varied, so 
unexpected, that they introduce us, during the analysis, and almost 
without any other comment, to a dual plural dimension: that of 
translation, which is always that of translations in the plural, and 
that of the work itself, which also exists in the mode of an infinite 
plurality. Through the work of analysis, the reader is thus freed 
from any naiveté or dogmatism.53
Retranslating always involves a level of critical reflexivity, according to 
Berman. It is the heightened expression of the reflexive essence of all 
translation. 
And yet, ironically, in Berman’s analytics the reflexive essence of 
translation as opening to the Other can only be realised as self-recognition 
and a return to oneself. My own experience of back-translating Berman 
has shown me that reflexivity in his theory, like in the reflexive method 
adopted to translate it, is indeed inseparable from self-reflexivity. While 
retranslating Berman reflexively and attempting to enact his analytics of 
translation performatively, I experienced much uncertainty concerning 
the concepts of own/foreign, self/Other, ethnocentric/estranging. Who 
was the ‘Other’ in my retranslation of Berman’s work: Berman’s original 
text or its respective readings by Heyvaert, Venuti or Massardier-Kenney? 
How can one pinpoint the foreignness of a text if translation is essentially 
a hermeneutic act, an interpretation, an endeavour to understand the 
Other? And, assuming that such otherness can be identified, how must 
one translate it into another form: by sticking to the letter of the original 
(as Heyvaert often does, choosing to reproduce the passive tone and 
grammatical structure of Berman’s text) or by giving it another form 
(as I have done in many places, preferring, for example, to actualise the 
empowerment of translation called for by Berman through the use of 
reflexive verbs)? What I encountered in the process of back-translating 
Berman was the ineffectiveness of striving to free translation from its 
‘ethnocentric’ impulse, and the irrelevance of such a term revealed in 
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the process of back-translation. I experienced the futility of attempting 
to translate Berman’s work without interpreting it; the impossibility of 
stepping outside my own understanding of, and critical stance towards, 
his texts. I found myself limited by Berman’s ‘system of deformations’, 
unable to judge the translations by Heyvaert, Venuti and Massardier-
Kenney according to Berman’s analytics – that is, without also deforming 
(and giving another form to) the theoretical aspects enacted.54 What I 
developed and expressed while back-translating Berman’s texts was 
in fact my own relation to, view of, and position towards Berman’s 
translation theory and its prior translations. 
The recurring references to psychoanalysis in Berman’s translation 
theory are not arbitrary. Berman’s circular approach, which views 
translating as the construction of one’s identity by the means of a 
speculative encounter with the Other, directly echoes Lacan’s concept 
of ‘mirror stage’. In Lacan’s critical reinterpretation of the work of 
Freud, the ‘mirror stage’ refers to the process through which an external 
image of the body (reflected in a mirror, or represented to the infant 
through the figure of another person) produces a psychic response that 
gives rise to the mental representation of an ‘I’: the infant identifies 
with the image, which serves as the basis for her emerging perception 
of selfhood.55 Berman’s theorisation of translation in L’épreuve de 
l’étranger follows a similar structure, since for him translation is the 
operation through which a culture becomes aware of its own identity: 
‘The formulation and the development of a national culture of its own 
can and must proceed by way of translation, that is, by an intensive 
and deliberate relation to the foreign.’56 For Berman, the ethical aim of 
translation as critical reflexivity is a mode of self-discovery: it is a detour 
via the Other which heightens self-awareness. However, contrary to 
Berman’s theory, in Lacan’s account self-recognition can never be fully 
achieved, or completed. For, in seeing her behaviour reflected in the 
mirror or in the imitative gestures of the other person, the subject is 
also confronted with the unreality of her own identity (the fact that her 
sense of selfhood is an illusory, fictional construction). This specular 
moment, which is not just an epoch in the history of the individual 
but an operation of identification in which ‘the battle of the human 
subject is permanently being waged’,57 establishes self-formation as a 
substantially alienating experience. In fact, a psychoanalytic approach 
to translation, and to research on translation, would indicate that if 
reflexivity can bring about increased self-knowledge, as Berman argues, 
it also requires recognising the illusory, partial and incomplete nature 
of such knowledge. 
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Uncertainty, undecidability, unknowingness
Berman’s theory states that analytical reflexivity, productive criticism 
and theoretical reflection on the experience of translating are necessary 
for an ethical translation practice – that is, for a better understanding of 
the ethical purpose of translating, and therefore for a potential liberation 
from its ethnocentric inclination. At the same time, however, Berman 
also acknowledges that becoming aware of the ethnocentric forces at 
play may not be enough to achieve the ethical aim of translation: 
The negative analytic is primarily concerned with ethnocentric, 
annexationist translations and hypertextual translations (pastiche, 
imitation, adaptation, free rewriting), where the play of deforming 
forces is freely exercised. Every translator is inescapably exposed 
to this play of forces, even if he (or she) is animated by another 
aim. More: these unconscious forces form part of the translator’s 
being, determining the desire to translate. It is illusory to think 
that the translator can be freed merely by becoming aware of them. 
The translator’s practice must submit to analysis if the unconscious 
is to be neutralized. It is by yielding to the ‘controls’ (in the 
psychoanalytic sense) that translators can hope to free themselves 
from the system of deformation that burdens their practice.58
For Berman, being conscious of ‘the play of deforming forces’ derailing 
translation from its ethical purpose is insufficient. To overcome 
ethnocentric impulses and neutralise unconscious forces, it is the 
practice itself that must submit to self-analysis. Only a self-reflexive study 
of translation is able to bring about such liberation, in Berman’s view. 
Hence his demand that translation should become its very own criticism, 
that it should move beyond its manifestation as practice to endorse its 
critical role as theory. ‘To say that the analysis, when moving through 
specific examples, is reflexive,’ he explains, ‘means that […] it always 
moves away from them to shed light at the proper distance, to look back 
on its own discourse and statements’.59 For Berman, a self-reflexive study 
of translation is essential for fulfilling translation’s ethical aspiration 
towards self-knowledge.
Berman’s call for disciplinary reflexivity bears a close resemblance to 
Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of reflexive knowledge in the field of sociology. 
In Science of Science and Reflexivity, Bourdieu advocates a self-reflexive 
approach whereby researchers would systematically ‘apply to their own 
practice the objectivating techniques that they apply to [their object 
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of study]’ in order to limit the effects of historical, social and cultural 
determinisms onto the knowledge acquired, and provide for a higher 
degree of freedom with respect to the social constraints that bear on the 
researcher.60 However, while seeking to develop a ‘reflexivity reflex’ in 
the social sciences, and personally engaging in self-analysis, Bourdieu 
also highlights the limits of reflexivity, showing that, ultimately, there 
is no neutral or outside standpoint from which the researcher can 
conduct her research.61 Researchers can never fully transcend their 
position because they cannot become aware of all the conditions that 
govern their choices and their positioning, even when such positioning 
seeks to overcome its own partiality through increased self-awareness. 
Self-knowledge is an impossible task, an unrealisable fantasy, as Judith 
Butler explains in Giving an Account of Oneself,62 not only because the 
subject and circumstances involved in the quest for self-knowledge are 
constantly changing, but also and perhaps more importantly because the 
unconscious is itself continuously evolving. Awareness, or the visibility, of 
hidden conditions is not necessarily liberating, because the very process 
of becoming aware of something or making something visible makes 
one unaware of or renders invisible something else. In other words, if 
reflexive approaches do bring about some form of self-knowledge, such 
knowledge remains both partial and resistant to measurement. 
Even when a researcher is not intentionally manipulative, her 
approach to and interest in reflexive translation strategies may themselves 
be influenced by factors of which she is unaware, or which are part of 
a mode of thinking of which she is unconsciously unwilling to divest 
herself. There is no solution to the limits of reflexivity – to the fact that I 
can never become aware of all the conditions that determine my decisions 
as a translator or as a researcher – nor even to the problem of delimiting 
the limits of reflexivity (for saying that there is no solution to the limits 
of reflexivity may itself be symptomatic not just of a partial but of a 
motivated stance). Acknowledging the limits of reflexivity does not mean 
negating the possibility of ethics, however. In fact, according to Judith 
Butler, experiencing one’s self-opacity requires that we establish another 
form of ethics, one that is not based on the idea of a transparent, self-
sufficient subject, but which rather accounts for its inability to establish 
fully the grounds for its own emergence. Recognising our incapacity ever 
to reach full awareness or self-knowledge is in itself ethical, for Butler, in 
that it creates a space for a generous and compassionate attitude towards 
others, with whom we share such an incapacity.63 Hence, ‘we must 
recognize that ethics requires us to risk ourselves precisely at moments 
of unknowingness’.64 Perhaps the greatest benefit of the reflexive method 
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adopted in my experimental translation of Berman’s theory, then, is its 
ability to make us experience the limits of self-reflexivity itself – since in 
attempting to translate a text reflexively we encounter the impossibility 
of enacting fully our understanding of the source text, and are forced into 
a tangible experience of our own foreignness to ourselves. 
The reflexive method presents a psychoanalytic approach to 
translating that displaces the concepts of ‘Self’ (Propre) and ‘Other’ 
(Étranger). As Monique Schneider explains: 
Dans l’itinéraire freudien, l’étranger a (…) changé de place; il n’est 
plus rencontré comme porteur de cette menace qu’il s’agirait, soit 
de rejeter au dehors, soit de laisser circuler; il fait soudain corps 
avec l’investigateur lui-même. Ce n’est plus l’autre que Freud 
rencontre comme étranger, c’est lui-même qui se retrouve placé, 
du moins tel qu’il se voit dans le regard de l’autre, en position 
d’étranger.
65In the Freudian itinerary, the foreign has (…) changed places; it is 
no longer perceived as bearing a threat which the subject would have 
to either repel, or allow to circulate; it suddenly becomes one with the 
investigator himself. It is no longer the other that Freud encounters as 
foreign, but himself which gets relocated, at least in the way he sees 
himself in the eye of the other, into the position of foreigner.66
From a psychoanalytic and clinical perspective, alterity does not refer 
to an external entity that the subject encounters and then needs to accept 
or reject; it rather designates the specular operation of reflection through 
which we experience our own foreignness to ourselves. In psychoanalytic 
theory this operation is primarily linguistic, since the relation Subject–
Other takes place in language.67 Self-opacity itself is a symptom of our 
obscure relation to language – of the fact that the language we learn and 
speak is never entirely ours. We learn and speak a language that precedes 
us, even though we act as though it belonged to us, as though it was ours. 
Our identification with language can therefore never be fully complete: 
‘one shall never inhabit the language of the other’, Derrida reminds 
us, ‘when it is the only language that one speaks’.68 Putting us face to 
face with the impossibility of encountering the Other fully, with our 
incapacity to experience the Other other than as an otherness within our 
own selves, the reflexive method confronts us with our shared condition 
as linguistic beings whose relation to ourselves – to our intentions, to 
our hopes, to our ideas – is never transparent. Mediated by the ‘only one 
language’ that I speak and which ‘is not mine’,69 my understanding of the 
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world, of others and of myself appears, through the reflexive lens, in all 
its obscurity, partiality and indeterminacy. 
The reflexive method adopted in my back-translation of Berman’s 
works highlights its own incapacity to realise itself completely, making 
me experience the impossibility of performing Berman’s theory other 
than as a partial positioning towards it. The reflexive method occasions a 
redefinition of ethics and reflexivity in translation. It shows that reflexivity 
can only be achieved partially and negatively – that is, by acknowledging 
its own impossibility. Reflexivity in this sense does not consist of striving to 
secure visibility, awareness or self-knowledge; it involves recognising that 
anyone’s task as a translator, or as a researcher on translation, is inescapably 
incomplete, indefinite and fragmentary. And it is precisely in its capacity 
to make us experience the limits of reflexivity that the reflexive method is 
at its most pertinent. If as Berman argues, ‘the properly ethical aim of the 
translating act’ is to ‘receiv[e] the foreign as foreign’,70 then admitting one’s 
own limitations as a translator or as a translation scholar constitutes the first 
step towards developing an ethical practice of translation. For, as Judith 
Butler suggests, following Levinas, receiving the Other as Other means 
accepting that its otherness will fatally remain Other, unknowable. In this 
context, ethics resides in the putting into question of the ego, the knowing 
subject, self-consciousness.71 
A deconstructionist, psychoanalytic approach to translation entails 
questioning the very assumption that reflexivity secures ethics. It means 
recognising the element of uncertainty at play in any translating task, 
admitting that translation and research on translation always incurs a risk: 
the risk of unknowingness. Unknowingness – or undecidability – opens up 
the possibility of ethical decision-making, according to Derrida, for ‘it is in the 
undecidable moment (when […] one does not know what to decide), that 
any proper decision can occur’.72 In Derrida’s philosophy, undecidability is 
at once the reason why a decision can never be absolutely rational, objective 
and predictable, and the very condition for responsible decision-making:
A decision in this sense is never simply an attempt to make the 
‘right’ (and therefore already decided) choice from predetermined 
or ‘presented’ options. It necessarily entails responsibility because 
it ‘can only come into being in a space that exceeds the calculable 
program that would destroy all responsibility by transforming it into a 
programmable effect of determinate causes. (Derrida 1988: 116).
Only when faced with an impossible decision – one for which a pre-
existing ‘right’ choice is not ‘presented’ – do we decide.73
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It is because a decision remains heterogeneous to the calculations, 
knowledge and consciousness that nonetheless condition it that it 
can be considered ethical. Drawing from Levinas’s philosophy of 
alterity, as developed notably in Humanism of the Other, Derrida’s 
concept of undecidability suggests that ethics may only be experienced 
interrogatively as unknowingness and self-opacity. ‘Could it not be 
argued’, Derrida asks, that ‘decision and responsibility are always of the 
other? They always come back or come down to the other, from the other, 
even if it is the other in me?’74 Responsible decision-making is haunted 
by alterity and the impossibility of an encounter with it. It is a moment of 
madness, which establishes every human decision as both accountable to 
the person making it and the expression of her own self-opacity. 
This does not mean that one should make blind decisions, however. 
On the contrary: ‘One must know as much as possible, one must 
deliberate, reflect, let things mature’, Derrida affirms. But, ‘however 
careful one is in the theoretical preparation of the decision, the instant 
of the decision, if there is to be a decision, must be heterogeneous to 
this accumulation of knowledge. Otherwise, there is no responsibility’.75 
Derrida does not reject or deny calculation altogether. In fact, there has 
to be some calculation, he claims. ‘Still, calculation is calculation’, he 
continues. ‘And if I speak so often of the incalculable and the undecidable 
it’s not out of simple predilection for play in order to neutralize decision: 
on the contrary, I believe there is no responsibility, no ethico-political 
decision that must not pass through the proofs of the incalculable or the 
undecidable’.76 In a deconstructionist approach to translation generally, 
like in the reflexive method in particular, responsible decision-making 
takes place as critical interrogation, wherein being critical does not mean 
selecting from pre-existing options or judging according to transmitted 
rules, but deciding in the strong sense – that is, by taking a risk. The 
act of decision-making by which the translator becomes responsible for 
her translation, and which makes her decision ethical, is not entirely 
knowable or understandable at the moment of decision-making. For an 
ethical translation cannot be programmed or predicted; it can only be 
assumed, and invented, in the act of translating itself.
Conclusion: from reflexivity to risk-taking
Berman’s theorisation of translation as reflexive criticism establishes 
a hermeneutic approach to reflexivity in translation, doubled by 
disciplinary self-reflexivity. For Berman, translating is essentially a 
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reflexive activity that is not possible without an interpretative reading of 
texts, without the elaboration of a rational system of choices.77 A reflexive 
study of translation is therefore crucial for realising the interpretative 
essence of translation as opening to the foreign – for Berman, the 
ultimate ethical aim of any translation act. As a form of productive 
criticism, which analyses the translation process through the activity of 
(re)translating, the reflexive approach adopted in my back-translations 
of Berman’s works exemplifies the theoretical reflexivity he champions, 
its limitations as well as its ambition. It shows that his understanding of 
translational reflexivity does not so much give access to the foreign, as 
he claims, but rather yields a return to oneself that is itself never fully 
complete. In this relation, my reflexive approach also highlights its own 
limits as a method that can only be realised negatively as self-reflexivity.
The purpose of Berman’s ethics of translation is to provide increased 
self-knowledge and self-awareness. In contrast, a deconstructionist 
approach to translating shows that if reflexivity can bring about increased 
self-knowledge, this is the knowledge of partiality and self-opacity. Like 
the operations of language, translation and research on translation are 
a never-ending process of deferral, which, however reflexive they might 
be, remain fatally incomplete, partial and open. ‘Even if one knows 
everything’, as Derrida suggests, ‘the decision, if there is one, must 
advance toward a future that is not known, that cannot be anticipated’.78 
‘If one anticipates the future by predetermining the instant of decision’, 
he continues, ‘then one closes it off, just as one closes it off if there is no 
anticipation, no knowledge “prior” to the decision. At a given moment, 
there must be an excess or heterogeneity regarding what one knows for a 
decision to take place, to constitute an event’.79 And this is why, according 
to Butler, ethics requires us to risk ourselves precisely at moments of 
unknowingness. 
My translation of Berman’s texts is conceived as an experiment in the 
risks of unknowing. It proposes to theorise, by enactment, the limits of 
an ethics of translation based on reflexivity. As such, it presents in turn a 
critical practice that gives priority to responsibility over knowledge – or, 
in Levinasian terms, an approach to translation ethics wherein ‘[e]thical 
testimony is a revelation that is not a knowledge’.80 From this perspective, 
translating reflexively involves encountering the elusiveness and 
incompleteness of any experience of alterity – that of language, of others, 
of oneself. In a reflexive translation, the Other is not a foreign culture, 
or a national identity, but our universal linguistic estrangement: the fact 
that, as Lacan suggests, there is no metalanguage,81 no space outside 
language from which I can neutrally observe and describe language.82
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Far from negating the possibility of an ethics of translation, to 
acknowledge the limits of reflexivity is in fact to foster an ethical 
attitude that accounts for the subject’s incapacity to comprehend the 
range of the conditions informing her decisions and their consequences. 
Experiencing the limits of self-reflexivity as a shared human condition 
enables an ethics of translation based on uncertainty and vigilance. 
Training translators who understand the limits of reflexivity is essential 
in developing an ethical approach to translation that recognises its 
shortcomings and values humility. Moreover, putting translators face to 
face with their own self-opacity serves to make them experience, albeit 
negatively, the value of self-reflexive decision-making, on the condition 
it is embraced in its incompleteness and in its imperfect realisation. For, 
crucially, acknowledging in oneself the limits of self-reflexivity does not 
mean abandoning reflexivity altogether. Being critical about the ability 
of reflexivity to realise its purpose is itself a form of reflexive thinking 
– one that invites translators and researchers to welcome continual self-
interrogation, humility and compassion. 
In this respect, the reflexive method engaged in these back-
translations of Berman’s work proves a useful critical tool, wherein 
translating is itself perceived as an act of self-interrogation (recognition 
of one’s own limits), an experience of humility (uncertainty towards 
one’s own decisions) and an opening to the Other (risking ourselves 
at moments of unknowingness). In the reflexive method, analysis is a 
productive activity wherein decision-making, and hence risk-taking, 
takes place in the singularity, and incalculability, of each translation 
event. Responsibility is experienced as an enactment of one’s own 
understanding and response to a text, and yet this responsibility can 
only be apprehended as becoming, evolving, being open to that which 
cannot be predicted, to unforeseeable encounters with unknown 
readers. In this framework, translation ethics are no longer understood 
as the experience or the trials of the foreign, but as the proofs of the 
incalculable through which one becomes responsible – proofs which, like 
a tentative impression of a page, invoke the transitory state of something 
still to come. Translating reflexively means pushing a text beyond itself, 
beyond its own boundaries, and in the process abandoning ourselves to 
the Other, calling for the Other to take us beyond ourselves. 
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Conclusion
Towards self-critical engagement in 
translation
The possibilization of the impossible must remain at one and the 
same time as undecidable – and therefore as decisive – as the 
future itself. Without the opening of an absolutely undetermined 
possible, without the radical abeyance and suspense marking a 
perhaps, there would never be either event or decision. Certainly. 
But nothing takes place and nothing is ever decided without 
suspending the perhaps while keeping its living possibility in living 
memory. If no decision (ethical, juridical, political) is possible 
without interrupting determination by engaging oneself in the 
perhaps, on the other hand, the same decision must interrupt the 
very thing that is its condition of possibility: the perhaps itself.
 Jacques Derrida1
(Self-)reflexivity
This book has given insight into translation theories that call for greater 
reflexivity in translation, and sought to map the various aspects of 
reflexivity brought into focus in each case. It has shown that whether 
relying on the visibility of a text’s translation status (Venuti), dialogic 
creativity (Bassnett), reflective decision-making (Meschonnic) or self-
awareness (Berman), the reflexive approach championed in each case 
is conceived in opposition to non-reflexivity: transparency, fidelity, 
mechanicity and repression. My experimental approach in this book has 
revealed that in practice the distinction between reflexivity and non-
reflexivity is more unstable, ambiguous and fuzzy than these theories 
tend to suggest, since in translation visibility produces invisibility; the 
translator’s response constitutes a new address; mechanicity is criss-
crossed by indeterminacy, and self-knowledge includes awareness of self-
opacity. 
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I began this book by asking whether reflexivity could be systematised 
so as to foster an ethical practice of translation. In response, I have 
argued that reflexivity, as described by Venuti, Bassnett, Meschonnic and 
Berman, cannot bring about and secure the empowerment of translation 
that they seek. Each of their theories strives to establish a reflexive 
approach that would enable translators to welcome the Other as Other, 
whether through foreignization, intimate dialogue, creative poetics 
or retranslation. However, instead of instigating an ethical opening 
towards the Other, the radically different, the unknown, these reflexive 
systems end up operating a circular return to the Self, whether through 
self-reference, self-discovery, self-reflection or self-knowledge. My 
exploration in this volume has indicated that in these views reflexivity 
is inseparable from self-reflexivity, even though it is not recognised or 
theorised as such.
The reflexive method has highlighted the difficulty, and yet the 
necessity, of distinguishing clearly the reflexive from the self-reflexive 
in translation. The reflexive act of folding a theory back on itself 
through translation reflects something about the translator herself, her 
interpretation of the texts translated and her view of translation, her self-
reflexivity. Moreover reflexivity, attending to the theories of others, I have 
suggested, not only invokes self-reflexivity, enacting my own perception 
of their texts, but also manifests as an experience of the limits of that 
self-reflexivity itself: the impossibility to encompass or control the factors 
driving my own decisions as a translator. Instead of calling for greater 
reflexivity in translation, the reflexive method as I have developed it 
here acknowledges both the intricate imbrication of reflexivity and self-
reflexivity in translation, and the necessity to maintain their difference. 
This work has redefined reflexivity in translation in terms of an 
impossible self-reflexivity. Throughout the practical as well as the 
discursive components of this book, reflexivity has been theorised as 
an experience of uncertainty, indeterminacy and undecidability. Unlike 
translation theories that advocate greater transparency, the reflexive 
method as I have investigated it suggests that reflexivity can only be 
apprehended negatively, at moments of hesitancy, ambiguity and self-
opacity. The main difference between the reflexive method practised 
here, as opposed to translation theories that call for reflexivity, is that 
my practice reveals the limitations of the empowering value that such 
theories attribute to reflexivity itself. Instead of asserting that reflexivity 
can make up for the lack of neutrality in translation, my reflexive method 
shows that no amount of highlighting, pointing or self-awareness can 
secure an ethical practice of translation. 
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The reflexive approach advanced and practised in this book does not 
claim to conquer bias. Rather, it suggests that no practice of translation 
or research on translation can provide an antidote to the limits of self-
reflexivity, or enable translators to overcome partiality. Furthermore, it 
emphasises the futility of such an ambition, and self-critically examines 
its own powerlessness to fulfil the fantasy of a stable, systematic approach 
to translation ethics. As I have tried to demonstrate throughout this 
volume, the reflexive method offers more than a reflexive approach: it is 
a critical and self-critical translation practice, which invites translators, 
translation scholars and trainers to welcome continual examination, and 
to interrogate self-interrogation itself. 
In investigating the particular form of reflexivity involved in the 
translation of translation theory, this book has challenged on multiple 
levels translation theories that identify reflexivity with ethics. Going 
beyond the opposition reflexive vs. non-reflexive, by redefining reflexivity 
in relation to self-reflexivity, it has sought to develop an experimental 
translation practice which is at once critical and self-critical, rather than 
simply reflexive. Furthermore, the reflexive method engaged throughout 
this volume has introduced practical examples of a deconstructionist 
approach to translation, as well as playful tools for engaging with theory 
in the classroom. In the rest of this conclusion, I would like to draw 
this work to an end by further demonstrating what I believe to be the 
greatest contribution of the reflexive method to translation studies, both 
as a working deconstructionist practice of translation and as a creative 
translation pedagogy. 
A deconstructionist approach
The reflexive method inspired by Jacques Derrida’s approach in ‘Des Tours 
de Babel’ proves a uniquely productive tool for exploring the applicability 
of theories calling for greater reflexivity in translation. Playing particular 
theoretical approaches off against each other by translating them in line 
with their own guiding principles provides a way of engaging with theory 
which is at once practical and critical, experimental and analytical. Each 
of the experiments in translation I have presented here uses the process 
of translating to question current approaches to reflexivity in translation, 
while proposing a tentative alternative. My foreignizing translation of 
Venuti’s The Translator’s Invisibility theorises reflexivity not as an attempt 
to secure, through foreignization, the visibility of a translation’s status as 
translation, but rather as an attempt to take into account the potential 
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failure of that performative gesture. Similarly, my open letter to Susan 
Bassnett extends her description of translation as an intimate dialogue 
between author and translator, and presents reflexivity in translation 
as a responsive enactment of a prior utterance. Furthermore, in my 
experimentation with machine translation, the word ânonnement, which 
in Meschonnic’s account signifies the lack of reflection characteristic of 
automated translation, comes to symbolise the hesitation underlying any 
decision-making process in translation, whether or not it is carried out with 
the help of computation. Lastly, my analytical back-translations of Antoine 
Berman’s works question the possibility of an ethical translation practice 
based on self-awareness, and strive to redefine reflexivity in translation as 
an experience of uncertainty and incalculability.
Using translation to take these texts beyond the theoretical aporias 
within them, my reflexive method is framed within a deconstructionist 
approach that views translation as ‘a conserving-and-negating lift’,2 
a work of recontextualising which both suppresses the original and 
extends it, erases it and goes beyond it. The reflexive method is a form of 
deconstructive writing which, as Derrida suggests,
must inevitably partition itself along two sides of a limit and 
continue (up to a certain point) to respect the rules of that which 
it deconstructs or of which it exposes the deconstructibility. Hence, 
it always makes this dual gesture, apparently contradictory, which 
consists in accepting, within certain limits – that is to say, in never 
entirely accepting – the givenness of a context, its closedness and its 
stubbornness [sa fermeture et sa fermeté].3
Deconstruction’s double critical movement of preservation and 
transformation consists of undoing a system in order to understand it and 
reconstruct it on new bases. Like deconstruction, the reflexive method is 
a productive form of criticism, which generates new practices out of the 
aporias of established theories. As I practise it here, the reflexive method 
creates foreignizing, responsive, hesitant and analytical translations out 
of the impossibility of performing the concepts of foreignization, dialogic 
translation, reflexive decision-making and self-reflexive analysis. In the 
reflexive method, like in Derrida’s deconstructionist approach, theories 
are produced as responses to anterior theories: ‘every text is a text upon 
a text (…) any theory is another text in an unstable network of texts in 
which every text bears the traces of all the others’.4 The reflexive method 
develops on the basis of, and in distinction from, reflexive translation 
theories. It uses the conserving-and-negating movement of displacement 
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characteristic of translation to unsettle translation theories that call for 
an ever-greater accumulation of reflexivity in translation. The reflexive 
method, as I have developed it here, displaces the theories it enacts, takes 
them beyond the realm of literary translation and nudges them towards a 
broader disciplinary context.
Using theory as praxis and praxis as theory, the reflexive method 
brings out the partial nature of performative translation endeavours, 
including my own. It shows that a reflexive performance of another 
text through translation cannot be achieved, in the sense of secured or 
sustained, for in its attempt to represent the other text a translation marks 
the absence of that text, displacing it into another context, subjecting it 
to the translator’s stance. My attempt to fold a theory back on itself by 
translating it into another form indicates that reflexivity in translation can 
only be experienced negatively, as a partial and subjective performance, 
as an incomplete representation of one’s own understanding of a 
text. And yet, as a method unable to provide a privileged viewpoint 
of heightened self-awareness or neutrality, the reflexive method is 
negatively self-reflexive and in that way illuminating. Embracing its 
own partiality as a subjective, critical enactment of a specific translation 
theory, the reflexive method enables a critical form of self-reflexiveness 
that highlights the unpredictability at play in translation processes. My 
experimentation with reflexivity in this book suggests that the major asset 
of a deconstructionist approach to translation is, ironically, its ability to 
make translators experience the limits of their own self-reflexivity.
Ultimately, the reflexive method indicates that an ethical translation 
practice can neither be systematised nor secured, but only intimated 
during the singular experience of attempting (and failing) to translate 
a text in a reflexive way. Translating reflexively shows that an ethical 
decision cannot be programmed, since it is incalculable, and the non-
calculable is itself unpredictable. Translating reflexively takes place 
beyond established parameters, but also testifies to them, including those 
formulated by the author of the source text. In my deconstructionist 
redefinition of reflexivity, a decision taken in formulating a translation 
is reflexive, and thus ethical, when it involves uncertainty – when it 
acknowledges its own limits as a partial and partly intuitive choice that 
exceeds the translator’s full understanding. The moment of reflexivity 
in translation is now a critical moment when the subject does not know 
what to decide but must decide nevertheless. It is the moment when, 
unable to follow a given translation theory or strategy, she must create 
something new, invent something which is not viable: a contradiction, 
like the foreignizing translation. In my reflexive method, like in Derrida’s 
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deconstructionist approach more broadly, from which it is drawn, ‘the 
condition of possibility of the thing called responsibility is a certain 
experience and experiment of the possibility of the impossible’.5 In this 
perspective, the translator becomes responsible when she experiences, 
practically and experimentally, the possibility that translating reflexively 
might be beyond the translator’s reach. This moment is also, as I 
experienced while writing this book, one in which I submit myself to the 
unpredictable, to the viewpoint of that which I cannot know or foresee, 
calling upon the Other, the unknown reader, to take the reflexive method 
beyond its own limits. 
The reflexive method is criss-crossed by many contradictions. It is a 
performative way of engaging with texts which stages the failure of its 
own effort to exhaustively perform another text. It is a form of theorising 
and a method of translating that highlights the limits of translation 
methodology itself. Like the deconstructive gesture that inspired it, 
the reflexive method is neither an analysis nor a critique. In ‘Letter to a 
Japanese Friend’, Derrida explains:
[Deconstruction] is not an analysis in particular because the 
dismantling of a structure is not a regression toward a simple 
element, toward an indissoluble origin. These values, like that of 
analysis, are themselves philosophemes subject to deconstruction. 
No more is it a critique, in a general sense (…). The instance of 
krinein or of krisis (decision, choice, judgment, discernment) is 
itself, as is all the apparatus of transcendental critique, one of the 
essential ‘themes’ or ‘objects’ of deconstruction.6
The reflexive method in translation is not an analysis in the sense of 
discovering something pre-existing, but in the sense of formulating a new 
perspective on the text translated. It is not a critique of prior theories, 
nor does it seek to propose a definitive form that reflexivity should take 
in translation. Rather, the reflexive method in translation interrogates 
the possibility of achieving reflexivity itself. In other words, it is not 
defined in opposition to the non-reflexive, but delves into the viability 
of that opposition. However, as an instrument of critical and self-critical 
investigation, the reflexive method is itself subject to the exigencies of 
self-reflexivity. It recognises that no amount of experimentation can 
ensure self-awareness, or undermine the effects of self-identity, or 
establish a theory impervious to future challenge. 
The reflexive method addresses rather than evades the aporias that 
it throws into relief: it strives to embrace its own contradictions, as an 
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operation that simultaneously does and does not constitute a method. 
Systematically folding a theory back on itself by translating it constitutes 
a method to the extent that it proceeds according to a rule as to how the 
translator should approach the task of translating the theory expounded 
in the text itself. However, the translation method used and explored in 
the process varies depending on the text investigated and its approach 
to translation – foreignization, intimate dialogue, machine translation, 
productive criticism, etc. The reflexive method functions by displacement 
and digression, detour and re-contextualisation, rather than through 
automatic pursuit of equivalence or the repetition of a procedure. In fact, 
the reflexive process shows that repetition and reproduction themselves 
contain an element of digression and displacement, an element which 
resists measurement. The reflexive method operates according to a 
certain undecidability, challenging method itself. As a process embedded 
in the particular, its significance is constructed in the singularity of 
each translation task. It is a method which highlights, and allows us 
to experience, the impossibility of systematising an ethical practice of 
translation.
But the reflexive method in translation is not simply a systematised 
transgression. It is not an attempt to systematise displacement, criticism 
or interrogation, but is rather a process which demonstrates that 
displacement and critical engagement occur regardless of the translator’s 
or the researcher’s intentions. Paradoxically, reflexivity is also and 
inevitably unreflexive, partly unthinking and unconscious. It arises as a 
response to a singular encounter with a text, a contingent interaction with 
it, a particular translating experience. Reflexivity as such is not something 
that the subject can secure or direct, but a gesture, a movement, a process 
of interrogation which must be made to cease for any decision to take 
place. It is a mechanical operation which exceeds programming, in that 
paradox lies its pertinence. As a response to Derrida’s deconstructionist 
approach to translation, it shows that translating concepts involves 
undoing them, transforming them. Unlike interpretations of Derrida’s 
work that focus on the notion of untranslatability (defining translatability 
in terms of assimilation by the Other, as opposed to untranslatability, 
the experience of the Other as Other), my understanding of his thought 
suggests that untranslatability takes place in the process of translating, 
and in the attempt and simultaneous failure to translate without 
displacing, transforming and recontextualising the text being re-enacted 
in the other language. Like deconstruction, the reflexive method is above 
all a process of translation triggered by the impossibility of translating 
faithfully and transparently, of enacting a text in both its form and 
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content, of performing it without making it different. The reflexive 
method shows that reflexivity is not something that can be inscribed in 
the translated text or secured through specific translation strategies, but 
is rather an experience of uncertainty that is integral to the process of 
translating. Ultimately, my experimentation with the reflexive method 
suggests that an ethical approach to translation is not something about 
which translators can learn cumulatively, applying that knowledge in the 
same way in different contexts; it is developed by each translator in the 
decisions she makes in the act of translation. 
In Exploring Translation Theories, Anthony Pym devotes a full 
chapter to what he calls theories of ‘indeterminacy’. At the end of the 
chapter, Pym recognises that, even though deconstructionist approaches 
to translation ‘offer very few guidelines that might be of practical use to 
translators’, they ‘could be of some practical consequence for the way 
in which translators are trained’.7 Pym does not go on to indicate how 
deconstruction could be used concretely in translator training. He does 
mention ‘productive use of translation within philosophical discourses’ as 
being ‘one of the paradigm’s most profound contributions’ to translator 
education,8 but he does not explain why, or what such ‘productive use’ 
would involve in practice. My exploration of the pedagogic applications of 
the reflexive method below seeks to address this question by providing a 
detailed account of the possible benefits and limits of a deconstructionist 
approach to training translators in higher-level education. The following 
section presents a summary of its main points.9 
Pedagogic applications
My experimentation with the reflexive method suggests that it is in its 
capacity to allow an experience of its own limits that the reflexive method 
is at its most productive. For reflexivity is not something that can be 
conveyed or transmitted, passed on securely to another; rather, it comes 
about as a singular experience of uncertainty inseparable from the very 
process of translating. The reflexive method is an incomplete, process-
driven approach embedded in the translator’s point of view. For that 
reason, it provides a uniquely effective instrument for teaching the values 
and limits of self-reflexive decision-making in translation. The attempt is 
not to pass on precedent knowledge, but to allow students to experience 
the limits of (self-)reflexivity through and as a translation process. 
The reflexive method offers an innovative, stimulating and playful 
way of engaging with theory. The gap between theory and practice has 
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long been discussed in translation studies, particularly in the pedagogy 
of translation, by scholars such as Hanna,10 Woodsworth11 and Rogers.12 
While many academics in the discipline (including Pym,13 Chesterman14 
and Baker15) recognise the need for theoretical knowledge, students often 
express a negative attitude towards theoretical training and tend to think 
that practice should be prioritised.16 Combining theory and practice, the 
reflexive method provides stimulating exercises which enable students to 
engage with theory in a practical way by translating the theoretical texts 
themselves. Translating theory in a reflexive way encourages students to 
learn theory by practising it, in so far as translating a concept involves 
attempting to understand it. The reflexive method invites students to 
interact with theories in form as well as content, highlighting the fact that 
translating involves a degree of theoretical engagement, since translating 
a text also requires positioning oneself in relation to it, and developing 
one’s own view of translation in the process. 
Using the reflexive method in an educational framework helps to 
allow students to experience the challenges of fidelity in translation. 
Striving to fold a theory back on itself encourages them to rethink the 
demand of fidelity in translation not in opposition to unfaithfulness 
or betrayal, but in terms of performativity, simultaneously saying and 
doing what the source text says/does. The aspiration to be faithful 
to the source text is challenged in such a practice, since the translator 
cannot perform a theory or concept (e.g. increase awareness of the text’s 
status as translation) without also negating it and/or going beyond 
it (e.g. in the act itself of pointing to translating). In accordance with 
a deconstructionist approach to performativity, the reflexive method 
shows that a performative translation of a theoretical concept involves 
displacing it, transforming it. Trying and failing to perform a theoretical 
text by simultaneously saying and doing what it says/does, students 
experience translation as a performative act rather than as ‘the transport 
of a semantic content into another signifying form’.17
Attempting to translate translation theory reflexively throws into 
relief the limits, incompleteness and contingency of the attempt to 
theorise translation in an objective way. It shows that the endeavour 
to explain or predict translation phenomena is embedded in a view of 
translation with its own limitations, internal contradictions and blind 
spots. The reflexive method teaches students that while being familiar 
with an existing theory will help them make better-informed decisions, 
in order to make effective use of theory they also need continuously to 
interrogate it in light of their own practice. What constitutes a theory is 
that it remains partial, open to question, open-ended and vulnerable to 
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refutation. The attempt to fold a theory back on itself allows students to 
experience the contingency of any given theory; it invites them to resist 
the temptation of applying theory unconditionally and indistinguishably 
from text to text. In other words, it encourages them to develop their 
own point of view and explore new possibilities of translation. As Pym 
explains, ‘theories provide translators with valuable tools not just to 
defend their positions but also to find out about other positions’.18 By 
getting students to translate translation theory reflexively, and making 
them experience the limits of such an ambition, the reflexive method 
helps them to develop a tangible form of theoretical vigilance.
The reflexive method teaches students that responsible decision-
making takes place in the singularity of each translation event. It presents 
a responsible decision as the result of a moment of indecision, a moment 
of reflection on the rules of reflection. It proceeds from a questioning of 
the strategies that are spontaneously formed in the act of translating. 
When translating reflexively, a decision must be made, almost invented; 
it cannot be calculated or programmed. Through the reflexive method 
students experience the uncertain, interrogatory nature of responsible 
decision-making in translation. They are encouraged to explore their 
own proposed solutions. To that extent, however, the moment of the 
decision, even as experienced through the reflexive method, interrupts the 
indeterminacy that makes that method possible, for ultimately translators 
must choose a translation. The reflexive method is not just an analysis or an 
exploration of hypothetical translations; it requires that students actually 
make a decision; it obliges them to decide without and beyond certainty. 
Translating reflexively shows students that uncertainty is indispensable 
to responsible decision-making, and that simultaneously a decision 
transcends the paralysing moment of indecision. It teaches them that a 
reflexive decision is also, partly and inescapably, unreflective, instinctive 
and intuitive, exceeding the decision maker’s prescription and intentions.
The reflexive method allows students to experience their own 
partiality in highlighting a concept within a given text and choosing to 
translate it in a certain way. It shows them that the manner in which a 
text is translated depends very much on the way the translator interprets 
it. By inviting students to translate a theoretical text according to their 
own understanding of that text, the reflexive method puts them face to 
face with their own role and agency as translators – emphasising the fact 
that translators are responsible for their translation, which necessarily 
reflects their own interpretation of a text, their subjective interaction with 
it and position in relation to it. As such, the reflexive method contributes 
to developing the students’ awareness of their role as translators – a key 
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objective of successful translator training, according to Donald Kiraly.19 
For Kiraly, this self-perception (or ‘self-concept’, as he calls it) is crucial for 
developing translator expertise because it provides translators with their 
own point of view to carry out the tasks.20 The mechanism of reflexivity at 
play in the reflexive method does certainly enable a heightened sense of 
self-awareness, a grasp of one’s own relation to and positioning toward 
the source text, but the self-awareness it brings about is incomplete and 
partial. The knowledge the reflexive method generates is the knowledge 
of partiality and opacity – of the impossibility of stepping outside one’s 
own perception.
The reflexive method shows that translating involves a double 
risk: the risk of misunderstanding the author and the risk of being 
misunderstood by the reader. Through the reflexive lens, translating 
therefore becomes an experience of double uncertainty. On the one 
hand, translators realise that their interpretation of the text is inevitably 
partial and subjective, determined by factors that exceed the frame of 
their awareness. On the other hand, they recognise that their imperfect 
rendering will in turn be interpreted in a subjective, intuitive or uncritical 
way. Training translators who understand the risks involved in translating 
is essential in encouraging them to take responsibility for their decisions. 
By inviting students to acknowledge the partiality of translation tasks 
and the uncertainties involved, the reflexive method requires them to be 
all the more daring and experimental in the choices that they make. It 
encourages them to analyse the possible implications of their decisions 
all the more thoroughly; it also teaches them to be humble about their 
work, open to the criticism of others (clients, readers, collaborators, etc.) 
and forgiving towards the errors or contradictions of fellow translators or 
critics, starting with those of the texts translated critically and reflexively.
Interest in the ethical dimension of translation has boomed in 
the past decades,21 and yet in most classrooms the ethos of neutrality 
still prevails.22 For Baker and Maier, ‘educators need to engage far 
more directly and explicitly with the issue of ethics and build it into 
the curriculum’.23 In their view, in order to encourage students to 
take responsibility for their decisions, teachers must refrain from 
prescribing strategies or specific courses of action: ‘Building ethics into 
the curriculum means opening up a space for critical reflection, training 
students to think through the consequences of their behaviour, rather 
than telling them what is right or wrong per se.’24 The reflexive method 
closely responds to this approach. By showing that the ethical decision 
cannot be taught, programmed or calculated, but that it emerges in the 
moment of translating itself, the reflexive method enables a teaching 
156 REFLEXIVE TRANSLATION STUDIES
practice which recognises that ‘ethical decisions can rarely, if ever, be 
made a priori but must be understood and taught as an integral and 
challenging element of one’s work’.25 The reflexive method teaches ethics 
by showing that ethics cannot be taught. As such, it provides ‘a space of 
experimentation and reflection’ where students are free to explore any 
argument and encouraged to decide responsibly.26 
As a method that changes according to the text it translates, the 
reflexive method also emphasises the singularity of translation tasks 
as unique events embedded in an individual, historical experience. 
The reflexive method highlights that performing a given strategy or 
concept to the letter is impractical, for the significance of the strategy or 
scope of the concept enacted is itself subject to change, fluctuating and 
contingent. Translating reflexively exacerbates the unpredictable nature 
of translation, the impossibility of anticipating every translation problem, 
of predicting one’s own response to a particular challenge. When asked 
to translate translation theory performatively, students often realise 
that elements in their translation decisions exceed prediction.27 They 
are thereby brought to recognise that as professional translators (of 
literature in particular) they will have to face situations for which they 
will not have been prepared. 
Using the reflexive method means also, from an instructor’s 
perspective, acknowledging that, however thoughtful and thorough 
our training might be, it is itself limited. This is so not only because it is 
informed to a certain extent by our own partial and subjective experience 
of translation, but also because it cannot predict every translation 
situation, or the state of translation in the future – something which 
has become all the more apparent in recent years, considering the rapid 
evolution and growing impact of technology on the way we translate. The 
question, then, is how can we prepare translators for something which 
does not yet exist? The possibility offered by the reflexive method is to 
teach translation not by providing ready-made solutions but by engaging 
in a process of interrogation and discovery. Students are inspired to 
constantly challenge their own approach to translation and to remain 
open to the possibilities offered by the specific context of the translations 
they undertake.
In its attempt to foster a translation practice that enables flexibility 
and openness to the unknown, the reflexive method provides a pedagogy 
which is itself flexible and open. In Becoming a Translator, Douglas 
Robinson stresses the importance of developing a learner-centred 
training which is adapted to its audience, and which respects the learning 
preferences of each student:
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[T]ranslation is intelligent activity involving complex processes of 
conscious and unconscious learning; we all learn in different ways, 
and institutional learning should therefore be as flexible and as 
complex and rich as possible, so as to activate the channels through 
which each student learns best.28
The reflexive method allows students to engage with translation both 
theoretically and practically in their own and multiple ways. Translating 
a text reflexively will mean different things to different students. The 
reflexive method allows for plurality because it is a process-oriented 
pedagogy, which does not teach by showing, but through experience – 
the experience of failing to enact a translation theory exhaustively.
In ‘Ethics in Interpreter and Translator Training’, Mona Baker and 
Carol Maier describe the main objectives of effective translator education 
in the following terms:
First, training should aim to provide students with the conceptual 
tools they need to reason critically about the implications of 
any decision. This means engaging with some of the theoretical 
literature on ethics that can provide a coherent terminology and 
a means of reflecting on the pros and cons of particular ways of 
justifying behaviour (…). Second, training should enable students 
to identify a range of potential strategies that may be deployed to 
deal with ethically difficult or compromising situations (...). And 
third, educators need to develop a set of pedagogical tools that can be 
used to create an environment in which students can make situated 
ethical decisions, rehearse the implications of such decisions, and 
learn from this experience.29
The reflexive method fulfils every aspect of the above description and 
more: it provides students with the conceptual tools they need not only 
to reason critically about the implications of their decisions, but also to 
think critically about the tools themselves. It invites them not only to 
identify a range of potential strategies for dealing with ethical issues, 
but also to interrogate the usability of these strategies in a different 
situation. It provides a pedagogic tool which invites students to reflect on 
possible consequences and learn from experience, and to consider that 
a responsible decision cannot be programmed or calculated. In other 
words, it teaches the importance of both vigilance and risk-taking. 
As an educational tool, geared towards a flexible, learner-centred 
approach which celebrates student singularity and diversity, the 
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reflexive method is itself traversed by contingency and uncertainty. In 
translator education, great emphasis is placed on determining teaching 
objectives and learning outcomes prior to a session.30 However, if, as my 
experimentation with the reflexive method suggests, the effects of any 
reflexive project are contingent, then the benefits of the reflexive method 
itself are not entirely securable or sustainable. Teaching the limits of self-
reflexivity is contingent, for educating is as much an encounter with the 
Other, the unknown, as the experience of translating itself. I can spell 
out learning outcomes to students so as to influence them, but how they 
understand them, interiorise them and transform them over time is not 
something that I, as a tutor, can ensure or control, even if I wanted to. 
This challenge, which applies to any teaching approach and not only to 
the reflexive method, does not mean that the pedagogic benefits listed 
previously are immaterial, but only that their emergence is subject to 
instability, change and uncertainty. From the translator trainer’s point 
of view, the reflexive method makes evident the need for continual re-
evaluation and readjustment of teaching objectives.
Just like non-reflexive approaches, the reflexive method does not 
provide, nor does it seek to provide, an absolute truth, or an ultimate 
approach to teaching translation theory. True, its experimental, 
innovative mode of operation seems to fulfil many key requirements of 
effective translator training, including combined theory and practice;31 
a process-driven approach;32 a learner-centred pedagogy;33 flexibility;34 
intuition;35 self-perception;36 critical thinking; 37 and incalculability.38 
However, these effects are themselves, in part, incalculable. If, as Lynch 
argues, ‘attempting to be reflexive takes one no closer to a central source 
of illumination’,39 the benefits of the reflexive method themselves 
cannot be taken at face value. For, like non-reflexive approaches, the 
reflexive method is also flawed, imperfect and lacking. The experience of 
incompleteness that it triggers should therefore also be applied to itself, 
thereby drawing attention to the fact that parts of its learning outcomes 
may be irrelevant in certain contexts or proved wrong in particular 
situations. One of the dangers of such a reflexive pedagogy is that it 
can easily be misinterpreted as solving the contradictions that it raises, 
instead of being used to face them. 
The open-endedness of the reflexive method (the fact that the form 
of critical engagement and self-interrogation it triggers is indefinite) is 
perhaps its greatest challenge. The aporias it highlights are insoluble 
(if they can be elucidated it is only to a certain extent, by producing 
new aporias in the process). As Biesta points out in ‘Preparing for the 
Incalculable’: 
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The main problem of deconstruction, which has been the cause of 
many ‘misunderstandings’ and ‘misinterpretations’, lies in what I 
propose to call its reflexivity, i.e., the fact that its conclusions (which 
are by no means endings) constantly subvert its assertions.40
Even the sense of incalculability of the decision (the impossibility of 
programming the event) can be misleading, according to Derrida. In 
Without Alibi, he explains: 
Will this be possible for us? Will we one day be able, and in a 
single gesture, to join the thinking of the event to the thinking of 
the machine? Will we be able to think, what is called thinking, at 
one and the same time, both what is happening (we call that an 
event) and the calculable programming of an automatic repetition 
(we call that a machine)? For that, it would be necessary in the 
future (but there will be no future except on this condition) to 
think both the event and the machine as two compatible or even 
indissociable concepts. Today they appear to us to be antinomic. 
Antinomic because what happens ought to keep, so we think, some 
nonprogrammable and therefore incalculable singularity. An event 
worthy of the name ought not, so we think, to give in or be reduced 
to repetition.41
Derrida acknowledges that, if in his philosophy an event or decision can 
only emerge beyond calculation, it may still become programmable. 
My argument in this book has been that deconstruction in fact 
anticipates the emergence of a programmable event – of a system 
preparing for the incalculable and preparing to manage it. According 
to Derrida ‘deconstruction is not a method’ but a non-programmable 
‘event’ deconstructing itself.42 Equally, my reinterpretation of Derrida’s 
approach to translation, and transformation of it into a method of 
critical interrogation and a translation pedagogy, suggests that trying to 
systematise the event might itself be a useful and productive endeavour, 
if only for investigating the scope, degree and various manifestations 
of its incompleteness. In realising that it is impossible to programme an 
event, it might be possible to prepare for it. As Biesta explains: 
Just education – if such a thing exists – has to be on the outlook for the 
impossible invention of the other. The other, Derrida writes, ‘is not 
the possible.’ The other is ‘precisely what is not invented’ (Derrida 
1989: 59–60). This means that ‘deconstructive inventiveness can 
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consist only in opening, in uncloseting, destabilizing foreclosionary 
structures so as to allow for the passage toward the other’ (Derrida 
1989: 60). But one should not forget that one does not make the 
other come. One lets it come by preparing for its coming. Education, 
in short, must prepare for the incalculable.43
With deconstructive inventiveness, the reflexive method destabilises 
translation theory as a whole, and in doing so opens a passage towards 
the Other, towards something which is yet to come, new concepts, new 
practices and new pedagogies. The reflexive method displaces, limits and 
partialises Derrida’s performative translating endeavour in ‘Des Tours de 
Babel’ by attempting to systematise it. Moreover, the reflexive method 
itself can only move into different contexts, both within and beyond 
academia. Its effects cannot be fully predicted, nor secured, since every 
new interaction will occasion a different experience, a singular encounter. 
Further benefits and limitations of the reflexive method are yet to emerge 
from further acts of displacing, translating and re-contextualising – from 
experiences which I, in this moment of writing, can neither determine or 
foretell.
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In the past decades, translation studies have increasingly focused on the ethical 
dimension of translational activity, with an emphasis on reflexivity to assert the role 
of the researcher in highlighting issues of visibility, creativity and ethics. In Reflexive 
Translation Studies, Silvia Kadiu investigates the viability of theories that seek to 
empower translation by making visible its transformative dimension; for example, by 
championing the visibility of the translating subject, the translator’s right to creativity, 
the supremacy of human translation or an autonomous study of translation.
Inspired by Derrida’s deconstructive thinking, Kadiu presents practical ways of 
challenging theories that suggest reflexivity is the only way of developing an ethical 
translation. She questions the capacity of reflexivity to counteract the power relations 
at play in translation (between minor and dominant languages, for example) and 
problematises affirmative claims about (self-)knowledge by using translation itself as a 
process of critical reflection.
In exploring the interaction between form and content, Reflexive Translation Studies 
promotes the need for an experimental, multi-sensory and intuitive practice, which 
invites students, scholars and practitioners alike to engage with theory productively and 
creatively through translation.
Silvia Kadiu is a translator and academic. She is currently a Visiting Lecturer in the 
Department of Modern Languages and Cultures at the University of Westminster, London. 
She holds a PhD in Translation Studies from UCL, and is the author of several articles on 
translation theory, literary translation and translation pedagogy.
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